THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 APRIL 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976706
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: April 4, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
4 April 1969
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PUK 1 [it 11KLYILIL1N 1 UNLY
5 April 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
4 APRIL 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Prague was calm yesterday afternoon?
Some of the groups which have been at the center
of anti-Soviet activity seem to be knuckling under. The trade
unions have announced for the first time since the August in-
tervention that they will join Dubcek's "normalization" ef-
forts, and union leaders are working hard to avoid a general
strike over proposed price increases. Czechoslovak journal-
ists, on the other hand, are
They were sharply criticized
Party's executive committee.
UPI 034, 5 Apr;
still giving ground reluctantly.
today by the Czech Communist
(Central Intelligence Bulletin;
There is nothing significant to report in the Middle
East, Vietnam, or Europe.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
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LAOS
Government forces yesterday abandoned the southern_ Laos base
of Thateng. The move was not precipitated by an enemy at-
tack; rather, it was ordered by the regional commander in the
face of low troop morale and difficulties of resupply and rein-
forcement.
The loss of Thateng--the first significant government posi-
tion in southern Laos to fall, into enemy hands this year--does
not by itself alter the military equation in the Bolovens
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Plateau area. It is, however, another result of an enemy
campaign dating back to 1967 to isolate the Bolovens and confine
government troops to areas along the Mekong River. Recent
Pathet Lao harassments along Route 13 appear to be part of
this effort. In addition, fresh pressure against small gov-
ernment positions at Keng Nhao and Paksong may be designed to
remove the last vestiges of government presence in the nort4-
ern part of the plateau.
The military situation in northern Laos meanwhile re-
mains quiet.
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I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
Several public statements by the Vietnamese Commu-
nists over the past few days suggest that they will con-
tinue to react negatively for a while to any approaches
for secret talks between the GVN and the Front. Tran
Buu Kiem on 3 April characterized recent US statements
on secret talks as "cunning treachery" aimed at divert-
ing public pressure "which demands an early end to the
war." A Liberation Radio commentary, also on 3 April,
made, the same charges.
Nevertheless, the Communists are seeking to keep
the door slightly ajar on possible future private talks.
Kiem quoted the Liberation Front response to Thieu's
call for private talks, in which the Front stated that
"the decisive question is not to talk this way or that;"
this clearly leaves open the( possibility of a Communist
agreement to private talks in the future.
The same Front statement presented a new formulation
describing the "decisive question" as "whether or not the
Nixon administration wants to put an end to its aggression
against Vietnam; whether or not it wants to withdraw un-
conditionally all US and satellite troops from South Viet-
nam." A commentary in the party daily on 3 April used the
same language. Previously the usual Communist formulation
was that the US "must end its aggression" and l"must withdraw
its troops..." (Underlining added.)
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This kind of semantic variation of basic themes
is a favorite Vietnamese Communist teChnique for intro-
ducing a hint of flexibility into hard-line, maximum pub-
lic positions. In regard to the bombing halt, for in-
stance, the North Vietnamese implied that an agreement
in principle by the US to stop the bombing unconditionally
would be sufficient to move them toward full negotiations.
In fact, however, Hanoi demanded that the US set a specific
date for ending the bombing and that the bombing actually
end before Hanoi would move ahead into substantive talks
with the GVN present.
In this regard, it should be noted that in his presenta-
tion on 3 April, Tran Buu Kiem also restated the hard-ver-
sion of the Communist demand--"the key to the settlement of
the present South Vietnam problem is that the United States
must withdraw all its own and satellite troops from South
Vietnam, without asking any condition whatsoever, and let
the Smith Vietnam people settle themselves their internal
affairs, in accordance with the political program of the
Liberation Front without foreign interference." (Under-
lining added.)
Thus we regard the Communists' attitude as being in-
clined against opening private talks between the Front
and the GVN, at least for the present. The Communists
apparently still believe their best tactic is to stand
firm for a while until they see whether domestic pres-
sures within the US will force the administration's hand.
At the same time, the Communists will continue to send
2
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,
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out vague signals suggesting they are ready for bargain-
ing on the key issues without in fact compromising their
basic positions.
The Communists may be attempting to orchestrate the
flexible phrasing of their public position with a slow-
down in the pace of their military offensive in South
Vietnam. Activity initiated by the enemy has remained
at a sharply reduced level for more than a week. The pull-
back of main force units continues in I and II Corps,
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Recent satellite photography provides the first
firm evidence that the "Shaddock" cruise missile launcher
has been deployed near the Sino-Soviet border north of
Manchuria. The Shaddock can deliver a nuclear warhead
to a range of about 300 miles. This missile augments
two other mobile missile systems that have been moved
to the border as part of the general Soviet buildup ,
of forces which has been going on there for several
years.
According to members of the Czechoslovak military
mission in West Berlin, Warsaw Pactieaders,- have "con-
firmed" that there would be a reorganization of the
3
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Pact to provide for increased command responsibilities
for personnel from member states. They said that East
German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman, who is the logical
choice fora high position because of his age and ex-
perience, has been in Moscow preparing for his new duties.
The Soviets presumably also consider Hoffman to be
a logical candidate for any new job because he is likely
to be more amenable to their direction than any of the
other defense ministers. The continuing absence from
public view of Bulgarian Defense Minister Dzhurov has
led to speculation that he too may be in line for a new
job, possibly as Hoffman's deputy.
In recent years, the Eastern European members of
the Pact--particularly the Rumanians--have been press-
ing the Soviets for a share in the Pact's command struc-
ture. All the members will probably welcome any institu-
tional change, but many of them probably will have doubts
that any practical effects will flow from the appointment
of such hard-line dogmatists as Hoffmann and Dzhurov.
EUROPE
On ,27 March a daily news letter published by Georges
Broussine,a Gaullist with an "in" to the Elysee Palace, con-
tended that US relations with Europe "turned a page" fol-
lowing President Nixon's visit. The letter stated that the
US now considers it has relations with the individual states
of Europe, not with the continent as a whole. This letter
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could be considered an indication that the French are playing
a psychological warfare game, particularly with the Italians,
Dutch, and British, attempting to frighten them by implying
that Washington is preparing to abandon them in favor of im-
proved bilateral relations with France. It conflicts, how-
ever, with another line taken by Paris, that the President's
visit created a good atmosphere but that neither side changed
its basic views on Europe.
MIDDLE EAST
The embassy in Tel Aviv has indications that Jewish emi-
gration' from the USSR to Israel has increased even more sharply
than we had thought. An embassy source reports that 600 Jews
emigrated in February alone. This is a higher rate than ob-
tained before the June 1967 war.
5
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa, faced with a growing deficit in its bal-
ance of payments, sold over 75 tons of gold on the free mar-
ket in Switzerland during the first quarter of this year.
The selling price averaged about $42 an ounce. Two-thirds
of the sales took place last month when a flurry of demand
for gold caused the price to rise sharply on the free mar-
ket. Despite Pretoria's reluctance to sell gold in quanti-
ties which might drive the price down, we expect substantial
new sales in the near future. South Africa's receipts from
gold sales in the first quarter--about $100 million--amounted
to less than half its payments deficit.
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