THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 JANUARY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977256
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 21, 1970

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007900170001-2
The President's Daily Brief
21 January 1970
49
7S/91--44&
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
21 January 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
The level of North Vietnamese infiltration rose
sharply during the past ten days. (Page 2)
President Thieu has made several significant changes
in military command personnel/
// (Page 3)
Recent Soviet press articles that suggest increased
tension and politicking within the Kremlin leader-
ship are discussed on Page 4 and at Annex.
The Israelis last night made a retaliatory attack
across the Jordanian border, south of the Dead Sea.
(Page 6)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NORTHNIETNAM
The level of infiltration has risen sharply dur-
ing the past ten days. Analysis of: new infiltration
group designators strongly suggests that at least 13
battalion-size units entered the infiltration pipeline
in North Vietnam during that period. This rate is
much above that noted during the first ten days of
JanUary and represents an input of about 7,500 troops.
The continued appearance of infiltration
numbers in rough sequential order further
strengthens our belief that communications
intelligence is providing a reliable basis
for measuring infiltration. Altogether,
the number of North Vietnamese combat
troops believed to have entered the pipe-
line since late October now stands at more
than 28,000. Over roughly the same time
frame (November, December, and January) in
1968-69, there were 55,000 in the pipeline;
for the same period in 1967-68, there were
42,000.
The Communists are continuing to assign
the bulk of their new infiltrators to the
southern portions of South Vietnam, prob-
ably including the Mekong Delta region.
Most of these troops will be arriving at
their destinations during February, March,
and April.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007900170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00936A007900170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu has embarked on a significant
shake-up of key military commands. The chief of the
best division in the delta is taking over command of
the area around Saigon. His predecessor there, who
has done a creditable job of protecting the capital,
apparently is in line to be the new II Corps comman-
der. The chronically weak 7th Division, which is now
solely responsible for the upper delta since the de-
parture of US forces from that area, will be taken
over by an effective airborne brigade commander./
The needs of the Vietnamization program
probably lie behind these changes. Rather
than being politically motivated, they seem
to reflect a desire for more aggressive and
dynamic military leadership.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOVIET UNION
For the past several weeks, curious editorials
and articles discussing problems of leadership and
decision-making have been appearing in the Soviet
central press. No single article provides more than
an ambiguous hint of these problems. Cumulatively,
however, they suggest increased tension and politick-
ing in the leadership. The targets and critics are
still hard to identify, but the Soviet leadership
will bear especially close watching for the next few
weeks. A more detailed discussion of these articles
appears at Annex.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007900170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007900170001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
GREECE
King Constantine wants to return to Greece and
is willing to do so without setting Conditions on
the ruling junta.
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Constantine also said he would 50X1
like to meet with someone from the Greek Government
prior to his return. Foreign Minister Pipinelis,
a royalist holdover, told Ambassador Tasca on 19
January that he favors the King's return and has re-
peatedly urged Premier Papadopoulos to begin a dia-
logue with Constantine.
PapadopouZos may also favor the end of
Constantine's exile, but some members of
the regime do not. As a result, Papado-
pouZos will be reluctant to act on this
contentious issue without the full back-
ing of his associates.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007900170001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007900170001-2
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