THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 OCTOBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977019
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: October 3, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600030001-0
The President's Daily Brief
3 October 1969
19
Top Secret
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
'WEST GERMANY
The speed with which the Socialists concluded an agree-
ment with the Free Democrats means that the Federal Republic
may soon have its first left-of-center government. The Chris-
tian Democrats appeared ready for drawn-out negotiations, but
not for this contingency, and their last-minute offers were
too late. Many Christian Democrats already appear resigned
to an opposition role for their party,.
Assuming no last-minute hitches develop between the ne-
gotiating parties, a vote on Brandt's candidacy for chancellor
could be taken as early as 20 October, when the newly elected
Bundestag convenes. For election, however,-Brandt must ob-
tain an absolute parliamentary majority, or 249 votes. With
a total coalition strength of only 254, the absence or defec-
tion of only six deputies would mean his defeat.
Such a narrowly based coalition would be unstable and
possibly short-lived. Many basic differences over economic
and labor policy have probably been papered over and ill crop
out again when the parties get down to serious lawmaking.
If by some mischance the Socialist - Free Democrat coali-
tion fails to achieve election in the Bundestag, it will be
difficult to put. together another. The stability of any other
coalition, even a resumption of the grand coalition, would be
shaky and there would be a good chance of new elections in a
year or two.
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
There has been no official comment from Moscow on the
election or the formation of a coalition. Soviet press re-
porting and commentaries have been sparse, cautious, and non-
committal, although there is a continuing tendency to play up
the Socialists' foreign policies as relatively "realistic."
Moscow is keeping its options open, however. One of the re-
current themes being played in public is that no major policy
changes are likely in West Germany regardless of whatever
coalition government 'is formed.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR - MIDDLE EAST
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Moscow may very well have changed its stance toward the
fedayeen, and for good tactical reasons. The irregulars are
becoming increasingly popular and politically more effective.
By jumping on. this bandwagon, the Soviets would again demon-
strate support for the Arab cause and gather whatever glimmer-
ing credit there may be for fedayeen successes.
The Soviets probably hope that their support would give
them a limited measure- of control over the fedayeen, and also
would tend to overcome Chinese influence among the guerrilla
bands. MOSCOW May also see this step as a way of activating
the Arab Communist parties in conjunction with the fedayeen.
It is- doubtful that Moscow's methods of supplying arms
will change significantly. Heretofore, the. Sovietshave con-
signed arms to the guerrillas through an Arab government. The
direct supply of arms ? to the fedayeen would cause political
complications for Moscow with various Arab governments already
concerned over the independence of the guerrilla organizations,
even though these governments themselves have been compelled in
recent months to take a more tolerant stance toward the fedayeen.
Should Moscow decide to send arms directly to the fedayeen, it
almost certainly will be with the consent of the involved Arab
governments.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
If the Soviets go through with this change in policy, it
would mark a tactical, rather than a strategic shift. Moscow
probably does not view this as inconsistent with its role in
the talks toward a political settlement in the Middle East, and
we expect it will continue working along these lines,
LEBANON-USSR
The Soviets are embarrassed by the exposure of their plot
to steal a Mirage aircraft from Lebanon. They vigorously pro-
tested the violation of their diplomat's immunity
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/they worked hard to have their peo-
ple expelled from Lebanon without being formally declared
persona non grata. One has already been deported. The other
will depart as soon as his condition permits.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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:c
North Vietnamese Reinforcements Begin to Move Into Action
...s. NV?A?reinforcementsn.
used in 1 October attack
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NORTH
VIETNAM
THAILAND
ientiane
THAILAND
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10
20
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40
STATUTE MILES
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
LAOS
Fresh North Vietnamese reinforcements attacked government
positions on the Plaine des Jarres on 1 October, but were beaten
off. At the same time, North Vietnamese also hit scattered posi-
tions on the northern fringes of the Plaine. These probes seem
to comprise a coordinated effort to put yang Pao's forces on a
defensive footing while major elements of the North Vietnamese
forces are still en route to Laos.
Whether this flurry of activity marks the opening round in
the anticipated North Vietnamese counteroffensive has yet to be
determined. At the least, it indicates the North Vietnamese
intend to clear the pathway for forces arriving from the east
and prepare to turn the tables on yang Pao as soon as their
logistic problems are sorted out.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600030001-0