THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 MAY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976753
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: May 2, 1969

_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
The President's Daily Brief
2 May 1969
19
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I, MAJOR PROBLEMS
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Brezhnev took a remarkably conciliatory line on major
foreign policy issues in his May Day speech. In the key para-
graph he specifically endorsed "the solution of international
problems through talks." He then listed as the principal
items in the Soviet program a restriction of the arms race,
liquidation of the hotbeds of war in Europe, Southeast Asia,
and the Middle East, and the easing of international tensions.
There was no reference either to an ideological or a direct
military threat from the West.
On Vietnam, Brezhnev Said only that the "patriots" fight-
ing there knew that_they had the "sympathy and support of the
Soviet people." He did not mention the US by name or call
for "expulsion of the imperialists" as Grechko did last year.
His statements on the Middle East and Europe were equally tem-
perate, with no reference to the customary whipping boys-Is-
rael, West Germany, and NATO.
The Soviet leadership probably had several reasons for
choosing to show the world a more benevolent image. Today's
position contrasts with the Chinese attitude, lessens the op-
probrium of Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia, and thereby
strengthens Moscow's position at the forthcoming International
Communist Conference.
It may also have been designed to further a US-Soviet
dialogue.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Elaborate security precautions in Prague prevented sig-
nificant May Day protests against the new leadership of Gus-
tav Husak. The police probably will remain on alert until
after 9 May, the anniversary of the Soviet liberation.
In his May Day speech Husak attempted to break the coun-
try's mood of hopelessness, frustration, and uncertainty. He
hinted that as a result of his talks with Soviet leaders at
last week's CEMA summit the issue of Soviet troop withdrawal
might be negotiable--which could win him some support from the
"wait-and-see" group in the population.
EUROPE
Pompidou's lead in the presidential race has been widened
by the decision of Valery Giscard d'Estaing and his Independent
Republicans to support him. discard, who broke with the Gual-
lists over the referendum, was apparently promised an impor-
tant cabinet post.
Giscard's support breaks into the loose and inchoate cen-
ter elements from which Pompidou will need significant support.
This apparently will also be forthcoming. Centrist leader
Pierre Sudreau says that Jacques Duhamel, leader of the center
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
parliamentary group, is virtually "on board the Pompidou
train." Although other centrists are still looking around
for a man of their own group, interim President Alain Poher,
on whom they had pinned their hopes of rallying all center
forces, may not run. Meanwhile, Pompidou on the right and
moderate Socialist Gaston Defferre on the left are siphoning
off center support.
The Defferre candidacy is a blow to the Communists who
had hoped to unite with the non-Communist left in support of
a single candidate. They are cool to Defferre, who is too
close to the Center for them, but may back him in the end.
Given the setbacks the Communists have suffered this past
year--the crisis of last May and Czechoslovakia--the party
wants to avoid political isolation which running its own
candidate would imply.
MIDDLE EAST
It is becoming increasingly clear that Tuesday's Israeli
commando raid on the upper Nile did not produce the results
claimed for it in Tel Aviv,
newspapermen visiting the
installations attacked by the Israelis report that nothing
was seriously damaged. Even the Israelis are now saying that
the raid's purpose was psychological rather than destructive.
The Israelis might feel compelled to try again in order
to restore their credibility. They could even decide that
something on a bigger scale is called for this time.
3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA:RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
50X1
VIETNAM
Hanoi's top negotiator, Le Duc Tho, is in Moscow on his
way back to Paris.
50X1
50X1
50X1
Tho spent nearly eleven weeks in Hanoi this time--a per-
iod certainly long enough for the Politburo to have made an
extensive review of the negotiations and to have assessed the
spring offensive in South Vietnam. Tho's imminent return to
Paris does not necessarily signal an early shift in the Com-
munists' negotiating stance. It does suggest, however, that
Hanoi expects new developments in the talks over the next few
months and has dispatched Tho, armed with appropriate instruc-
tions.
Senator Tran Van Don has told our Embassy in Saigon that
he has been contacted by an intermediary, acting on behalf of
a high-ranking member of the National Liberation Front, about
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
the formation of_a coalition government. Don alleged that the
.Communists had asked him to "work with" General Duong Van "Big"
Minh. Don, along.with Minh, played a key role in the over-
throw of Diem in 1963.
Don claimed he had sent word back to the Communists that
coalition government is "impossible for the moment" and that
it "depends on the results in Paris." He said he had been
frequently contacted this way, describing his responses as
"moderately negative." In relating all this to the embassy,
Don may have been fishing for our reaction to the possibility
of a Don-Minh government which might be able to work out a
deal along the lines of the Communists' "peace cabinet" pro-
posals.
Don alleged--probably with 'a great deal of truth-,-that
"everybody has such contacts." The hopes of a sizable number
of politicians in Saigon that they might participate in a post-
settlement government is an important vulnerability which we
Would expect the Communists to play onto the hilt. The
obvious willingness of Don, and no doubt others, to keep their
lines open to the Front certainly does nothing to dissuade the
.Communists from the belief that they are on the right track
with their "peace' cabinet" strategy..
50X1
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
BOLIVIA
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04./27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOVIET UNION - CHINA
50X1
50X1
Satellite photography in mid-April of Damansky/Chen Pao
Island in the Ussuri River showed over a hundred craters on
the part of the island nearest China and the adjacent river
ice. These craters were. probably caused by Soviet artillery
fire during the heavy fighting on 15 March.. Prepared artil-
lery and antiaircraft positions could be seen on the Soviet
side of the river, along with several tanks and over a hundred
other vehicles and pieces of equipment. On the Chinese side,
no comparable reinforcement was observed, but defensive posi-
tions seem to have been dug near the island.
6
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007100010001-7