THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 15 DECEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977195
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: December 15, 1969

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800130001-7
The President's Daily Brief
15 December 1969
47
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800130001-7
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
15 December 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow
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West Germans. (Page 1) 50X1
The Communists seem ready to step up the fighting in
South Vietnam. (Page 2)
Coup in Panama. (Page 3)
Aspects of Soviet policy in the Middle East are dis-
cussed at Annex.
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USSR - WEST GERMANY
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SOUTH VIETNAM
? A number of signs point to Communist plans to
increase their military activity in the period before
Christmas.
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renewed at- 50X1
tacks will begin in mid-December and will be concen-
trated in Tay Ninh Province and the upper Mekong
Delta region. a line noted in captured 50X1
documents says the Communists intend to 50X1
make the delta a primary battlefield during their
winter-spring campaign.
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PANAMA
The chief of staff of the National Guard, Col.
Sanjur, seized control of the Provisional Junta Gov-
ernment during the night. Guard Commandant General
Torrijos is in Mexico on an informal visit, and will
not be allowed to return.
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NOTES
USSR-Egypt:
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the USSR promised the 50X1
UAR "everything it asked for"--including arms--dur-
ing the course of high-level Soviet-Egyptian talks
in Moscow last week. The communique issued at the
end of the visit did not provide a clear signal of
such intentions. It did, however, refer to certain
unspecified "practical steps" aimed at enhancing
Soviet-Egyptian cooperation.
USSR - Communist China: The announcement that
First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and his
deputy are returning to Moscow, ostensibly to par-
ticipate in the coming session of the USSR Supreme
Soviet, may signal a Soviet decision to downgrade
its delegation to the talks in Peking. The Russians
have been toying with this idea for some time; the
other six members of the Soviet delegation are ap-
parently remaining in Peking. A Chinese news agency
statement on 13 December claimed, however, that the
Soviet negotiators would be gone for only one week,
and the talks would be "temporarily recessed in
their absence." This appears to be a thinly veiled
threat that the talks could break down completely
if the two Russians do not return to Peking. Never-
theless, neither side has much to gain in allowing
the talks to end at this time, and some compromise
on this issue may still be arranged.
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THE SOVIETS AND THE FEDAYEEN
In the wake of Kosygin's_careful promises of
support to the Palestinians, we have reached the
following conclusions about Soviet policy toward the
fedayeen.,
Two points stand out in Premier Kosygin's speech
of 10 December: the high-level, official endorsement
of the Arab fedayeen, and the seemingly contradictory
emphasis on the need for a political settlement of
the Arab-Israeli crisis.
For months the Soviets have been giving propa-
ganda support to the fedayeen, along with small
amounts of arms channeled through Arab governments
or other third parties. Now, by Kosygin's remarks,
the fedayeen are recognized as engaged in a "just
national liberation struggle," a meaningful phrase
in the Soviet lexicon. So engaged, the fedayeen
must be given support.
How much support, and to what end, no Soviet
has yet spelled out. The Soviets, however, have
given every sign that they have mounted the fedayeen
bandwagon with some reluctance.
The Soviets' past behavior toward
uncontrollable extremist groups shows that Moscow
is uncomfortable in such company.
The Soviets do not want to go through another
June war, which the activities of the fedayeen could
ultimately provoke. Thus, Moscow's support is given
more than a little grudgingly, with a purely oppor-
tunistic view toward tactical advantage.
(continued)
Al
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The advantage of such a policy is clear. A pro-
fedayeen posture revalidates Soviet credentials, in
the Arab world and elsewhere, as the champion of rev-
olutionary forces--these credentials lost some valid-
ity in June 1967. The fedayeen stand for the kind of
resolute opposition to Israel most popular among the
Arab people. The Soviets can ignore this only at
great risk.
Just as important right now, however, is how
Soviet support for the fedayeen--and for a certain
level of Arab militancy in general--relates to the
bargaining for a political settlement. Tension has
been Moscow's handmaiden in the Middle East from the
beginning of Soviet penetration there. The Soviets
realize that the tension now being created by Arab
militancy adds to the pressures on Israel--and on
the US--to make concessions. The apparent contra-
diction between support for militancy and Kosygin's
pointed reiteration of Moscow's intention to go on
working for a settlement tends to fade when consid-
ered in this light.
Kosygin's speech is, in sum, a brief delineation
of Moscow's dualistic strategy in the Middle East--
arm for war, negotiate for peace. The Soviets are
arming and backing the fedayeen, just as they have
armed and backed Arab governments for years. In
this connection, they are careful to keep their deal-
ings with the fedayeen in line with the governments
who are uneasy about the guerrillas. The Soviets
also want a negotiated settlement--satisfactory to
the Arabs, and yet allowing for Israel's existence--
but they recognize the enormous obstacles. They can-
not stand still, however, while the efforts to over-
come these obstacles drag on.
We can expect more statements of support, more
heavy propaganda, and perhaps increased clandestine
supply of arms and financial aid to the fedayeen.
We can also expect Soviet spokesmen to accent the
danger inherent in the Middle East situation--as did
the Warsaw pact declaration last month. All these
efforts are designed to give the negotiating advan-
tage to Moscow and its friends, but without the in-
tention of pushing the situation to the point of
full-scale hostilities.
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