THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JULY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976881
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 16, 1969

Declassified in -P-art - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300140001-1
The President's Daily Brief
16 July 1969
19
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
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SOVIET AFFAIRS
In a statement.issued Monday after talks_with an East
German delegation, the Soviets took a.much-tougher-line on the
German question than. Gromyko did in his speech- last week. Al-
though the statement voiced support for developing "good-neigh-
borly" relations with West Germany, it reverted-to the usual
rigid set of conditions--including recognition_of East Ger-
many--which are known to be unacceptable to Bonn, The Soviets
scored Bonn's "militarist-revanchist" and "imperialist-expan-
,
sionist" policies as basic sources of tension in Europe. There
was no mention of Gromykols cautious offer of_bilateral talks-
with.Bonn and four-power talks on Berlin.
These harsh words were no doubt intended in part by Mos-
cow to easeEast German apprehensions over the note of flexi-
bility Gromyko conveyed in his speech. We tend to doubt,
nevertheless that the Soviets would_be.swayed.from making any
overtures of detente to the West by objections from the East
Germans.
There is nothing significant to report on Europe or the
Middle East,
II? OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
EL SALVADOR - HONDURAS.
Ground fighting is continuing, Most notably at Nueva
Ocotepeque, near the western end Of the border, The Hondurans
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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El Salvador-Honduras Military Actions
.San Pedro Sula
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Honduran planes attack
POL storage facilities
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Langue
matillo
St?
95609 7-69 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
there seem to be getting_the worst of it and are_beginning to
withdraw.
Air strikes stopped after the arrival of the OAS peace
team, but the Hondurans fear the Salvadorans might resume them
today.: Esso installations in El Salvador suffered substantial
damage yesterday_from_retaliatory bombing by the Honduran Air
Force.
Leaders in both countries have shown chagrin over the
poor showings of_their respective ground forces, and both sides
are running short-of supplies.
Each Country has professed willingness to accept a gen-
eral cease-fire if_the_other does it first. Honduras thinks
El Salvador, being the aggressor, should make the first move
The Sanchez government in El Salvador on the other hand runs
the strong risk Of being ousted if it takes the lead on a
ceasefire
CUBA
Castro, with a_nod_toward Peru said in a spp4on on 14:
July that "armed. struggle" was not the only approved road to
power. In contrast to his usual emphasis on guerrilla warfare
as the only to change things "inmost countries of Latin
America," Castro said, "it is only fair that each :country de-
velop its own style in accordance with the conditions of that
country"
This of course does not mean that Cuba won't continue
suppOrting insurgency where chances for success seem good, but
3
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his remarks square_more_closely with the views of traditional
Latin American Communist parties. They have long said the path
to power should be the choice of local Communist leaders, not
Havana.
Castro gave_the Peruvian Government good marks so far for
having a "revolutionary character." He promised that if the
Peruvians--or any..other.Latin American government--stayed on
an anti-imperialist course and renounced the OAS sanctions
against Cuba, Havana would pick up a bid for renewed relations.
INDIA
Mrs. Gandhi finds herself in another hassle with old-guard
Congress Party bosses, this time over the party's candidate for
the presidency. Against her strong opposition, a party nomi-
nating committee has announced that Sanjiva Reddy, speaker of
the lower house of parliament, will be Congress' candidate.
Another Congress Party candidate, believed to have Mrs. Gandhi's
support, has refused to pull out, and there are signs that the
Prime Minister may try to get the decision .to back Reddy over-
turned by the party's executive body.
The new president will be elected on 16 August by an elec-
toral college made up of members of the national parliament and
state legislatures. Unless the Congress Party, can get together
on one candidate, there is a chance it could lose.
Under normal conditions, the presidency is not much more
than a ceremonial position, but it could assume considerable
importance if, as expected, no single party gains a clear
majority in the next... general election, which must be held by
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
1972. In that case, the president's voice could be the decid-
ing one in the choice of a new government.
MALAYSIA
Friction between moderates and radicals in the ruling Malay
party over how tough to be with the Chinese intensified over.
the past weekend. The executive committee ousted the leader
of the party's extremist wing for circulating a letter calling
for Prime Minister Rahman's resignation. The letter blamed the
party's recent electoral losses, and the subsequent communal
rioting,. on Rahmam's ."pro-Chinese"- policies.
This conflict sharply increases the threat of a major party
split which would erode the popular base of the emergency regime.
Malay extremists, who are believed to have considerable support
extending even to junior army tanks, can be expected. to increase
their pressures on the government for more pointedly anti-Chinese
policies.
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