THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF (AFTERNOON) 28 APRIL 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976746
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 28, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
28 April 1969
(Afternoon)
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101? HE PRESIDENT ONLY
29 April 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
28 APRIL 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
EUROPE
Pompidou announced his candidacy this morning. (FBIS
12, 29 Apr)
MIDDLE EAST
Israeli aircraft this morning attacked Jordanian and
terrorist positions south of Lake Tiberias, according to an
Israeli announcement.
The crisis in Lebanon continues unabated. The embassy
in Beirut reports that:
--Former Premier Karami is willing to try again, but only
if he can achieve some kind of national consensus on the
terrorists. If Karami cannot put together another government,
President Hilu's only alternative is to call in the army.
--The army seems to be backing away from its determina-
tion to rein in the fedayeen.
--The Fatah terrorist organization seems willing to ex-
plore the possibility of a modus vivendi with the Lebanese,
but a rival, Syrian-supported organization remains intransigent.
The Lebanese suspect that even Fatah's apparent reasonableness
is only tactical and temporary.
--The fedayeen in Lebanon now number 1,200-1,500.
Israeli officials yesterday told an embassy officer that
the crisis had been triggered by the efforts of "leftists,"
with Syrian backing, to destroy the Lebanese political system.
They expressed concern that the crisis could spread to Jordan
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if Lebanon
does
not hold
the line.
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There is nothing significant to report on Vietnam or.
Soviet Affairs.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
BOLIVIA
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101? 'TIiI PRESWEN7 ONLY
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
EUROPE
So far, only Francois Mitterand has thrown his hat into
the French presidential ring. Pompidou is still silent, and
Giscard d'Estaing stopped short of declaring at his press
conference. Giscard did say, however, that he would not
support anyone who had been involved in the political bat-
tles of the past year, which we take to mean that he will not
back Pompidou. Despite many rumors to the contrary in Paris,
we tend to doubt that De Gaulle intends to run again.
Interim President Poher in his initial address called
for unity but neither announced his own candidacy nor set
a date for the election. We will report any further devel-
opments in tomorrow morning's late notes.
The West German cabinet last week once again postponed
a decision on the nonproliferation treaty, and the treaty's
opponents are saying openly that there is now no chance of
a German signature before next fall's elections. Foreign
Minister Brandt apparently has realized that both his par-
ty's vote totals and the treaty's prospects could be damaged
if the treaty (which is none too popular in West Germany)
becomes a major campaign issue. He therefore has recently
been pushing less strenuously for early signature.
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VIETNAM
MIDDLE EAST
The Israeli press is exultant over De Gaulle's resigna-
tion. Israeli officials
satisfaction is obvious. They do not expect a
sharp change in French policy, but they clearly anticipate
that Israel will get a fuller hearing in Paris now.
Their optimism seems justified. The French Government
probably will not make any major policy changes until after
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the elections, but none of De Gaulle's potential successors
is likely to be as rigid toward the Israelis as the General
was.
The Arabs and Israelis meanwhile continued to exchange
fire on all fronts.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
There is nothing significant to report.
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
PAKISTAN
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COMMUNIST CHINA
The composition of the 25-member politburo announced to-
day fails to reveal a decisive victory for any of the competing
interest groups in Peking. The listing of the members in the
Chinese version of alphabetical order successfully conceals
their relative ranking, but the body appears to be essentially
a compromise product balancing divergent political interests.
Most of Mao's more radical supporters who played major roles
in the Cultural Revolution are members. Their presence, how-
ever, is offset by an infusion of military men, some of whom
were severely criticized early in the Cultural Revolution.
This attests both to an attempt to legitimize the army's rble
in the party and to its importance in running the state. A
major surprise in the new ruling body is the absence of vir-
tually all of the central government ministers who served in
the previous politburo; this may suggest some diminution of
Premier Chou En-lai's political strength.
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. Lin Piao's "political report" also suggests that the
congress failed to achieve a consensus on several difficult
problems which have plagued the leadership in recent months.
Lin adopted a vague and rhetorical approach to the problems
China faces in the post-congress period and avoided delineating
specific programs. The prime policy issues discussed in d
tail were the vexed question of how to deal with officials
criticized during the Cultural Revolution and the need for
careful economic planning and renewed attention to increasing
production. He prescribed the "rehabilitation" of large num-
bers of cadres, suggesting that a considerable number of mid-
dle and lower level government and party officials will be
restored to duty.
The report touched relatively little on foreign policy.
Most of Lin's remarks were given over to generalized-denuncia-
tions of the United States and the Soviet Union. In this
context, Lin continued to maintain Peking's general silence
on the war in Vietnam, which was barely mentioned in passing.
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