THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 DECEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977213
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 26, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800220001-7
The President's Daily Brief
26 December 1969
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
26 December 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
//General Giap's
recent article on the war suggests that Hanoi will
respond to the allied Vietnamization program by
dragging out the fighting indefinitely. (Page 1)
Moscow and Bonn
(Page -2)
Bangkok is publicizing the possibility of a with-
drawal of Thai troops from Vietnam. (Page 3)
Cyprus. (Page 4)
Moscow has offered a $30 million credit to Peru to
finanCe the purchase of agricultural machinery.
(Page 5)
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NORTH VIETNAM
These are our preliminary thoughts about the
long, theoretical article on the war written by North
Vietnam's Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. A more
complete analysis will follow when we receive the
full text.
The article is one of the clearest indica-
tions to date that Hanoi's principal re-
sponse to the allied Vietnamization pro-
gram will be to try to drag out the fight-
ing indefinitely. Giap repeatedly stresses
the need for the Communists to preserve and
to build up their forces, to safeguard and
to expand base areas, and to be in a posi-
tion to take advantage of whatever oppor-
tunities may come their way in the course
of further protracted warfare. Giap calls
for strong military action, of course, but
his stress on fundamentals and on adequate
preparations suggests that Hanoi believes
that much more spadework is needed before
the Communists will be ready to attempt an-
other head-on military challenge.
Enemy violations of the 24 hour allied truce
did not involve any major combat activity.
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USSR - WEST GERMANY
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THAILAND-US
There appears to be less than meets the eye in
recent reports that Thailand is considering with-
drawing some of its troops from South Vietnam. Both
Deputy Prime Minister Praphat and Foreign Minister
Thanat have given private assurances to Ambassador
Unger that their government fully appreciates the
need for Thailand to keep troops in Vietnam for the
time being. They claim there is no plan for with-
drawal.
Thanat recently implied to Unger, however, that
the Thai believe they are obliged to portray their
participation in the Vietnam war as being in step
with allied policies. He claimed that his intention
in raising the possibility of a troop withdrawal was
to reaffirm the temporary nature of the Thai presence
in Vietnam and to underline Thai confidence in the
Vietnamization program. Thanat discussed the possi-
ble withdrawal of Thai forces with Saigon's ambassa-
dor yesterday, according to the Bangkok press.
Thanat announced to the press earlier this
week that during the recent ASEAN meeting
in Kuala Lumpur he had brought up the pos-
sibility of pulling out troops with South
Vietnam's Foreign Minister Lam. A few
days earlier, a group of Thai legislators,
seemingly with the blessing of at least
some government leaders, sent an open let-
ter to Prime Minister Thanom calling for
withdrawal of the Thai troops.
In the light of Thailand's growing dissat-
isfaction with the US on other matters,
the manner in which the Thai have raised
the troop issue--direct discussions with
Saigon and in the press--may be designed
in part as a not so subtle reminder to
Washington of the importance Bangkok at-
taches to being involved in decision mak-
ing on matters of mutual interest.
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CYPRUS
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USSR-PERU
Moscow has offered a $30 million credit to Peru
to finance the purchase of agricultural machinery.
The credit--Russia's first to Peru--was announced by
Peru's Foreign Minister Mercado on 20 December and
confirmed by the Soviet commercial attache.
Repayment terms probably will be typical
of Soviet trade credits--10 years or less--
rather than the extension of long-term aid.
The sale of Western equipment to privat
farmers could be hurt by the Soviet credit
offer. In the past, however, the poor
quality of Soviet machinery and Zack of
service eventually Zed other Latin Ameri-
can countries back to traditional US and
West European suppliers.
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Top Secret
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