THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 JANUARY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977264
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 26, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
26 _January 1970
25
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY. BRIEF
26 January 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Vietnam
(Page 1)
Hanoi departed from the norm in .a recent broadcast
by praising the wisdom of past policies that led to
a cease-fire with the French. We review the content
and possible motivations behind this unusual broad-
cast in an annex.
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VIETNAM
A North Vietnamese broadcast last week contained
some of the most, intriguing hints yet of policy and
leadership trends in Hanoi since Ho Chi Miph's death.
Our preliminary views on the significance of the
broadcast are treated in today's annex.
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NORTH? VIETNAM
Hanoi has issued a variety of statements to
mark the 40th anniversary on 3 February of the Indo-
chinese Communist Party (now the Vietnam Workers'
Party). A North Vietnamese broadcast on 20 January
seems particularly significant, however, because it
contains an oblique suggestion that the Communists
might try to use the Paris talks to obtain a respite
in the fighting. The broadcast summarizes a recent
pamphlet commemorating the anniversary.
The passage with the. most. important implications
of Hanoi's intentions, is one which calls the signing
of a compromise "preliminary" agreement with France
in March 1946 a "very correct and clear sighted un-
dertaking of our party." That agreement provided,
among other things,, for a cease-fire, for the. return
of French forces to north and central Vietnam, and
for the opening of. political negotiations between, the
Viet Minh and France. It fell far short of what Ho
Chi Minh and his colleagues wanted at that time, but
they accepted the terms because they did not believe
they were in.a position to fight. The. Hanoi broad-
cast last week asserts that the March 1946 agreement
allowed the Communists to get, rid of one enemy (the
Chinese Nationalist troops then occupying part of
North Vietnam), and to concentrate on the struggle
against "the immediate and most dangerous enemy...
at the time" (i.e., the French). The agreement,
said the broadcast, enabled the Communists to pre-
pare their forces for a protracted resistance war,
which broke out later when negotiations with the
French failed.
It is highly unusual for Hanoi to cite the ef-
ficacy of negotiating a compromise agreement as a
means to gain time. To do so at present suggests
that the leadership believes there are opportunities
for applying similar tactics now, presumably in. the
context.of the Paris talks.
(continued)
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The broadcast on 20 January is also noteworthy
for its suggestions of current_Communist tactics in
the war and for changes in the North Vietnamese lead-
ership which probably have accompanied the adoption
of these tactics. The broadcast specifically cites
the so-called "August Revolution" of 1945 as a
"model" of how a revolutionary war should be con-
ducted. Hanoi has stressed this theme heavily in
recentmonths. The lessons it seems to:want,drawn
from that earlier period are that long, military and
political preparations must precede any successful
seizure of power, and that in South Vietnam the Com-
munists must now concentrate on such preparations
if they are, to be. in a position to exploit, favorable
openings in the future
Truong Chinhis the North Vietnamese _figure
most associated with the August Revolution,.and this
stress seems to reflect his rise to special promi-
nence inthe party hierarchy. The broadcast under-
scored this conclusion by linking Ho Chi Minh and
Truong Chinhwith,the "perfection" of party policies
for fighting a revolutionary war.
The broadcast also strengthens the impression
that Hanoi.has been trying to restore a better bal-
ance between the efforts designed to build up the
regime in the North and those devoted to fighting
the war in the South. The relative priority of
these two tasks has been the touchstone of debate
within- the leadership for the past decade. Since
late 1968,,the regime has swung toward re-emphasiz-
ing "building socialism" in the North and trying to
fight.the war in less costly ways that cannot be ex-
pected to produce quick results.
The broadcast treats this shift quite pointedly
by citing a party policy report delivered by first
secretary Le Duan in 1960. The broadcast asserts
that the report "made clear that the task of social-
ist construction in the north is the most decisive
task for the development of the revolution in our
country as a whole and for the cause of national
reunification of our people." The 1960 reportin-
deed contained such,a formulation, but it was art-
fully balanced by another sentence which stressed.
that the war in the south has a "direct and deci-
sive effect" upon the achievement of reunification
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and party objectives, throughout Vietnam. It thus
gave equal weight to the party's "two strategic
tasks," which the recent broadcast does not
Moreover, in associating Le Duan with such a
one-sided view, the. broadcast neatly obscured the
fact that in the past he has always been one of the
foremost spokesmen in underscoring that the.taskof
"building socialism" in North Vietnam must not be.
,used. to put limits on the war effort in South. Viet-
nam. Indeed,,Le Duan can be more readily identified
with those in the leadership who were willing to,
push the war effort, forward with less regard for its
impact on the north, and whose, views generally car-
ried the day through mid-19.68. There is no reason,.
of course, why Le Duan's position on this subject
could not have shifted.in recent,years, along with
the rest of the leadership. The broadcast is one
more reason to believe, however, that regardless of
where.individuals stand in the post-Ho hierarchy,
the new regime recognizes., that the policies pursued
through most of the 1960s have not paid off and, that
itis committed to going back, to some of the funda-
mentals.of fighting a "people's;war" which eventu-
ally allowed the Communists to prevail against .the
French.
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