THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 OCTOBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977063
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 29, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
The President's Daily Brief
29 October 1969
19 50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
29 October 1969
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Lebanese Army leaders have determined the conces-
sions they are willing to make to the fedayeen; it
is doubtful, however, that the latter will be satis-
fied. (Page 1)
The Czechoslovak delegation got little in Moscow
but a hearty endorsement of Husak's leadership.
(Page 2)
Chancellor Brandt has outlined a broad approach to
foreign policy that may run into difficulties in
the Bundestag. (Page 3)
Discontent is growing in the Bolivian military over
civilian radicals led by Minister of Mines Quiroga.
(Page 4)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LEBANON
The Lebanese have finally gotten their delega-
tion to Cairo for "mediation" talks under Nasir's
auspices. Armed forces commander Bustani is repre-
senting them.
Bustani seems unlikely to return to Bei-
rut with much to comfort Hilu. He is per-
sonally not very forceful and the fedayeen
are not likely to compromise except on
something close to their own terms.
1
50)50X1
50X1
50X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Moscow sent the visiting Czechoslovak party-
state delegation home yesterday with a ringing ver-
bal endorsement of Husak's leadership, but little
else. The joint statement issued at the departure
of the delegation mentioned neither a hard-currency
loan nor a partial withdrawal of troops. The most
tangible result was an agreement to expand trade
and economic cooperation and to sign a new treaty
of friendship and alliance next year.
The Soviets apparently do not intend to
give up the carrot and stick tactics that
have been so effective in Czechoslovakia,
despite their satisfaction with the trend
of events in Prague. The Czechoslovaks
had hoped that Moscow would be prepared
to be more forthcoming on troop and money
matters in return for Prague's reimposi-
tion of authoritarian controls.
The trade agreement will produce some ad-
ditional Soviet deliveries of fuel and
material, but will not help Czechoslovakia
escape from its economic crisis. The
friendship treaty will probably serve as
window dressing for the new shape of So-
viet-Czechoslovak relations.
Nevertheless, the red-carpet treatment which
the delegation received and Brezhnev's glowing en-
dorsement of Husak's leadership are indicative of
Soviet satisfaction with his policies. Brezhnev en-
dorsed Husak as "an outstanding political figure."
Husak noted, however, that "normalization" has not
been completed. 1
This means that new domestic restrictions
in Czechoslovakia and further purges of
the party, government, and mass organiza-
tions are likely.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
WEST GERMANY
In his official policy statement yesterday,
Chancellor Brandt mapped out a broad activist
course in foreign affairs, although one that care-
fully avoids radical departures from already estab-
lished policy lines. He placed special emphasis
on pumping new life into Bonn's relations with the
East. He would initiate direct talks with the USSR,
Poland, and East Germany, and would have the West-
ern Allies continue to seek Soviet cooPeration in
alleviating sources of tension over Berlin.
While avoiding specifics, Brandt seemed to
imply that his government would be more flexible
in meeting Eastern demands. As a starter, he al-
luded to the concept--alien to Wes? German conserv-
atives--of two German states existing in one nation.
The Chancellor indicated that his government,
while continuing its allegiance to NATO, would take
a more positive attitude than previous Bonn govern-
ments toward detente measures. Bonn's special con-
tribution in this line would include negotiation of
renunciation of force agreements with East European
governments and signature of the NPT in due course.
Hewing to a cautious line on the European Community,
Brandt called for its strengthening and broadening.
Although he endorsed British entry, he also spoke
of the need for German-French harmony.
Brandt's scattergun approach provided few
clues to priorities among the diverse pol-
icies he Outlined, suggesting that Bonn
will press them all and be satisfied to
make progress where it can. Nor did he
indicate which way Germany might move if
forced to face up to hard choices among
the potentially conflicting strains.
Negative outbursts from the opposition
Christian Democrats suggest that the
Brandt foreign policy may face tough going
in the Bundestag. They also suggest that
Kiesinger may have difficulty maintaining
the discipline required to fulfill the
responsible opposition role he has prom-
ised.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
BOLIVIA
Opposition is growing to the civilian radicals
led by Minister of Mines Quiroga. The foreign min-
ister, General Ruiz, has told Ambassador Castro'
that he and his military colleagues will no longer
tolerate being used by the civilians. Ruiz says
Ovando has decided to take over the negotiations
with Gulf Oil himself and to exclude Quiroga from
any further dealings with the company. Some mid-
dle-grade officers are calling for Quiroga's dis-
missal.
All this is still fairly nebuZous. On his
past record, Ovando is highly unlikely to
rein in Quiroga effectiveZy, and neither
Ruiz and his associates nor anyone else
seems ready to translate discontent into
action. What seems to be going on is a
typically Bolivian interlude of multilat-
eral intrigue, and the best that can be
said is that nobody-- leastof all Ovando--
is really in control.
One man to keep an eye on is the present com-
mander of the armed forces, General Torres./
/A source of the US Em-
bassy says he fears that Quiroga, who knows as well
as anyone that power ultimately rests with the man
who controls the army units around the capital, has
worked out an alliance with the opportunistic Torres.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
NOTES
Sudan: Revolutionary Command Council Presi-
dent Numayri has further consolidated his control
by assuming the prime minister's portfolio. Prime
Minister Awadallah, who was made deputy prime min-
ister and foreign affairs minister, came into dis-
favor a few weeks ago when he said that Communists
were necessary for the success of the revolution--
a statement which brought into question the re-
gime's supposed Sudanese nationalist orientation.
Other changes appear to reflect little beyond Nu-
mayri's efforts to erode the civilian influence in
the government.
5
50X1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600250001-6