THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 APRIL 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976726
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 16, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
16 April 1969
19
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PUK I tiL ITLVD1-INT ONLY
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17 April 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
16 APRIL 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
President Hilu of Lebanon says his government has made a
major decision to confront fedayeen groups by force if they
-attempt to cross the Lebanese-Israeli border. This has not
yet caused difficulties between Muslim and Christian officers
in the Lebanese Army despite the general Muslim sympathy for
the fedayeen movement. Hilu is convinced that all fedayeen
groups are basically revolutionary in their thinking and modus
operandi and will eventually become a captive of Moscow or
Peking despite their current backing by conservative Arab
states. He also understood from his Jordanian contacts that
a Major confrontation between Amman and the fedayeen would have
to take place in the near future.
VIETNAM
The limited activity in the I Corps area on 16-17 April
adds substance to other indications that the Communists intend
to step up their military activity in the northern provinces
in the weeks ahead. In addition to the indicated movement of
elements of two divisions and other independent units toward
I Corps, there are intercepts revealing increased supply
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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and heavy weapons movements into the Laotian panhandle.
(Central Intelligence Bulletin)
There is nothing of significance to report on Europe
or Soviet Affairs.
OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
KOREA
The destroyer USS Tucker confirms it has picked up two
bodies in debris 17 miles from the crash site of the EC-121
plane.
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The North Korean Defense Minister General Choi Hyun,
apparently talking to the officers and men of the North Korean
army unit responsible for the shootdown, thanked them for their
action and was quoted as saying that the flight was part of
planned preparations for "inciting a new war in Korea.
? ? ?
the situation remains tense and it shows that a war may break
out again at any moment." The speech appears to be part of
the North Korean effort
/to
keep its units alert to any military
US or South Korea.
reaction from
either the
A Chinese Communist newspaper in Hong Kong bitterly at-
tacked the "despicable Russian revisionists for shamelessly
and brazenly selling out North Korea by sending two warships
to help the Americans find the bits and pieces of the maraud-
ing plane. ...the Russian action would be acceptab]e if this
were a civilian plane and not a military intruder." (AP 283,
17 Apr)
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
Five major fedayeen organizations on Tuesday flatly re-
jected Husayn's recent proposals for a Middle East settlement.
They have of course consistently denounced all proposals in-
volving a negotiated settlement, and in the bargain have made
it clear that neither Nasir nor Husayn speaks for them in in-
ternational forums. What is significant about this latest
blast, however, is that Husayn has been singled out for spe-
cial treatment. This is yet another sign that the tenuous
six-month truce between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Govern-
ment is coming to an end.
The government has fumbled badly in its dealings with
the terrorists during Husayn's current trip abroad. When he
returns home tomorrow, Husayn will have his work cut out for
him if he decides to try to rein them in again.
The Lebanese Army, no doubt much to its own surprise,
managed to persuade the some 100 terrorists it clashed with
yesterday to withdraw. After considerable dickering the
terrorists got into Lebanese trucks and were taken to the
Syrian border.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The Czechoslovak central committee meeting tomorrow
will open in a charged atmosphere as it seeks to grapple
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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with the aftermath of the recent anti-Soviet riots. The
Soviets are maintaining pressure on the Dubcek regime to
purge the liberals from the leadership, to give a greater
role to party conservatives, and to reimpose party control
over all elements of Czech society.
Ata minimum, central committee conservatives, who are
in a minority, probably will press for an end to open ex-
pression of anti-Soviet sentiment, genuine control of the
press, and tighter discipline over party members. Moderates
and liberals will probably go along, but they may be ex-
pected to try to place limits on the censor's authority over
the media and will undoubtedly oppose any other conservative
proposals to restrict personal rights and liberties. The
leadership will probably try to steer a middle course. Mos-
cow has approved a party action program adopted last November
and seems to be pressing for its implementation rather than
revision.
Dubcek is reported ready to propose a reduction in
size of the 21-man party presidium. This will probably
mean the ouster or demotion of several liberals, includ-
ing Smrkovsky, as well as others who came into prominence
during the invasion in August 1968. The moderates, how-
ever, seem to have at least an even chance of retaining
their posts.
It is unclear how the population will react to per-
sonnel and policy shifts which it considers to be too
retrogressive. Students particularly are unreconciled
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to the reimposition of strict domestic policies and their
public declarations have been uncompromisingly anti-So-
viet. Trade union leaders have pledged their coopera-
tion in trying to calm the situation, but they cannot
guarantee the performance of the workers, who might join
the students if the latter go into the streets.
An unusually harsh winter has gotten the Soviet
economy off to a poor start for 1969. Bad weather not
only affected the agricultural sector (large areas of
winter wheat will have to be resown), but also caused
disruption in production and transportation schedules
and shortages of fuel and raw materials. Moscow blames
these factors "to a significant degree" for the slow
growth rate in industrial production in January and Feb-
ruary (only 2 1/2 percent above the corresponding period
of 1968; normally the Soviets shoot for a growth rate. of
about percent).
VIETNAM
There is nothing significant to report.
EUROPE
There is nothing significant to report.
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
KOREA
North Korean military activity since the shootdown has
been cautious.
No movement of North Korean forces has been detected,
nor has there been any aircraft activity in reac-
tion to the search.
The South Koreans are showing some concern over US re-
solve in dealing with North Korean attacks and the latest
incident is being cited as evidence that South Korea needs
more US military assistance. Calls for retaliation also
continue to be heard in SeouL
In Tokyo, opponents of the US-Japan security treaty
are trying to use the incident to exploit Japanese fears of
becoming involved in a Korean conflict. Both the Socialists
and the Communists ?are stressing that the aircraft was from
a US base in Japan.' Foreign Minister Aichi was hit by a
barrage of opposition questions in the Diet today.
For its part, Moscow remains noncommittal in its press
coverage, although it obviously does not mind any inferences
Pyongyang may care to read into the participation of Soviet
naval units in the search.
4
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
A recent outbreak of terrorism--much of it Communist-
inspired--is likely to draw some drastic reprisals from the
military which has been the main target of the ambushes.
Violence begets violence in the Dominican Republic, and the
situation could deteriorate if there is an escalation of re-
taliatory killings. All this has put President Balaguer in
a difficult position. He does not want to be left open to
charges of permitting the military to run amuck, yet because
his commanders are his main source of support, he does not
want to put them on too tight a leash.
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