THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 8 JANUARY 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977234
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: January 8, 1970

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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007900060001-4
The President's Daily Brief
8 January 1970
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
8 January 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Relatively few new North Vietnamese troops have en-
tered the infiltration pipeline during the past week.
Meanwhile, the heavy fighting currently under way ,
throughout much of South Vietnam probably foreshadows
the kind of tactics the enemy will emphasize over the
:short term. (Page 1)
The one-day general strike held in Saigon does not
appear to have caused any serious disruption. (Page 3)
The French Foreign Ministry claims that any eventual
arms contract with Libya will provide for a long lead-
time on the delivery of military supplies and strict
controls on their use. (Page 4)
Cambodian chief Of state Sihanouk has left for an ex-
tended stay in France, turning his back on a mounting
political challenge from opposition elements in the
government. (Page 5)
Sudan. (Page 6) 50X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
Relatively few new North Vietnamese troops have
entered the infiltration pipeline during the past
week. Seven new groups have been detected on the
move in North Vietnam. Only one group was of the
usual battalion strength; the rest were small, with
less than 100 in each group. Altogether the input
over the week amounted to about 1,000 troops.
Several more battalion-sized infiltration
groups, and a variety of very small groups contain-
ing fewer than ten people, have been noted in Laos.
At least some of the larger units are assumed to
have started south in November.
The small groups do not add substantially
to infiltration estimates, but their size
may belie their importance to the Commu-
nists. captured documents
have indicated that small groups often
contain specialists such as sappers, rock-
eteers, doctors, political action teams,
and other key additions to the Communist
apparatus in the South.
The infiltration estimate since late Oc-
tober, when the flow began to quicken, is
now fairly firm at roughly 21,000 men.
This figure is only half that noted dur-
ing the same period in 1968, but the dif-
ference becomes less important when the
destinations of the infiltrators are con-
sidered. For example, infiltration fig-
ures for November and December 1968 in-
cluded over 10,000 men believed to be in
regular North Vietnamese units that moved
into the Demilitarized Zone area but were
not committed to action for several more
months. Only about 4,000 men in this cat-
egory have been noted in the past two and
a half months. During the 1968 period,
about 14,000 enemy personnel earmarked
for the Saigon area entered the infiltra-
tion pipeline. This is only slightly
larger than the number of troops dis-
patched over the past two months to the
same area--some 12,000. Some of these
replacements probably will be used to
strengthen North Vietnamese regiments
that recently moved farther south into IV
Corps, as well as to replace in part the
losses sustained during the period in 1969
when infiltration reached unusually low
levels.
(continued)
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Heavy fighting continues throughout much of
South Vietnam as the second phase of the Communists'
winter-spring campaign, which apparently got under
way on 3-4 January, gathers momentum.
The latest actions probably foreshadow
the kind of tactics that the Communists
will emphasize over the near term. The
enemy has relied on small groups of sap-
pers or commandos to carry out some of
the heaviest assaults in recent days, in-
flicting significant casualties on allied
forces. Enemy harassing fire has been
most effective against remote outposts
and towns. There have been reports of
heavier action planned for later in the
campaign, including the commitment of
more main force units.
The Communists continue to augment their forces
in the delta provinces of IV Corps with North Viet-
namese regulars. There is fresh evidence in inter-
cepts that the North Vietnamese 95th Regiment has
relocated from III Corps.
Other Communist main force units that re-
cently moved to the delta include the
273rd, 18B, and 101D regiments. The ad-
dition of the 95th Regiment would raise
enemy main force strength in the delta
almost to the equivalent of two regular
divisions.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
The one-day general strike held in Saigon yes-
terday does not appear to have caused any serious
disruption. The strike had been called by local ele-
ments of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor after
they had been unable to persuade the government to
get the city's bus company back in operation after
several months' idleness. Although the local leader-
ship had voted to extend the strike, the confedera-
tion's national chairman, Tran Quoc Buu, got them to
call it off and resume parleys with the government.
The decision by local leaders to order a
strike is a further sign of widespread dis-
gruntlement with the recent rise in the
cost of living. The confederation under
Buu has provided important political sup-
port to President Thieu, and this open
challenge to the government by the Saigon
local union may create strains in the re-
lations between the government and the con-
federations. In view of Buu's action to
limit the strike, however, it could prove
to be a relatively isolated and transitory
event.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
FRANCE-LIBYA
The French Foreign Ministry is clarifying its
intentions regarding arms negotiations- with Tripoli.
In a recent conversation with Ambassador Shriver,
Foreign Minister Schumann stressed that when an arms
contract with Libya is signed,.a long lead-time on
deliveries will be an important part of the deal.
Schumann also said there would be strict and precise
clauses in the contract forbidding the transfer of
the weapons to other powers, or their use in "other
theaters of operation." He reiterated previous French
denials that France planned to occupy bases evacuated
by the US and UK, but said that it was possible that
a "few" French technicians and instructors might be
sent to these installations. Another high Foreign
Ministry official said that France intended to main-
tain the option of suspending delivery of the equip-
ment under certain circumstances--such as Libya com-
ing under the control of the UAR.
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it appears
that the Foreign Minister, by stringing
out delivery time tables, hopes to vitiate
the impact of the deal on the Middle East
military balance of power. Schumann re-
gards the next year as a critical period
for successful peace efforts in the Mid-
dle East.
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CAMBODIA
Prince Sihanouk abruptly departed for France
on 6 January, turning his back on a mounting polit-
ical challenge from opposition elements in the gov-
ernment. The Cambodian chief of state is expected
to be one for two or three months on a medical re-
treat.
Sshanouk's inability to bring his
determined opponents to heel during the
recent National Congress in Phnom Penh
also influenced his decision to go abroad
at this time. Prime Minister Lon NoZ's
post-congress acceptance of the resigna-
tions of four pro-Sihanouk cabinet mem-
bers has added to the Prince's political
battle fatigue. His extended absence
should give the government the opportun-
ity it has long been seeking to manage
its own affairs, free from Sihanouk's
obstructive interference. Nevertheless
it is unlikely to take any strikingly
new initiatives while he is away. As
has been the case in the past, Sihanouk
probably will return to Cambodia revital-
ized and ready to make fresh efforts to
reassert his political supremacy.
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SUDAN
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