THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 JUNE 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976823
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 12, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
12 June 1969
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
Further study of the namelist of the new Communist "Pro-
visional Revolutionary Government" suggests that the Communists
do not intend it to serve- as a rallying point for neutralists
and other non-Communists who oppose Thieu but had no stomach
for the Front or the Alliance. The people named to the top
spots in the new "government" are all well-known hard-core
Communist-front professionals. On the other hand the power-
less and faceless political hangers-on who for years have
filled top positions in the Front and more recently in the
Alliance have all been shunted aside into an "advisory coun-
cil." The Provisional Revolutionary Government is clearly
designed to be what it calls itself, a "revolutionary" gov-
ernment which has inserted itself as the South Vietnamese
force to be dealt with on the Communist side of the table.
For openers, the PRG may well take as hard a line as Le
Due Tho did on 31 May on the subject Of dealing with the GVN.
The Communists may believe it is worth sticking to this line
for some time in order to see how, firmly the US is committed
to backing Thieu. But if they find that their gambit fails
to pay off in undermining the GVN, or in eliciting a favor-
able response from the US, they will almost certainly use it
for other bargaining purposes.
Some of the language in the Front's ten-point program
strikes us as especially significant in this regard. The
program lays out broad ideas for a settlement, at the heart
1
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CHINA
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93465 1-69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
of which is a "provisional coalition government" to be formed
after a cease-fire and before new general elections. During
,this period, according to the ten points, "neither party shall
impose its political regime on the people of South Vietnam."
This language suggests that the Communists are not putting
all their money on overthrowing the GVN or even on getting
Thieu booted. It allows for the continued existence of both
the GVN and the new Communist "regime" during such a period,
with their conflicting claims to Sovereignty still intact.
It may -mean that eventually the Communists will be willing
to leave these claims unresolved for the transitional stage
and to put them to the test of some form of elections. They
may envisage some joint provisional executive agency, the
members of Which would be drawn from the PRG the GVN and
other "political forces." This executive would referee the
elections.
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SOVIET AFFAIRS
The international Communist conference continues to bump
shakily along with dissident parties challenging Moscow's po-
sitionron China, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and points
in the conference document.
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The speech by the Italian party representative yester-
day was particularly critical of the invasion and anti-Chi-
nese statements on the floor. He said his delegation was not
willing to sign the document in its present form. Czech party
chief Husak rebuked the Italians later in the session.
The speech of Rumanian party boss Ceausescu on Monday
was moderate by comparison with the Italians. He did insist
on Rumania's right to dissent and to be independent of Mos-
cow. He hinted that he might not be able to sign the final
document but said his ,delegation would not walk out.
Many delegations are said to be critical of the vague
and haphazard methods of the meeting, and much work still
must be done on the wording of the basic document. No de-
cision has yet been reached as to whether the parties must
approve the document in toto or will be allowed to abstain
on some sections.
MIDDLE EAST
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The French have now decided--subject of course, to re-
view after Sunday's runoff election--to supply arms to Lebanon
after all. They say they will provide a gift of enough arms
' to equip two infantry battalions and will also grant a nine-
month credit of $1.6 million.
EUROPE
A recent restatement by Pompidou of his foreign policy
views showed a considerable degree of continuity with De Gaulle,
especially in his emphasis on France's role as a leader in
world affairs. The sharp edges were absent, however. More-
over, France's membership in the Atlantic Alliance was empha-
sized more than the General was wont to do.
Some specific points made in the speech are as follows:
--On relations with the US: France intends to maintain
its alliances, particularly with the US, always its friend
and ally., Peace in Vietnam would remove the last clouds from
US-French relations.
--On rapprochement with the East: This policy will be
pursued resolutely--especially with Moscow--and must take
precedence over condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czech-
oslovakia because a policy of blocs will inevitably lead to
conflict.
--On relations with Germary: France will remain faith-
ful to this reconciliation but the cooperation will not be
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
"privileged" (a term frequently used by De Gaulle) but "exem-
plary" (an example of cooperation for the rest of Europe).
--On Europe and enlargement of the Community: Move ahead
with projects already under way; Pompidou expressed approval of
the idea of enlargement but only after a meeting of the Six
followed by discussion with "candidate states." (This could
be interpreted as pointing toward a clearer but still distant
prospect of UK entry, provided London would be satisfied with
a good deal less than it wants.)
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
CAMBODIA
Sihanouk's statement yesterday regarding 'a resumption
of diplomatic relations with the US is another sign that de-
spite the tortuous twists and turns he is determined to get
Cambodia in a better position to play the US off against the
Vietnamese Communists; We do not know what, if anything,
prompted Sihanouk's latest volte face, but his reference to
an exchange of charges suggests that, at least for the mo-
ment, he intends to follow through.
We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the
announcement was made to strengthen Sihanouk's hand in cur-
rent negotiations with Hanoi over the border problem. Al-
though the full text of the press conference is not yet
available, Sihanouk once again referred to "very disturbing"
Vietnamese Communist encroachments in the border area.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
? Sihanouk's reaction to recent press stories regarding
US military actions in Cambodia, and how he solves the thorny
question of recognizing the Viet Cong's new "Provisional Revo-
lutionary Government," may reveal What game he is currently
playing.
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Top Secret
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