THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 AUGUST 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976925
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 9, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
9 August 1969
Top Secret 50X1
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The week-long lull in Soviet military air activity con-
tinues, but what it portends is still not clear. The small
amount of flying that has been detected during this period
appears to be limited mainly to essential tasks such as de-
fensive fighter patrols and a few transport movements.
?
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(
Zond-7,? the unmanned lunar probe launched Thursday, seems
to be on course and working satisfactorily. The probe will
reach the vicinity of the moon on 11 August, loop around it,
and return to earth for recovery, probably in the USSR, on 14
August.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
At the Romanian party congress now under way in Buchat-
rest; both Ceausescu and the Soviet chief delegate, Katushev,
have restated their respective regimes' disparate views, but
they have avoided an open clash.
In his opening address, the Romanian party leader spoke
of a system of sovereign Communist states but reiterated his
opposition to the concept of blocs. His definition of im-
perialism could be applied to both Moscow and Washington.
While vowing to preserve Romania's independence, he also took
a conciliatory line toward the USSR.
Katushev, for his part, condemned "the perfidious prac-
tice of bridge-building"--an indirect reference to ?the Pres-
ident's visit. He also reminded all present that the Kremlin
considers itself entitled to act against dissidents who
threaten the socialist system. His speech met with strong
opposition from the Yugoslav, Italian, and Spanish parties.
In Moscow yesterday, Izvestia published an article con-
taining the first direct and authoritative Soviet statement
linking criticism of the "bridge-building" concept with the
President's trip. Moscow probably still plans to avoid an
open break with Bucharest, however, as indicated by Pravda's
publication of a lengthy summary of Ceausescu's congress
speech.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Tensions are again rising in Czechoslovakia as the an-
niversary of the Soviet invasion approaches. Although Mos-
cow would probably prefer to avoid violence at this time, it
may regard repression--rather than further conciliation--as
the best means of avoiding a flareup on 20 August. At annex
we examine the reasons for Soviet concern.
EUROPE
The devaluation of the French franc took the interna-
tional financial community, including the finance ministries
and treasuries of the major Western countries, completely by
surprise. Although it was generally accepted that devaluation
was one option open to the Pompidou government in dealing with
France's steadily declining external reserves, no one expected
that it would come at this time, when a modicum of calm had
returned to world exchange markets. The French have thus
scored an impressive tactical success by pulling devaluation
off amid a minimum of speculative pressures.
Devaluation will help considerably to slow the growth of
French imports and should stimulate French exports, thereby
beginning to reduce the French trade Imbalance that had grown
to serious proportions in 1968 and 1969. In the short term,
devaluation will have to be buttressed by continued or per-
haps even more restrictive policies aimed at slowing the pres-
ent boom.. In the longer run, however, it may help French eco-
nomic expansion by easing pressure on the balance of payments.
3
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06 108
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93465 1-69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The devaluation will have major repercussiOns. throughout
Western-Europe, although competitive devaluations of other
currencies-is not expected. The French action will throw the
EEC's agricultural financial scheme-and therefore the Common
Agricultural Policy--into even- greater disarray. The British:
pound almost certainly will come under speculative attack when
the Major foreign exchange markets reopen on Monday. French
devaluation removes a principal source of speculative pressure
for revaluation of the deutschemark, but even so the mark is
still substantially undervalued against most other major cur-
rencies. A speculative crisis after the German elections thus
may stilloccur.
?Reports
is getting in position for another
month. One major focus may be Tay
VIETNAM
inces in III Corps, where the Viet
indicate the enemy
round of attacks this
Ninh and Binh Long prov-
Cong 9th and the North
Vietnamese 1st and 7th divisions are available for action.
There are tentative indications that some enemy main force
units in. other parts of the country may also be on the move.
Ralliers and. prisoners are reporting enemy plans for
"high points" around 19 August and again on 2 September;
both. datesmark important Vietnamese Communist anniversaries.
It was in much this same time frame that the Communists last
year launched their relatively-low-keyed August-September
campaign, after a long summer lull.
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. ?
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MIDDLE EAST
Israel, alleging increased fedayeen and Jordanian Army
activity, has sent its planes against Jordanian military
targets three times in as many days. The Israelis claim that
during the past week-, the Jordanian Army, using tanks and
artillery as well as small arms., had begun. firing"at any
target found, military or civilian, but primarily military.
They profess the belief that this is not the result of local
initiative but of a decision at a higher level.
Whatever the truth to these charges, the Jordanians may
be in for some hard times unless they can cool things off
along the cease-fire line.
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
USSR-CHINA
The border navigation talks_in Khabarovsk, begun on
18: June, have ended--apparently on a. successful note. Ac-
cording to TASS, the two sides signed a protocol on the
improvement of shipping on border waterways for the current
season. The seeming success of the talks shows that on
matters of mutual practical advantage, the Soviets and the
Chinese can reach agreement despite the tensions between
the two countries. The next annual meeting will be held in
China.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Nearly a year after their intervention in Czechoslovakia,
the Soviets have achieved only some of their aims; now they
are bracing for possible dembnstrations on the anniversary of
the invasion.
The Soviets have reason to be concerned. The Czechoslo-
vak population is ignoring official appeals for calm; provoca-
tive handbills continue to appear. Most of them call for
peaceful anti-Soviet and antiregime demonstrations, but ten-
sion is so high that a small wrong move could set off riots.
In the past few weeks there have been instances of violence
against the Soviets.
Conservatives in the Czechoslovak party, probably confi-
dent of Soviet backing, are openly critical of party chief
Husak for proceeding too slowly in recreating an orthodox Com-
munist regime. They are calling for arrest and trial of the
liberals and other anti-Soviet and anti-Communist individuals.
They want a condemnation of Dubcek, accompanied by his public
recantation. They want the government to follow the party's
orders again and demand that nonparty groups such as labor
unions and student groups profess their fealty or disband.
Most of all they want the leadership to state publicly that
the invasion was justified.
Husak, who condemned the invasion last year, has so far
withheld an endorsement of it. He is opposed to the return
of terror and wants to run a carefully controlled version of
Dubcek's "participatory" government. In talks now going on
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
in the Crimea Brezhnev and Podgorny are undoubtedly pressing
demandssimilar to those of the conservatives on Husak and
President Svoboda. They may also be calling for a.purge of
Dubcek's appointees and their replacement by reliable conser-
vatives.
The same kind of pressure is probably being exerted in
Prague by General Yepishev, chief political officer of the
Soviet armed forces. Since his arrival, a purge of liberal
and anti-Soviet officers in the Czechoslovak armed forces
seems to have reached further into the upper levels of the
Defense Ministry. Yepishev may also be looking at the read-
iness posture of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and trying
to determine how reliable the Czechoslovak armed forces would
be in the event of a crisis.
some Czechoslovak forces will
be on alert during the anniversary, apparently as a precau-
tionary measure,. Although Soviet forces may be moved to alert
positions near the cities--possibly under the guise of exer-
cises--they would probably not be used unless Czech demonstra-
tors get out of hand.
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In any event, there is a possibility that military exer-
cises involving the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia will be
taking place at the same time as the anniversary. . One uncon-
firmed report said that a Warsaw Pact exercise would be held
during the period 18-23 August.
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