THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 DECEMBER 1969

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005977191
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 12, 1969
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 The President's Daily Brief 12 December 1969 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T0093eA007800110001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 December 1969 PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS Thieu's political opponents are likely to exploit the alerting of certain South Vietnamese military units following coup .rumors yesterday. (Page 1) Mrs. Meir's new coalition government includes a larger number of proponents of a militant anti-Arab policy. (Page 3) The Libyan Government may try to implicate the US in the recent coup plotting. (Page 4) South Korea is reacting in low key to the hijacking of its airliner. (Page 4) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SOUTH VIETNAM South Vietnamese Air Force units at the Tan Son Nhut headquarters complex were put on alert yester- day and the National Police guard force there was doubled. These steps were taken as a result of new coup rumors in Saigon. We have no evidence to substantiate these rumors, and top leaders in Saigon do not appear unduly concerned. Even these lim- ited precautionary measures, however, will undercut government efforts to develop an image of stability, confidence, and con- stitutionality. Opponents of the govern- ment almost certainly will seek to exploit this nervousness; considerable behind-the- scenes political maneuvering is ZikeZy. The coup rumors, and any plotting which may have occurred, seem to be an outgrowth of the bitter reaction against the govern- ment following the tax and price hike in late October. This reaction has been par- ticularly strong within government and military circles. For most of the past year, key military leaders apparently have recognized that the overthrow of the constitutional gov- ernment would entail ?a serious risk of losing US support for the war effort. The recent flurry of rumors, however, suggests that some military officers again think that a coup might be a practical possibil- ity. Those opposition elements who fear Vietnamization is a prelude to a deal with the Communists, rather than a way to con- tinue the fight in the absence of progress on negotiations, may also be persuaded to think in terms of a coup. (continued) FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY The government's failure to keep opposi- tion elements convinced of its stability is caused in part by Thieu's growing sus- piciousness and his consequent tendency to isolate himself from all but a small circle of advisers.r Thieu's handling of the austerity tax, his public position on the My Lai affair, and his recent remarks about beheading some National Assemblymen, all point to an in- sensitivity to the political situation. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY ISRAEL Every major party is represented in Mrs. Meir's new coalition government. More than half of the ministerial offices went to members of Mrs. Meir's Labor-Mapam Alignment, including the key portfolios of defense, foreign affairs, and finance. The right- ist Gahal party made the biggest gain in the 24-mem- ber cabinet, getting six posts compared to its pre- vious two. Mrs. Meir could have formed a smaller co- aZition government but preferred to pro- ject an image of national unity. As a re- sult, the GahaZ party has obtained consid- erable leverage to promote its militant anti-Arab policy. By broadening the rep- resentation in her government, Mrs. Meir has sacrificed flexibility. It seems cer- tain that Israel will remain uncompromising in its attitude toward a peace settlement. 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY NOTES ? Libya: The military junta may attempt to impli- cate the US in the coup plotting that led to the re- cent arrest of two cabinet members. Speaking over Libyan television yesterday, junta leader Qaddafi noted that the plot coincided with the beginning of negotiations on US withdrawal from Wheelus Air Base. He alleged that the plotters had "income or support from the base." Qaddafi also alluded to former min- ister of defense Hawwaz's recent dealings with two US firms that have been having problems with the Libyan Government. Moreover, the only other person singled out as a conspirator by Qaddafi was an un- named major said to have returned to Libya from the US shortly after the September revolution. Qaddafi's speech suggests that the Libyans will probably be extremely uncompromising in next week's negotiations. South Korea - North Korea: South Korea intends to use normal diplomatic machinery to negotiate the return of its hijacked airliner from North Korea. The Seoul government has indicated to US officials that it will seek the release of the passengers, crew, and plane through the International Red Cross and the Korean Military Armistice Commission. In an earlier hijacking case in 1958, this low key approach resulted in the release of the crew and passengers within a month. The plane was never returned. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9