THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 15 APRIL 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976724
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 15, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
15 April 1969
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LION 11-1E FKL3ILILIN 1 VIN L,
16 April 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
15 APRIL 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Dubcek's trip to Moscow apparently has been cancelled.
Press sources in Prague suggest that the cancellation was
due to continuing disagreement between Czechoslovak liberals
and conservatives. (Reuters 16 Apr) 3.5(c)
MIDDLE EAST
Lebanese troops clashed yesterday with a group of about
100 terrorists who had crossed into Lebanon from Syria. The
Lebanese are now trying to persuade the group to go back to
Syria, but they doubt that they will be able to do so. Four
firefights in the last week between terrorists and Israeli
forces on the frontier have made the Lebanese even more ner-
vous than usual about Israeli retaliation.
There is nothing significant to report on Vietnam or
Europe.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
KOREA
Two US destroyers are now in the area in which the US
, ?
plane was lost. It is still not clear if there are any sur-
vivors.
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Under the headline "American Plane Shot Down over North
Korea," Moscow newspapers this morning carried a brief account
of the North Korean news agency's version of the incident.
Tass, however, also reported the US Defense Department statement
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that the plane was
lost
over the
Sea of Japan.
? The South Korean press is demanding that the US re-
taliate against the North Koreans. Government spokesmen
have been more cautious. There has been no official govern-
ment statement so far.
The embassy in Seoul reports that there have.been no
reports of infiltration activity from North Korea since the
plane was lost. Nor have there been any firefights along
the Demilitarized Zone.
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I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
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MIDDLE EAST
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Exchanges of fire across the Suez Canal have increased
in frequency and intensity in recent weeks. Shooting of
some kind--most of it initiated by the Egyptians--is now a
daily occurrence. Artillery duels have become commonplace,
and there was another air battle on Monday. Neither side
seems interested in scaling down the exchanges; Cairo wants
to focus world attention on the problem and refute charges
of Egyptian inactivity, and the Israelis are more willing
to shoot back now that their hardened shelters are finished.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
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At annex today we discuss Soviet propaganda charges of
"Sino-US collusion."
EUROPE
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OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
Cambodian
with Viet Cong
Such incidents
in number than
but they are a
the Communists
CAMBODIA
border forces have fought several engagements
and North Vietnamese troops in recent months.
are not without precedent and are still fewer
those involving Cambodian and allied troops,
clear sign of the growing tension between
and the Cambodians in the border area. I
The change in the Cambodian attitude has resulted largely
from the heavier fighting along the border over the past sev-
eral years and the greater use the Communists have made of
their bases in the southern half of Cambodia. The heavy in-
flux of North Vietnamese troops may also have disrupted long-
standing local arrangements worked out by the Viet Cong with
Cambodian border officials./
Phnom Penh is also showing its increasing preoccupation
with Communist bases in other ways. Cambodian news media
have described in greater detail than heretofore Viet Cong
violations of the border,,and Liberation Front,representatives
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LAOS: ' Pak Beng Falls to Enemy
-22.
NORTH
VIETNAM
Sarnneua
/ Nam Bang
? /
Pak Beng uang
Praba.ng
cluong
Sob-I
4/71
ere.ii9
VIENTIANE
1-7 Communist-controlled
territory
Contested territory
THAILAND
. . 7P
MILES
94694 4.69 CIA
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have been maneuvered into public admission that such depreda-
tions occur. By applying such pressures on the Communists,
while at the same time moving toward a resumption of rela-
tions with the US, Sihanouk is again trying to achieve by
political means what he cannot by military.
For their part, the Communists are trying to maintain
as cordial relations as possible with the Cambodians. The
recent Cambodian actions do not seriously threaten Communist
bases in Cambodia, and the Communists are probably not overly
concerned about what the Cambodians can do in this regard.
LAOS
The Communists have captured Pak Beng, a government out-
post on the Mekong River in the northwest. On 14 April a se-
ries of enemy ground assaults led to the fall of the garrison
and several outlying defense positions.
This action caps a seven-month enemy effort to clear gov-
ernment forces from the Nam Beng Valley. The Communists prob-
ably wanted to draw off government guerrillas that had been
operating against Lao and Thai Communist elements along the
Thai-Lao border.
Communist forces have long contr011ed the area surround-
ing Pak Beng, but their new access_to, the valley will make
it easier for them to move troops and supplies into western
Sayaboury Province. The erosion of the.governMent's presence
in this area may also have considerable impact in the Thai
border area, where a Communist tribal insurgency has made
significant inroads.
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Around the Plaine des Jarres the government's counter-
offensive continues to make limited headway. The Communists,
probably thrown off balance by heavy air strikes have so far
limited their response to a series of probing attacks against
the neutralist headquarters at Muong Soui.
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TIM 1 LLL FK1J1DhN 1 UN L Y
SOVIET CHARGES OF SINO-US COLLUSION: HOW MUCH DOES MOSCOW
BELIEVE?
For the better part of the past- three years the Soviets
have been publicly charging Sino-US collusion on a wide range
of international issues, grossly exaggerating the extent
of dialogue between Washington and Peking. Moscow knows how
sterile the Warsaw talks have been over the years. Moscow's
allegations of collusion, therefore, are primarily propaganda
aimed at discrediting Peking. Moscow is in effect attempting
to turn back on the Chinese the charges of collusion with the
US which Peking has regularly leveled at the Russians. The
Russians also are seeking by innuendo and half-truth to im-
plant the idea that collusion accounts for the discrepancy be-
tween Peking's bold words and cautious deeds.
As with other major Soviet propaganda campaigns, however,
there is an element of real concern beneath the public charges.
In this case, the concern is over an eventual US-Chinese ac-
commodation at Soviet expense. Such an accommodatiorvi.s prob-
ably not considered likely in the short term, but there is al-
most certainly far less confidence about even the medium term,
As a result, Soviet officials frequently seek information on
the extent of contacts between the US and the Chinese, and on
possible US policy changes toward Peking.
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The Soviet concern that Peking may some day decide to
seek an arrangement with the US is perhaps not yet clearly
articulated in Moscow, but probably stems from Moscow's fear
that the post-Mao era in Peking will produce a more flexible
Chinese foreign policy. The Soviets probably realize that
Peking could indeed ease its isolation and gain diplomatic
maneuvering room by muting its simultaneous and absolute hos-
tility to both Moscow and Washington. The Soviets also prob-
ably judge that Peking would be more likely to edge toward
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Washington than toward Moscow, given the depth of Chinese
hostility to the Soviets. An attack on the Chinese leaders
in the current issue of the Party theoretical journal Kommunist
makes the statement that Maoist "foreign political steps have
at their base... tendencies of relying on any forces in the
political struggle against the USSR and other fraternal coun-
tries." ? This is probably an accurate assessment of the Krem-
lin's real feelings. On the other side of the coin, our em-
bassy in Moscow has reported considerable consternation among
vaious Russian officials over, statements by several prominent
Americans-at the recent US National Committee Meeting on Sino-
US Relations which advocated a significant US effort to
reach an accommodation with China.
Meanwhile, no incident is too small to be used by Moscow
in its effort to embarrass Peking. .Thus, following the Sino-
Soviet border clashes last month,. Moscow renewed charges that
the Chinese were obstructing Soviet aid destined for Vietnam.
The Chinese apparently did harass or refuse to cooperate with
Soviet officials at border transshipment points for several
days following the clash on 2 March, but the Soviets inflated
this to a claim that China had "closed its border". to Soviet'
aid for embattled Vietnam.1
In another instance late last year, a Soviet journal did
an expose on a commercial telephone link-the only one exist-
ing--between San Francisco and Shanghai citing it as an ex-
ample of US-Chinese cooperation. Probably embarrassed by
this publicity, Peking shortly thereafter broke the connection.
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The "Sino-US collusion" charge will continue to be
a polemical issue as long as Moscow feels that it can be
used to blacken Peking, and to help reduce the impact of
similar charges against itself--charges to which it is in-
deed more vulnerable than is Peking. In all probability,
Moscow does not believe the vast majority of its charges.
Given its traditional suspicions and its heightened ner-
vousness since the Ussuri River incident, however, Moscow
probably does believe there is a greater prospect of im-
proved US-Chinese relations than is apparent in Washington.
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