THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 JUNE 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976847
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 26, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200220001-3
The President's Daily Brief
26 June 1969
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
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V I ETNAM
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Thieuls conversation with Ambassador Bunker on 23 June
illustrates once again his fundamental attitude toward the
whole issue of negotiating with the Communists. As he remarked,
he sees his offers on the election issue as a means of 'buying
time" with the American public. He calculates that the Commu-
nists are unlikely to accept any offer he feels able to make.
However, he is becoming concerned that he is being pushed to-
ward substantive concessions while Hanoi sticks to its hard
position He told Ambassador Bunker that he wants assurances
from the US that if. the Communists should turn down any new
offer on elections, he would not then be asked for still further
concessions.
Thieu suggested that any .new proposal be coordinated
carefully by jointUS-GVN working groups. His intent here is
not only to push back the timing of any new move but also to
nail down what further steps the US might have in mind should
the Communists prove adamant.
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At the time of this conversation, Thieu had not seen Le
Duc Tho's interview with Murray-Marder, in which Tho dismissed
a suggestion that the Communists might join the GVN on an
electoral commissiOn-and flatly ruled out international super-
vision of elections. These. statements can only have-strength-
ened Thieu's reluctance to move ahead with any new election
proposal.
Tho's comments were aimed at increasing the divisive
pressures on Washington and Saigon, in line with Hanoi's
present diplomatic campaign to portray Thieu as the sole
stumbling block to a settlement. Tho's remarks also were meant
to emphasize his suggestion in private to Ambassador Lodge
that bilateral US-DRV talks offer the only avenue for progress
toward ending the war.
Military activity was generally light. Attacks on the
Special Forces camp at Ben Het continued, however. Defenders
reported renewed ground fighting and artillery attacks.
There is nothing significant to report from Europe or
the Middle East.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
IL OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
Communist pressure on Muong Soui eased yesterday.
Government defenders, aided by continuous air support,
beat back a number of small-scale enemy attacks. Light,
sporadic firing continued throughout the night.
? A North Vietnamese sapper captured during the early
fighting says his unit moved into Laos from North Vietnam
in early June with the specific purpose of attacking Muong
Soul. This rapid and undetected deployment points up the
vulnerability of the neutralist headquarters to fresh
enemy troops moving in from the east.
PERU
Peru's new agrarian reform law, which provides for the
expropriation of all major land holdings and associated
"agro-industries"--many owned by US companies such as W. R.
Grace--seems sure to meet strong opposition among Peruvian
landowners. The sweeping reforms strike at the heart of the
political and economic power of the traditional oligarchy.
Many responsible Peruvians have been unhappy-with VelascO's
performance over, the past few months, and the new law may be
the irritant that will cause effective opposition to coalesce.
At the moment, however, those who oppose the reforms lack the
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political strength to force President Velasco to retract or
modify the law.
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The cabinet debated the proposed law for 20 hours before
it was promulgated late on ?24 June, evidence that there is
opposition even within the government. Probably the opposing
cabinet members were less concerned about the discontent of
the landowners than they were about the possible effect of
the law on the Peruvian economy. President Velasco claims
that the reforms will not lower agricultural production, ?but
disruptions in output seem inevitable.
The measure is apparently not directed at the US. More-
over, the expropriation of US-owned property will be moderated
somewhat by Velasco's statement that compensation will be
paid?partly in cash, partly in bonds. The amount to be paid
each landowner. has yet to be determined.
?
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)
Top Secret
,
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