THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 SEPTEMBER 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976967
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 3, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
3 September 169
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VIETNAM
Ho Chi Minh may be dead or so seriously ill that he
cannot be expected to live for long.
A communique issued by North Vietnamese authorities
early on 3 September, Hanoi time, announced that during
"the past few weeks" the 79-year-old leader "has not been
well," and that a team of experts had been assembled to
provide him with constant care. A later communique noted
that "his sickness is developing and tends to become Criti-
cal." These statements strongly suggest an attempt to pre-
pare the populace for a subsequent death announcement.
In response to the interest in this subject expressed
by the Office of the President in California, we offer at
annex some preliminary speculation on the possible con-
sequences of Ho's death.
MIDDLE EAST
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SOVIET AFFAIRS
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LIBYA
The junta appears to be settling in. No opposition
to its rule has appeared, and the republican radio is broad-
casting long lists of those who allegedly have rallied be-
hind the regime. King Idris arrived in Greece from Turkey
today. His representative, Umar Shalhi
plans to come to the United States
to continue his search for support.
In Tripoli the Revolutionary Command Council has an-
nounced that rather than appointing a government, it will
run the country itself. Its composition remains a mystery;
Other than its tendency to use standard Arab radical
rhetoric, there is no further evidence of the Command Coun-
cil's political orientation.
BOLIVIA
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SPECULATION ON THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES
OF Ho CHI rINH'S DEATH
In addition to today's announcements from Hanoi, a primary
reason for believing that Ho Chi Minh may be dead or close to
death is a series of Communist transport flights into North
Vietnam during the past few days. Two special flights from
Peking to North Vietnam were flown last week; this past week-
end three separate VIP flights arrived from the USSR, China,
and North Korea. Some of this travel could have involved
medical assistance for Ho or delegations to North Vietnam's
national day celebrations on 2 September, but the bulk of it
probably reflected Hanoi's calling in representatives from
its major Communist allies at a time of potential crisis.
Both Moscow and Peking have important axes to grind in such
a situation, but it is unlikely that the North Vietnamese
would bring other Communist powers onto the scene if Ho were
ill and the key issues were still in doubt.
Instead, it seems more likely that power probably al-
ready has passed--in fact, if not in name-- to Ho's succes-
sors and that they have called together their principal al-
lies to inform them of the shape of a post-Ho leadership
lineup, to spell out future regime policies, to ask for con-
tinued Communist support, and perhaps to head off any heavy
handed meddling from abroad.
The last time Ho acted out a public role was in mid-June
in connection with the founding of the Communists' "Provisional
Revolutionary Government." Rumors that he was ill have
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appeared since then in the Hanoi diplomatic community, but
like similar reports in the past, they were never confirmed
and never acknowledged by the regime. The first solid clue
that Ho was perhaps seriously ailing came on 1 September when
the regime held its national day rally and Ho failed to put in
his customary appearance. Last year, North Vietnam made a
special point of alleging Ho's good health.
Confirmation that Ho has been seriously ill helps to
explain evidence of disarray in North Vietnam during the past
few months. Since at least last spring, when the regime held
a prolonged strategy review and seemed to have set a rela-
tively firm course for itself, there have been frequent signs
of pulling .and tugging within the leadership about the war,
the negotiations, and domestic policies.
One example of this may be the apparent switch in Com-
munist tactics on how to deal with the Saigon government. At
the time of the bombing halt last October, and into the first
part of this year, the Communists acted as if they had de-
cided they eventually would have to sit down and negotiate
in a forum including the South Vietnamese Government. Their
consistent refusal to follow through since then, except in
the formal sessions in Paris, may be only a tactical ploy,
but it could also reflect difficulty in agreeing how and when
to implement what was a tough and basic decision. This could
easily have become an unmanageable problem while Ho was still
alive but perhaps not exercising a firm hand at the helm.
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Further evidence of indecision or debate in the leader-
ship can be seen more generally in the Paris talks and in
Hanoi's entire politico-diplomatic effort since last spring.
Immediately after the North Vietnamese concluded their strat-
egy review, the Liberation Front announced its ten-point pro-
gram on 8 May. A month later the Communists announced the
formation of a "Provisional Revolutionary Government" in South
Vietnam, presumably as another step in their scenario for a
political settlement. Hanoi's top man in Paris, Politburo
member Le Duc Tho, returned to the talks in early May and at
the end of the month injected a whole new Communist tactic by
suggesting privately to Ambassador Lodge that the US and North
Vietnam should take up all issues in secret, bilateral discus-
sions.
The momentum involved in this series of initiatives from
the Communists seemed likely to be followed by developments;
instead, paralysis set in, and since then the Communists have
done nothing but stall in Paris. Le Duc Tho left for Hanoi
in early July for reasons which were never apparent in terms
of Communist strategy, especially in view of the decisions
which presumably were made earlier in the spring. It now
seems apparent that he has been huddling with other top mem-
bers of the leadership because of Ho's declining condition.
Similar evidence of indecision or debate can be gleaned
from North Vietnamese media, where it has been readily appar-
ent that a sharp dispute has been going on over agricultural
policy, over the familiar issue of how much of North Vietnam's
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resources should be devoted to the war, and over when and how
to crack down on abuses of Marxist orthodoxy in economic and
social affairs. It is quite conceivable that the failure of
Communist forces in South Vietnam to initiate some of the of-
fensive actions they have planned may have been caused in part
by a leadership crisis in Hanoi.
Ho's demise would, of course, remove the man who has been
the dominant figure in the Vietnamese Communist movement for
nearly 40 years and who probably has many times exercised a
final judgment in deciding policy disputes. His successors
will be men who have generally managed to work together over
the years in pursuit of broad common goals, but whose public
statements in themselves reflect profound differences of ap-
proach on many basic issues. Ho's lingering illness and the
uncertainties thus created may well have complicated the prob-
lem of coming up with agreements on specific policies and tac-
tics.
Some kind of consensus on the regime's future course and
on a new leadership probably was worked out prior to the first
announcement that Ho has been ill. Ho may even have given his
personal stamp of approval to some new hierarchy. In the short
run, this probably will result in maintenance of continuity,
perhaps with some fairly early tactical shifts. Over the
longer haul, however, a new leadership probably will have trou-
ble making and carrying out major decisions, especially if they
depart significantly from past ones, without the benefit of
Ho Chi Minh's personal prestige and authority.
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Only four men on the Party Politburo have clear shots at
some of the principal power previously wielded by Ho. In
their nominal party positions conferred at the last Party Con-
gress in 1960, they are (1) Party First Secretary Le Duan;
(2) theoretician and National Assembly Chairman Truong Chinh;
(3) Premier Pham Van Dong; and (4) Defense Minister Vo Nguyen
Giap. Their relative standing today probably is somewhat
different.
Le Duan almost certainly has lost ground in the past year
or so because many others disagreed with his policies of sac-
rificing virtually everything for the struggle in the South.
He may have been sustained until now only by reason of a close
personal relationship with Ho.
Truong Chinh will almost certainly emerge as a dominant
personality, and perhaps the principal figure, in a new regime.
His views have been featured prominently for more than a year,
and the country and the war probably have been headed in the
directions he laid down in a long report last summer. A major
question mark is his health. He spent nearly two months in
East Germany between April and July receiving medical treat-
ment and recuperating from an operation.
Truong Chinh probably is allied with Defense Minister
Giap in advocating a cautious and protracted application of
the tactics of a "people's war" to the struggle in the South,
and in trying to ensure that the strength of the regime in the
North is preserved and built up along strict Marxist lines.
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It is widely believed that Communist tactics in South Vietnam
during the last year are a direct result of Giap's influence
and that he probably opposed the more reckless offensive ef-
forts of the first part of 1968.
Premier Pham Van Dong probably would retain his post or
might even advance to the presidency in a post-Ho leadership
lineup. He may well be a solid member of the Chinh-Giap camp
and stay where he is as head of the government apparatus.
We cannot forecast with any confidence what specific
policies might be pursued by a leadership dominated by Truong
Chinh and supported by Giap and Pham Van Dong. All these men
are deeply committed to the struggle in the South and bent on
the achievement of at least certain minimal objectives before
giving any ground themselves. Any shifts in policy probably
would emerge only gradually, but they might well take the di-
rection that much of the recent evidence suggests: preparing
to fight the war over the long haul if this proves necessary,
but being ready to shift the struggle largely to the political
arena if, the time seems right and enough opportunities for
eventual Communist success are left open.
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