THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 SEPTEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976989
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 16, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
16 September 1969
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The Czechoslovak party is still maneuvering on the ques-
tion of how to deal with last year's liberals--led by Dubcek
and Smrkovsky. The on again - off again central committee
session is now rumored to have been postponed until the end
of the'month.
In the meantime Husak is in the process of informing
other parties of his "political intentions." Yesterday he
met with Gomulka, with whom he is on friendly terms, in the
border city of Ostrava. Since Gomulka is very ,close to Mos-
cow, the meeting will boost Husak's prestige and could
strengthen his hand against the ultraconservatives who are
demanding immediate and drastic action against the liberals.
The Czechoslovaks apparently also feel they need another
reading on Soviet attitudes before they call the central com-
mittee together. This presumably is the reason for Cernik's
quick trip to Moscow this morning.
MIDDLE EAST
General Bull plans to recommend closure of most of the
truce observer posts along the Suez Canal. If UN headquarters
accepts his recommendations, only six of the original 16
posts--three on each side of the canal--will still be manned.
Bull's justification is twofold: first, the cease-fire no
longer exists and his teams look silly trying to police it;
and second, the danger to the teams is unacceptable.
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Cairo has announced that Nasir will not be visiting the
Soviet Union "this month or in the immediate future." The
visit--which would have
tary subjects
laid on some time ago; Nasir's
combined talks on political and mili-
--had been
conservative rivals in the
Muslim world, by scheduling the Islamic summit for the period
he was planning to be away, forced the postponement. For
their part the Soviets, who have a good deal on their plates
at the moment, probably are just as happy to see the visit
put off.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Recent satellite photography shows that a new group of
ten silos for the SS-11 is being constructed at an existing
ICBM complex. About 650 SS-11s are now operational. When
construction is completed on all identified ICBM groups--by
about, mid-1971--the Soviets will have 1,360 ICBMs, including
820 SS-11s.
VIETNAM
Sihanouk seems to have made at least one concession to
the Communists when he went to Hanoi for Ho's funeral. Phnom
Penh radio has announced that he concluded a "commercial
treaty" with the Provisional Revolutionary Government. The
terms have not been publicized,
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Last May Sihanouk slapped an embargo on all supply ship-
ments to the Viet Cong. Even though the ban on arms shipments
presumably still applies, publicizing the semicovert flow of
nonmilitary supplies is a gain of sorts for the Communists--
at least it may bring down the costs of this traffic. For
his part, Sihanouk may have considered the agreement a small
enough price to pay to inveigle the Vietnamese Communists
into a new round of talks on the frontier issue and Communist
bases in Cambodia.
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PERU
The Velasco regime is firmly in the saddle in Peru as it
nears the end of its first year,in office. Since the ouster
of the Belaunde government last October, Velasco has pushed
forward with a whole series of measures apparently designed
both to solidify his popular support and to bring about far-
reaching changes in the country's economic and social structure.
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We suspect he will unveil a further installment in this pro-
gram on 3, October, the anniversary of his takeover, or on 4
or 9 October, the anniversary of his first moves against the
International Petroleum Company.
At annex today we discuss one of Velasco's key decrees,
the land reform law announced last June.
BRAZIL
There has been no news overnight from Rio de Janeiro,
where the Brazilian military has been trying since yesterday
morning to agree on a successor to Costa e Silva. The delay
is understandable; the high command also has to decide how
long the successor is to hold soffice, and in addition it ap-
parently is trying to keep from bending the constitution any
more than necessary.
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PERU'S LAND REFr-PROGRAM
Last June, with the mixture of idealism and opportunism
which has become his trademark1 President Velasco promulgated
one of.the most far-reaching land reform laws ever introduced
in Latin America, and one which over the long run stands a
better chance than most such laws ofactually going into ef-
fect. CIA economists have examined the new law and have
reached the following conclusions about its impact and pros-
pects:
--The reform could benefit between 300,000 and 500,000
peasants (most,of them Indians), and in the process it would
largely do away with one of the most oppressive feudal land
tenure systems in "Latin America. Even so, substantial num-
bers of rural people would remain landless or with plots too
small' to feed themselves adequately.
--If the law is fully implemented, it will have its most
far-reaching effects in the mountains of the interior, where
most of Peru's small landholdings are located. Larger hold-
ings will be permitted along the coast, where commercial ag-
riculture is concentrated. The large coastal sugar planta-
tions (including two owned by W. R. Grace) have been expro-
priated but will continue to operate, first under government
supervision and then as cooperatives.
--The reform is likely to reduce the amount of agricul-
tural output at first, as the producers consume more them-
selves and as marketing patterns are disrupted. Peru
Al
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therefore will probably become a net food importer early in
the 1970s.
--Land reform should benefit the country over the long
run, but it comes when the economy is slack. The direct. cost
to the government should not be too great, but funds for pump-
priming purposes, such as credit and technical assistance,
will be thinly spread. The need to import more food for the
cities could create balance-of-payments problems.
All this assumes that the government will actually fol-
low through. This is by no means certain, although it is a
better bet under Velasco than under previous regimes. So far
the government has taken property mainly in the coastal re-
gion; the interior, which presents more difficulties both po-
litically and economically, has hardly been touched. Our
guess, however, is that Velasco will press ahead with as much
reform in these areas as his resources permit. Some new move
on this front could come as part of the anniversary festivi-
ties in early October.
The social changes brought on by the land reform could
trigger major changes in Peru's political structure. The
oligarchy's power will be reduced, perhaps substantially.
Simultaneously the Indians for the first time will have a
chance to become a significant political force. At least for
a while they probably will be firm (though not necessarily
very active) supporters of the regime. In the longer run,
however, they could turn out to be a new and volatile factor
in Peruvian politics.
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Top Secret
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