THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 SEPTEMBER 1969
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005976983
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 12, 1969
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
DOC_0005976983.pdf | 148.34 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27: CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
- .
The President's Daily Brief
? 12 September 1969
19
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOVIET UNION - COMMUNIST CHINA
We have nothing to confirm the Japanese Communist Party
chief's assertion to the press that the initiative for yes-
terday's meeting between Kosygin and Chou came from Moscow,
but the idea seems plausible. //
Thus, what-
ever the genesis of the meeting, the green light obviously
came at the last minute.
The fact that the meeting took place at all is an index
of the danger Moscow and Peking see in the growing tension
between them. Given the shortness of the meeting, the lack
of advance preparation, and the evident absence of any give
on either side, it is unlikely that the two premiers achieved
anything substantial. At the very most their talks may have
put a temporary brake on the deterioration in relations.
COMMUNIST CHINA
Peking may be finding itself in the position of having
cried wolf, for too long on the subject of war threats, a
theme it has played on for some time to shore up various un-
popular domestic causes. Now when the regime seems more ac-
tively concerned to gird the public for possible conflict
with the Soviet Union, its "war preparations" propaganda is
encountering widespread apathy and skepticism.
Broadcasts from several provincial centers have criti-
cized "certain individuals" and also local army units for
L
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
their failure to "understand" the Soviet threat and have said
that these elements
have urged peasants
must be re-educated. Other broadcasts
not to become "benumbed by feelings of
peace" or "slacken vigilance" in making preparations for war.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Ultraconservative pressures for the ouster of Dubcek and
parliamentary leader Smrkovsky from their party and other of-
ficial positions are becoming intense. Their fate--and that
of other reformists--may be decided next week, when the cen-
tral committee is expected to meet in plenary session.
President Svoboda still seems to be trying to hold off
the attackers, but Husak is said to be wavering after
having said he would not tolerate purges or political
This may be Husak's last chance. If he caves in now,
earlier
trials.
he
risks becoming once and for all a captive of the ultras.
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow took a notably anti-US tack in its first comment
on Tuesday's Israeli foray into Egypt. A Pravda article yes-
terday charged that the root of Tel Aviv's militarism lay
chiefly in the US. It also claimed the raid showed the need
for "urgent measures to eliminate the consequences of Israel's
imperialist aggression." We read the article as a none-too-
gentle effort to prod the US into extracting further conces-
sions from the Israelis.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOVIET AFFAIRS
CAMBODIA - NORTH VIETNAM
Sihanouk appears to have used the occasion of Ho's fu-
neral to open new substantive talks with North Vietnamese
leaders. On his return to Phnom Penh, he indicated that the
talks had touched on the major issues that have been an in-
creasing source of tension between the two sides over the
past year. Without spelling out what was said, Sihanouk
claimed that Pham Van Dong had made "many promises." He also
made clear.to his listeners his low estimate of the value of
Vietnamese "promises."
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The Cambodians have been trying to get the North Viet-
namese to sign a border-agreement for almost five years.
Hanoi's position has been that this issue must be settled
with South Vietnamese Communists./
The importance of Cambodia to the Communists' war ef-
forts, and the fact that Sihanouk is now holding up-arms and
ammunition deliveries to Communist forces may make North
Vietnam more. responsive to his urgings. In any event, this
question presumably will be the major topic during Pham Van
Dong's forthcoming trip to Cambodia.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27: CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
(
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2
_ _
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007500110001-2