THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 DECEMBER 1969
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005977191
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 12, 1969
File:
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DOC_0005977191.pdf | 202.22 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9
The President's Daily Brief
12 December 1969
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007800110001-9
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
12 December 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Thieu's political opponents are likely to exploit
the alerting of certain South Vietnamese military
units following coup .rumors yesterday. (Page 1)
Mrs. Meir's new coalition government includes a
larger number of proponents of a militant anti-Arab
policy. (Page 3)
The Libyan Government may try to implicate the US
in the recent coup plotting. (Page 4)
South Korea is reacting in low key to the hijacking
of its airliner. (Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnamese Air Force units at the Tan Son
Nhut headquarters complex were put on alert yester-
day and the National Police guard force there was
doubled. These steps were taken as a result of new
coup rumors in Saigon.
We have no evidence to substantiate these
rumors, and top leaders in Saigon do not
appear unduly concerned. Even these lim-
ited precautionary measures, however, will
undercut government efforts to develop an
image of stability, confidence, and con-
stitutionality. Opponents of the govern-
ment almost certainly will seek to exploit
this nervousness; considerable behind-the-
scenes political maneuvering is ZikeZy.
The coup rumors, and any plotting which
may have occurred, seem to be an outgrowth
of the bitter reaction against the govern-
ment following the tax and price hike in
late October. This reaction has been par-
ticularly strong within government and
military circles.
For most of the past year, key military
leaders apparently have recognized that
the overthrow of the constitutional gov-
ernment would entail ?a serious risk of
losing US support for the war effort. The
recent flurry of rumors, however, suggests
that some military officers again think
that a coup might be a practical possibil-
ity. Those opposition elements who fear
Vietnamization is a prelude to a deal with
the Communists, rather than a way to con-
tinue the fight in the absence of progress
on negotiations, may also be persuaded to
think in terms of a coup.
(continued)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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The government's failure to keep opposi-
tion elements convinced of its stability
is caused in part by Thieu's growing sus-
piciousness and his consequent tendency
to isolate himself from all but a small
circle of advisers.r
Thieu's handling of the austerity tax, his
public position on the My Lai affair, and
his recent remarks about beheading some
National Assemblymen, all point to an in-
sensitivity to the political situation.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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50X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
ISRAEL
Every major party is represented in Mrs. Meir's
new coalition government. More than half of the
ministerial offices went to members of Mrs. Meir's
Labor-Mapam Alignment, including the key portfolios
of defense, foreign affairs, and finance. The right-
ist Gahal party made the biggest gain in the 24-mem-
ber cabinet, getting six posts compared to its pre-
vious two.
Mrs. Meir could have formed a smaller co-
aZition government but preferred to pro-
ject an image of national unity. As a re-
sult, the GahaZ party has obtained consid-
erable leverage to promote its militant
anti-Arab policy. By broadening the rep-
resentation in her government, Mrs. Meir
has sacrificed flexibility. It seems cer-
tain that Israel will remain uncompromising
in its attitude toward a peace settlement.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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NOTES
? Libya: The military junta may attempt to impli-
cate the US in the coup plotting that led to the re-
cent arrest of two cabinet members. Speaking over
Libyan television yesterday, junta leader Qaddafi
noted that the plot coincided with the beginning of
negotiations on US withdrawal from Wheelus Air Base.
He alleged that the plotters had "income or support
from the base." Qaddafi also alluded to former min-
ister of defense Hawwaz's recent dealings with two
US firms that have been having problems with the
Libyan Government. Moreover, the only other person
singled out as a conspirator by Qaddafi was an un-
named major said to have returned to Libya from the
US shortly after the September revolution. Qaddafi's
speech suggests that the Libyans will probably be
extremely uncompromising in next week's negotiations.
South Korea - North Korea: South Korea intends
to use normal diplomatic machinery to negotiate the
return of its hijacked airliner from North Korea.
The Seoul government has indicated to US officials
that it will seek the release of the passengers,
crew, and plane through the International Red Cross
and the Korean Military Armistice Commission. In an
earlier hijacking case in 1958, this low key approach
resulted in the release of the crew and passengers
within a month. The plane was never returned.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Top Secret
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