THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 APRIL 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976714
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 9, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
9 Apri/ /969
19
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FOR THE PRESIDENT UN L Y
10 April 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
9 APRIL 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Students in Prague intend to strike soon over the recent
restrictions on the press, and they are trying to drum up
support in the trade unions. The Dubcek leadership is trying
to calm the situation, but its influence with the students
has declined in the wake of its recent efforts to meet Soviet
requirements for "normalization."
The leadership is also worried about discipline and morale
in the Czechoslovak armed forces, in part because the Soviets
have expressed concern on the subject. President Svoboda has
visited four military posts in the last week.
There is nothing significant to report in the Middle East,
Europe, or Vietnam.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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PUN 1 HL PKESIDEN,1 ONLY
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
CANADA - COMMUNIST CHINA
Peking has agreed to "full-scale negotiations" with
Canada about recognition, according to press reporting from
Ottawa.
NIGERIA
Another 500 tons of arms for Biafra
are to arrive in Gabon by ship next
week,.
2
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
The Communists appear to be off balance as a result
of recent South Vietnamese initiatives on the peace is-
sue, particularly President Thieu's statement to the Na-
tional Assembly on 7 April. Communist responses continue
to be highly defensive and notable for their failure to
provide straight answers to direct questions about whether
they are rejecting Saigon's proposals or refusing cate-
gorically to negotiate with GVN authorities under any
circumstances.
This ambiguity was particularly evident in the Libera-
tion Front's "special" news conference held in Paris yester-
day. It was a highly inept affair and left newsmen puzzling
over why it was called at all. The Front spokesman claimed
he "had something to say," but his responses to questions
about recent South Vietnamese statements 'consisted solely
of tired cliches and epithets.
In view ? of the care. the Vitnamese'Communits--normally
take.in'-expressing their positions', their failure specifidally
to reject Thieu's offer is significant, That the Communists
are not closing the door on further contacts, and eventually
even negotiatiOns,-withGVN representatives appears obvious.
Indeed their ambiguous and clumsy responses may-be _ intended'?
to giVe:this impression In our view, hOwever, their-reactions
so far seem to reflect mainly the difficulties they are.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
having in coming to grips with SaigOrCs more confident and
forthcoming. stance concerning a future politiOal settlement.
We still think the Communists will not soon respond
positively to South Vietnamese feelers for private contacts.
They probably calculate that given enough time, the US de-
sire for progress in Paris will prompt Washington to take
new initiatives to set up private talks in the kind of four-
way format they seem to want.
Although we do not,eXpect-. the ?CommUnists-to-agree'-to?
private meetings with the GVN-at this point, we would not..
rule'out some overtures'..from.the. French. or. Soviets on be-
half- of the:Vietnamese ?Communists ?aimed - at.breaking-the icp.
in Paris, Hanoi may.well -consider- the post-offensive pe-
riod a sUitable time for such anindireCt.initiative It
might';. for example, take the form of another Soviet "w
have-reason-to-believe" statement suggesting the direction
in which we should move next if we want to see negotiations
move ahead.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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EUROPE
international agreement on plac-
ing voluntary limits on certain textile exports
Bonn has confirmed to a US Embassy of-
ficial Germany's dislike for such an agreement, although
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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he rsaid the GerMans'would listen to the US case The
officials of the Community are 'setting up their positiOns
becauseAhey expect Secretary Stans-to bring up the ques-
tion on his forthcoming European trip.
Apart from the textiles issue, the Europeans wel-
come:the Stans visit as an opportunity to discuss pro-
tectiOnist trends on both sides of the Atlantic?and the
Community countries may be interested in setting up some
kind of new machinery to resolve trade issues between
the US and the Common Market
SOVIETAFFAIRS
MIDDLE EAST
There is nothing significant to report.
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Nigerian Federal Drive Slackens
I3enue
Benin City
2nd Federal _Federal offensiye
?Division Okig
blunted by Biafran
Ell rAN Uzuakoli force
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
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94418 4-69 CIA
215 510
STATUTE MILES
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NIGERIA
Federal spokesmen have been claiming their forces
are getting close to Ojukwu's capital at Umuahia, but
Biafran military intercepts indicate that the federal
drive has in fact been blunted. Biafran forces appar-
ently still occupy the key junction of Uzuakoli and are
counterattacking a- few miles north( Of the town. ?Nor is
the federal offensive producing any gains elsewhere on
the Biafran perimeter.
Lagos apparently genuinely believes the Biafrans
have lost Uzuakoli--it has invited a group of foreign
correspondents to visit the town--and the disappointment_
when the truth comes out will add,:to the undercurrent of
unhappiness with Gowon's government. (MAP)
LAOS
At Annex we discuss the Communist military threat
and the role of Laos in Hanoi's over-all negotiating
strategy.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Map 1
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FUR "IHE PRESIDENT ONLY
THE CURRENT COMMUNIST THREAT IN LAOS
Recent fighting in Laos has once again surfaced the
specter of a Communist military victory there and has
raised questions about North Vietnamese aims in that
country. The North Vietnamese position is that the prob-
lem of Laos will have to be settled apart from the talks
on Vietnam. We might expect the Communists to take as
much additional territory as possible prior to reopening
talks on Laos. On close inspection, however, it seems
reasonably clear that the current offensive has only lim-
ited objectives and probably does not presage an impending
Communist call for renewed negotiations.
By most objective criteria, the dry season offensive
mounted by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces this
year has been notably restrained. Except for some not
unexpected--although still dangerous--inroads in the north,
the Communists have gained no substantial new territory,
brought no great numbers of new people under their con-
trol, captured no important political or population cen-
ters, nor otherwise significantly improved their tactical
Or strategic position in the countryside. This year's
dry season operations, at least through the first week
of April, have been carefully modulated, unadventuresome,
and essentially defensive in nature.
A comparison with last year's dry season offensive
might help put the current situation in sharper relief.
Last year at Nam Bac, the enemy dealt government forces
the worst defeat of the war, putting out of action close
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uang Prabang
PLA/NE
ES
JAR
teng Khouangville
NORTH
VIETNAM '
Ta Vien
ha Thom
VIENTIANE
orikhane
THAILAND
0 Government-held location
0 Communist-held location
501.1744
94380 4.69 CIA
STATUTE MILES
T I
o 10 20
N 'LOME 'CRS
THAILAND
CAMS00111
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to 3,000 troops, capturing vast stocks of arms and ammu-
nition, burying government pretensions in north-central
and northwest Laos, and, finally, precipitating a crisis
of confidence in Vientiane that has not yet run its
course.
In the northeast, where much of the enemy's ac-
tivities have been centered this year, the Communists
captured the guerrilla base at Phou Pha Thi, demonstrat-
ing the vulnerability of any government position no matter
how "impregnable,"
By early March, government guerrillas in Samneua and
Xieng Khouang provinces were in full retreat, an attack
against Na Khang was thought to be imminent
and nothing--or so
it seemed at the time--stood in the way of a clean Commu-
nist sweep.
Farther south, the Communists pushed government
forces out of Ta Vieng and Tha Thom and moved down-
ward along Route 4, harassing the provincial capital of
Borikhane and raising a new threat to the Mekong River
town of Paksane. To the east, the enemy moved against a
number of guerrilla bases defending the approaches to Meo
leader yang Pao's headquarters at Sam Thong. In the pan-
handle, North Vietnamese troops moved out of the infil-
tration corridor and captured, for the first time, the
town of Muong Phalane situated on Route 9. More impor-
tantly, fresh North Vietnamese battalions surrounded the
provincial capitals of Saravane and Attopeu, pushed the
government out of the rice-rich Sedone Valley, attacked
A2
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and eventually occupied Lao Ngam, and all but sealed off
the strategic Boloven$ Plateau. To do their work, the
Communistsare estimated' to have-brought in as many, as
12 additional battalions ftom-North Vietnam.
In contrast to last year's formidable roll call,
the Communists this year have captured only one major
government base--Na Khang--and have brought heavy pres-
sure to bear on only, one
Thateng; They also. have
against irregular forces
strategic government position--
increased harassing attacks
in northwest Laos and have
taken a number of preliminary steps to move back into
Vientiane Province, from which they were driven several
years:ago. But on the whole the Communists' drive.has
fallen considerably 'short of last year's threshold.
There is, in short, not only sufficient reason .to query
why the Communists have not pursued last year's gains
with more,vigor, but also reason to qUestion whether
there has actually been a full "offensive" this year.
What then, is the basis of the alarmist statements
that have been made by government leaders in Vientiane,
the sense of foreboding that engulfs the capital? In
part, the situation reflects diSappointMent that the
Paris talks have not made more progress and thatthe end
of the fighting in Labs, after all of these years of
conflict, is still not in: sight Deep down the answer
lies in the Laotian psychology--the expectation that
each Communist blow may be the beginning of the end.
The fact remains, nevertheless, that the North Viet-
namese could, with assets already on hand and with little
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or no warning, move to the Mekong, overrun major politi-
cal and population centers and, in short order, bring
Souvanna Phouma's government to heel. That North Viet-
nam has refrained from moving in this direction over
the past seven years is a reflection of the fact that as
long as portions of Laotian territory contiguous to Viet-
nam are-in Communist hands, and as long as the struggle
for South Vietnam continues, what happens in Laos is of
secondary-importance.
Hanoi has been reluctant to press for a military
solution in Laos, in part because it cannot predict what
the US response might be, and in part because a military
move that seriously jeopardized Souvanna's government
would of necessity also be of such a character as to
appear to the world to be a clear case of aggression
against a "neutral" country. A move of that nature in
Laos would tend to undermine Hanoi's political posture
in the South Vietnam struggle and would probably alien-
ate some of the international sympathy and support that
the Communists clearly covet.
Despite these limitations on its freedom of action,
North Vietnam plays from an extremely strong hand in
Laos, and is in a position to up the ante anytime it
chooses. If the Communists want to precipitate a full-
blown crisis in Laos--either with the intention of push-
ing Souvanna into an unfavorable settlement or of exer-
cising some leverage on the US in Paris--there are a
number of pressure points where they can do so at
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relatively little military cost. It would probably take
a dramatic turn of events in South Vietnam to force the
Communists' hand, but Hanoi retains the option of play-
ing its trump cards in Laos whenever it sees fit.
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Top Secret
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