THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 JUNE 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976805
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: June 2, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
2 June 1969
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
Le Duc Tho's two-hour rejoinder to Ambassador Lodge's
statementAll their meeting on. 31 May is the first solid in-
dication that Hanoi believes the time has come for grappling
in private, with the main issues. The main new element was
his proposal that US and DRV negotiators take up "everything"
issue by issue on the basis of the Front's ten points, reach
agreements, and finally call in the Front and a "reformed"
Saigon government to sign agreement's and carry them out.
While. this cuts across the allied position that Saigon
should carry the bail on issues involving South Vietnam,
Hanoi has taken pains to make the suggestion tempting by
dropping its long-standing insistence that only the Front
could speak for the Communists on matters involving South
Vietnam. This dropping of some pretenses about the status
and, authority of the Front is a major departure for the Com-
munists, even though. its main purpose at this time is to
isolate the Saigon government.
Le Duc Tho's comments concerning the Saigon government
were tough and categorical He confirmed once again that
the Communists would never accept elections held under the
aegis of the GVN or within the present constitutional frame-
work. Tho flatly ruled out direct talks with GVN representa-
tives in any forum at least until there were changes in both
Saigon's policies and its leadership.
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Nothing Tho said suggests the Communists are going to
give any substantive ground soon or easily. His hard line
on the South Vietnamese Government in effect sets the stage
for a period in which Hanoi will concentrate on trying to
split Washington and Saigon in hopes of bringing down the
Thieu government.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT 01\1.17
EUROPE
Pompidou's share of the first round balloting--44 percent
of the vote--is not 'only three percent more than the polls had
predicted but also more than De Gaulle himself received on the
first ballot in 1965. This contrasts sharply with runner-up
Poher's 23 percent and Socialist Defferre's humiliating five
percent. Poher's poor showing, coupled with the fact that the
Communist candidate, Jacques Duclos, received over 21 ?percent
of the vote, will enable the Gaullists effectively to attack
Poher on the grounds that his victory in the second round
would be absolutely dependent on Communist voter support.
Moreover, in order to win on the second ballot Poher will
have to pick up not only all first-ballot Communist and So-
cialist voters but also some support from those who cast their
ballots for minor "new left" candidates--an extremely diffi-
cult undertaking. Poher's task may also be complicated by
defections from his own centrist camp.
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Another important consequence of the election will be to
increase the leverage of the Communist Party in its relations
with the non-Communist left. The trouncing of Defferre by
Duclos in the "election within the election" will add strength
to the argument that without Communist support the left is not
a viable political force in France.
The West German cabinet agreed on 30 May that in the fu-
ture Bonn will not automatically break diplomatic ties with
any state recognizing East Germany. This declaration is to
be given to all governments with whom the West Germans have
diplomatic relations. Although the Federal Republic will con-
tinue to regard recognition of East Germany as an unfriendly
act, its response in each case will be determined by prevail-
ing circumstances.
This is a victory for Foreign Minister Brandt and the
Social Democrats, who have long wanted to drop officially
the so-called Hallstein doctrine calling for severance of
relations with countries recognizing East Germany. It is
also a further stage in. the development of West German at-
titudes toward, acceptance and ultimate recognition of East
Germany, although formal recognition is still a long way off.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
At a Czechoslovak party plenum on 29-30 May Husak and
his colleagues began a housecleaning of the party membership
in order to consolidate their own position and to convince
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the Soviets that they are speeding the process of "normaliza-
tion." The leadership reprimanded or expelled a number of
unreconstructed reformists and initiated investigations into
the activities of others. Husak indicated that these measures
were just the beginning and that the party would take action
in the future against dissidents in other sectors of society--
for example, the trade unions, intellectuals and students.
Punitive actions, however, will probably be confined to ex-
pulsion from the party and possibly, dismissal from jobs. Ar-
rests are apparently not contemplated.
Pro-Soviet conservatives, who have been making a concerted
bid for power, failed to make significant gains at the plenum
and are probably only partly satisfied with the results. Husak
has made it clear that he will not tolerate hardliners who want
to return to the repressive practices of former party boss No-
votny. The expected removal of a liberal from the party sec-
retariat,, however, appears to have given the conservatives a
slight majority on that body.
The communique issued at the end of the preparatory meet-
ing of Communist parties in Moscow indicates that differences
over the text of the main document--on imperialism--remain un-
resolved and that the chief dissidents, the Rumanian and Italian
parties, are still unappeased. Although the communique does
not specifically state .5 June will be the opening date of the
conference, there is no positive evidence of further post-
ponement. Soviet prestige has been bolstered by the announce-
ment that the hitherto recalcitrant Cuban party will send a
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delegation of high-level observers to the conference. The
Yugoslav party has officially announced that
tend.
East.,
will not at-
There is nothing of significance to report on the Middle
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
VENEZUELA
President Caldera's request that the Rockefeller mission
postpone, today's visit will probably encourage other govern-
ments to request postponement or cancellation of visits sched-
uled,for later this month. President Frei of Chile has al-
ready told the US ambassador that Santiago would have to be
turned into an armed camp to deal with'expected demonstrations
against ,the visit. Argentina is also a good bet to request
cancellation.
Demonstrations and possibly some violence were being
planned by Venezuelan students and extremist groups, but they
probably would not have been any more serious than those al-
ready encountered by the Governor and his party.
CURACAO
Government officials have publicly blamed the difficul-
ties of the last few days on "foreign-trained Communists."
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some of the island's
small radical element were active during the rioting. Many
of the activists, however, are probably now under arrest, and
the original construction workers' strike has been settled.
Dutch marine reinforcements have raised military strength on
the island to 1,200 men, which should be sufficient to main-
tain order. The government probably will ignore the labor
unions' demand of 31 May that it resign or face new disorders.
The unions, however, are threatening a new general strike and
increasing numbers of threats are being received by US citi-
zens resident in Curacao.
MALAYSIA
The security situation in most parts of Malaysia has
improved, but Malays and Chinese are still eyeing each other
with deep suspicion. Among the Malays, exultation at having
?bested the Chinese has given way to fear of Chinese retalia-
tion. Many members of the Chinese community are indeed talk-
ing of retaliation, but for the moment at least, Chinese
leaders are urging restraint.
Deputy Prime Minister Razak and Home Minister Ismail,
who currently dominate the regime, see a period of at least
six months before their emergency council can relinquish con-
trol.
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