THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 MAY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976791
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 24, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
24 May 1969
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
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Under the bombast of the presentations at Paris on
Thursday by both Liberation Front and North Vietnamese dele-
gates were rather forthright attempts to spell out problems
the Communists have with the US eight-point proposal.
Than Buu Kiem stated that "according to the US," the
war would be continued during both the 12-month period when
mutual withdrawal would be taking place and during the pe-
riod when regroupment within South Vietnam of the remaining
non 7 South Vietnamese forces takes place. In Kiem's view,
this proposal is aimed at giving the US enough time to
strengthen the South Vietnamese army and government.
Kiem's statement reinforces the basic Communist objection
that allied proposals to date do not provide them adequate
security to insure even the survival of the Communist ap-
paratus, much less what the Communists regard as their right
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to establish a legitimate political power base. Kiem made
this point when he said that US proposals for mutual with-
drawal would leave Communist forces
Vietnamese military operations, and
elections conducted under the aegis
government.
at the mercy of South
again when he rejected
of the present Saigon
Kiem emphasized one of the Front's ten points that
"neither party shall impose its political regime" on the
South during an interim period between a
general elections.?
for a "provisional
which would, among
He also raised again
coalition government"
cease-fire and
the Front's proposal
in this period
other things, organize and supervise
elections. Kiem clearly left room for bargaining on this
key point, however. He did not insist that the Front's
proposal was the only way to tackle the problem of interim
political authority, but only that the situation required
a "provisional administration" to attend to "necessary work
following the restoration of peace."
Xuan Thuy in effect watered down the Communist demand
for an "unconditional" US troop withdrawal by acknowledging
that this was a "problem to be discussed." More importantly,
Xuan Thuy obliquely suggested that the method used to get
around the bombing halt impasse last year. (the so-called
"understanding") might also be suitable to resolve the troop
withdrawal issue. He did this by comparing what he called
the US demand for reciprocity from the Communists on troop
withdrawals to the 'previous administration's demand on the
bombing issue. Like all other Communist statements on this
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subject, Xuan Thuy flatly ruled out Hanoi's acceptance of
the concept of reciprocity or "mutual" withdrawal.
Xuan Thuy's appearance at the talks Thursday was ap-
parently his last for awhile; he leaves Paris today for
his first trip back to Hanoi since the talks started on
13 May 1968. The trip was probably prompted by a need to
take Stock in the wake of President Nixon's peace initiatives
and to devise new tactics to cope with them. The President's
speech of 14 May came just after the top North Vietnamese
official. in Paris, Le Duc Tho, had returned from nearly three
months of consultations in Hanoi and to have sent him back
would have conveyed an impression of disarray in the North
Vietnamese camp, especially with his politburo standing.
A
MIDDLE EAST
official, while convinced that 50X1
bilateral talks between Washington and Moscow offer the best
hope for reaching an agreed Middle East settlement, is pes-
simistic about the prospects of the two countries compromising
their differences.
If the bilateral talks break down,- the officer, 50X1
believes the four- 50X1
power exercise will become meaningless. Before this happens,
however, London plans to present--hopefully in conjunction
with the French--its full position on a settlement and, if
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there is still no agreement, to publicize this position in
order to marshal world opinion behind efforts to reach a
settlement.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The Rumanian party central committee held a one-day
meeting Wednesday at which party boss Ceausescu was chosen
to head the delegation to the 5 June international Communist
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conference. He received a "mandate" to work toward improving
the language of the conference document--that is to get ap-
proval for insertion of changes he unsuccessfully sponsored
in recent visits to Moscow and Warsaw.
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Moscow
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probably intended to influence their attitude50X1
toward China on the eve of the conference, charging that Chi-
nese troops have occupied six square kilometers of Soviet
territory as the result of events on 2 May. Other, evidence
suggests that the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border was the scene
of some sort of incident in early May; the Soviets leaked
this version to Western newsmen at the time but how closely
the present Soviet version accords with the facts cannot be
determined from evidence currently available. Moscow claims
that so far it has only protested the Chinese occupation and
is seeking the advice of fraternal parties. Some of these--
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most notably the Italian--criticized both sides over the.
Ussuri River clashes ?in March and the Soviets are apparently
trying to gain maximum backing against the Chinese by pro-
claiming a policy of restraint.
Moscow has concluded the extended range test series
of the SS-9 ICBM carrying multiple re-entry vehicles, and
announced yesterday that the closed area in the north
Pacific was again open to ships and aircraft. The three
tests conducted during the series were generally successful
although there appeared to be minor problems on one of
them. This multiple re-entry vehicle system could be
operational by the end of the year.
EUROPE
There is nothing significant to report.
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
LATIN AMERICA
Demonstrations are quite likely in most, and perhaps
Violence in some, of the countries to be visited by Gov-
ernor Rockefeller on the second phase of his Latin American
mission beginning next Tuesday.
In Colombia, the first stop, several youth and student
groups apparently are organizing demonstrations designed
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to embarrass the governor. Colombian security officials are
mainly concerned lest 'Lindisciplined and extremist students
try something rash.
In Ecuador, student disturbances have been going on
for over a month, and it is possible there could be some
violence designed primarily to embarrass the government.
Ecuadorean officials believe they. will be able to control
limited demonstrations, but are considering transporting
the governor from the Quito airport to the palace downtown
by helicopter if they appear to be getting out of hand.
Bolivian student leaders are reported to have agreed
to hold demonstrations in La Paz. The students also hope
to get workers and peasants into the streets on the day
of Rockefeller's arrival.
Finally, Venezuelan authorities are concerned over
the security situation primarily because of growing anti-US
student agitation and violence. Concern over the governor's
safety has led to a recommendation that he stay at the Ca-
racas military officers' club rather than a hotel.
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Top Secret
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