THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 JUNE 1969
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005976825
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 13, 1969
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DOC_0005976825.pdf | 290.89 KB |
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_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007200110001-5
The President's Daily Brief
13 June 1969
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
.SOVIET AFFAIRS
The summary of Husak's speech Wednesday before the
international Communist conference, as released by Prague,
shows that the Czechoslovak party, chief stopped well short
of backing the Soviet invasion last August. Although Husak
criticized the Italian and Australian references to the in-
vasion as unwarranted interference in internal affairs by
parties not knowing the facts, he also was careful to point
out that the situation in Czechoslovakia--from Pubcek's
election in January 1968 to date--has never represented a
diversion from socialism. He further pointed out that there
had been enough internal strength to protect "socialist
achievements" last August, and though he mentioned weak-
nesses existing in the party. leadership and social structure
at the time, he probably meant to imply that Prague could
have handled the situation without Moscow's help.
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A number of Soviet ambassadors to non-Communist Asia
have been recalled to Moscow, presumably for a comprehensive
review of foreign policy in that part of the world. So far
we have no reports that diplomats in Asian Communist coun-
tries are to be included.
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Moscow probably believes the prospects of progress
toward settling the Vietnam conflict are now greater and
wants to formulate a policy for Asia in the postwar era.
The Soviets may also be influenced by signs that China is
cranking up its traditional diplomatic machinery again
after two years of inactivity.
Military activity in the Soviet Far East continues at
a high level.
EUROPE
The French Communists have now implied they will do
everything possible to assure that the party directive to
boycott Sunday's election runoff is not ignored.
Jacques Duclos, the Communist candidate in the first
round, stated recently that "there will be eyes everywhere
to mark would-be cheaters who try to make voluntary ab-
stainers vote." Duclos ostensibly referred to any attempts
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to rig the votes, but to many Frenchmen the implication was
that "big brother" would be watching to scare off potential
voters. A Ministry of Interior official stated that an ab-
stention rate of 00 percent or higher among Communist 'voters
was not unreasonable.
VIETNAM.
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MIDDLE EAST
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II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
KOREA
South Korean security forces lured a North Korean agent
boat into a carefully prepared trap yesterday off the south-
western coast of South Korea. The 75-ton "spy ship" had been
sent by .Pyongyang to exfiltrate an agent who had been secretly
captured and doubled by the South Korean CIA late in May. The
boat sank and its crew are all dead. A similar trap set last
August on Cheju Island, also resulted in the loss of a North
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?Korean boat. This incident comes in the wake of the abortive
landing attempt, on the east coast of South Korea last Sunday,
by the crew of another North Korean boat.
,LIBYA?
King Idris' recent acts of favoritism to powerful but
widely disliked court hangers-on have tarnished his image and
revived talk of removing him in favor of the ineffectual
Crown Prince. At annex we discuss some aspects of the present
political situation in this country, a classic example of slow
deterioration toward instability.
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PUK .11-1h IIKEYIDLIN1 UAL Y
LIBYA: DESERT POLITICS
? Many members of the Libyan establishment-the tribal,
religious, political, and military leaders who have tradi-
tionally monopolized the positions of influence under King
Idris--are getting worried about the power Idris has per-
mitted the two Shahli bothers, Umar and Abd-al-Aziz, to ac-
cumulate. The brothers, whose beginnings were relatively
modest, have benefited from the King's favor over the years
to such an extent that Umar is now one Of the most influen-
cial- advisers at the court and Abd-al-Aziz controls the Lib-
yan Arty,.
Faded with the prospect of possible eclipse by the Shahlis,
other influential Libyans Are plotting against the brothers.
As a rallying point for their activities they are using the
Crown Prince, a Colorless and ineffectual nonentity whom the
79-year--old Idris has never allowed to be trained for the mon-
archy. The King's recent decision to modernize the army, which
would provide the Shahlis with an even bigger power base, has
Stimulated the malcontents to even greater efforts. They may
try to move against the brothers before the modernization is
complete/
'Essentially all this plotting and infighting is a quarrel
over who is to get the largest cut of the spoils, which have
risen sharply with increased oil revenues. But there are
larger implications as well. The Shahli family has long been
known for its pro-Egyptian bias, although the attitude of
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its leading members have become increasingly conservative as
they acquire a larger stake in things as they are. The fam-
ily's numerous enemies, however, are totally committed to the
status quo but are united only in their opposition to the
Shahlis. They would almost certainly fall to quarreling among
themselves if the King were forcibly removed or retired.
Idris himself has provided the cement that has held the
disparate and antagonistic elements of the Libyan political
scene together over the years. Were he to go--and particu-
larly if he were to be removed by force--there does not seem
to be a single personality or interest group strong enough to
keep potential rivals for power from each other's throats.
Moreover, instability in Libya is likely to have wider impli-
cations for the area as a whole.
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