THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 17 JUNE 1969

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005976831
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 17, 1969
File: 
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PDF icon DOC_0005976831.pdf133.91 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 The President's Daily Brief 17 June 1969 19 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY I. MAJOR PROBLEMS MIDDLE EAST Since the six-day war, both Egypt and Israel have been upgrading their early-warning radar capabilities, and both countries are now substantially better prepared for any eventuality. In 1967 the Israelis penetrated Egyptian airspace both by flying under the Egyptian radar screen and by approaching Egyptian territory along routes not adequately protected by existing radars. A new study shows that this will not be so easy in the future.1 Because of its smaller size, Israel needs far fewer radar sites. / In addition, occupation of the Sinai provides a larger buffer zone between Egyptian airfields and the Israeli cities. VIETNAM Two rocket rounds were fired into downtown Saigon on 16 June, with no casualties and minor damage. Communist forces staged several attacks on allied positions. At 1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY least two North Vietnamese regiments in northern South Viet- nam are moving about, possibly a prelude to withdrawal for refitting. There is nothing significant to report on Europe or Soviet Affairs. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS SUDAN Three weeks after seizing power, the new regime-seems firmly entrenched. It has faced no effective resistance, and none is in sight for the moment. The populace seems willing to allow the regime a chance to fulfill its professed intentions; it has been quite successful in playing on pop- ular discontent with the corruption of the former government. The ultimate political orientation of the regime, how- ever, still remains in doubt. The government is mouthing the usual Arab nationalist slogans, but there has been a slow drift to the left. In terms of numbers the Communist position is substantial, with a dozen or more top-level positions in the cabinet and the military-dominated Revolutionary Council held by known Communists. Some factions within the party, however, are concerned that close identification with the government could endanger its future should a strong anti- Communist reaction occur. The party also continues to be FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY troubled by internal dissension, with some factions maneuver- ing to oust the present secretary general. The degree of Egyptian influence in the new regime is .also not clear. Pro-Egyptians, including the new prime minis- ter, occupy important positions in the government, and Cairo has expressed great satisfaction with developments2 Neither would find much comfort in a Communist re- gime in the Sudan, and it is likely that they will work to prevent such a consequence. Whatever the outcome of the present maneuvering for power, the regime will be faced with an almost insurmountable task of building a modern state. Sudan's economic backward- ness, its racial, religious and culturally divided populace, and its primitive political institutions present a challenge that has baffled all previous governments; this one is not likely to do much better. ROCKEFELLER MISSION Governor Rockefeller's arrival in Brasilia was unmarred by threatened violence. In Rio, police seem to have most of the violence-prone leftist leaders under wraps for the dura- tion of the visit but some demonstrations and a few noise bombs in the streets can be expected. In Sao Paulo, dissi- dents are still planning violence, and local security forces may react with greater vigor than in the other Brazilian cities. The ensuing street fight, if it occurs, will be noisy and could be bloody. FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200140001-2