THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 MARCH 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976689
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 26, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
26 March 1969
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LATE Nurs ED
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
26 Mhreh [969
, THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
.26 MARCH 1969
VIETNAM
The Viet Cong radio today called Thieu's proposal for
secret talks with the NLF a "crafty trick aimed at covering
up the United States' bellicose and stubborn attitude,"
according to press reports from Saigon. (UPI 037A, 27 Mar(7h)
SOVIET AFFAIRS
VIDDLE EAST
Therc nnthing hignLficaut to roporl.
EUROPE
Therc is nothind si(jnificant to report.
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPVENTS
PAKISTAN
Ambassador Orhlert :;c1VI Ayub and General Yahyh Lhih
murnjnp. Both emphasized that Ayub's decjsion to step
f)(t:Nli)V,I\17.
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ITV? '17 E PR ESL
I.
26 March
down had been his own, and Yahya asserted that the
will be maintaining Aynh's economic and political
1969
military
policies
until a civilian government can be established.
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The country remains generally calm, but
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soon
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some unrest is likely as
as the regime's numerous opponents begin to find
their
footing.
PERU
NIGERIA
PRPOI )/,\7 (/'
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
Once the Communists have digested Thieu's statement
of willingness to talk privately with the NLF, they may
well dismiss it publicly in the way they have brushed off
other remarks by South Vietnamese officials. The "no
comment" approach adopted by Communist representatives in
Paris yesterday, however, indicates they are not going to
make such a move without some consideration in Hanoi.
Regardless of what the Communists say publicly, Hanoi
will take Thieu's statement, as well as President Nixon's
remarks yesterday on negotiations, as signs that the US
is anxious to achieve progress in the talks and to move
toward negotiations. Fundamentally, progress in Hanoi's
terms requires "recognition" of the National Liberation
Front as the prime spokesman for the Communists on matters
concerning South Vietnam.
The Communists are not likely to respond to Thieu's
statement with any initiative of their own. Hanoi prob-
ably calculates that pressures on the US for progress in
the talks will grow if the Communists continue to stall in
Paris and are able to string out their current military
effort in South Vietnam. They undoubtedly believe that
this situation will produce further initiatives from the
allied side.
For the time being, the Communists probably would
discourage any South Vietnamese bid for private contacts
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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with the Front, but without closing the door altogether.
Before they accept the idea of bilateral GVN-Front talks,
however, they probably want to involve the US at least in
some preliminary discussions which include the Front.
Perhaps they are pointing toward some kind of informal
four-way contacts during the tea break at the plenary
sessions in order to get the ball rolling.
The politically minded militant Buddhists and some
other local observers clearly believe that the Thieu gov-
ernment overplayed its hand when it allowed a military
court to hand down an unexpectedly harsh sentence to
Thich Thien Minh. The militant Buddhists are organizing
prayer meetings .and are circUlating protest letters ac-
cusing President Thieu, a Catholic, of trying to "anni-
hilate" Buddhism. They have noted the warning implicit
in the sentencing of Minh, however, and are proceeding
with caution.
Significantly, moderate Buddhist leader Thich Tam
Chau, who has been fairly close to the government, seems
to agree that the government made a serious mistake.1
Another political bellwether,
Senator Tran Van Don, has issued a statement of concern
about Minh's sentence and has urged the government and
the militants to compromise their differences.
2
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Despite considerable concern that the sentence has
set back national unity, there is also widespread recog-
nition that the militant Buddhists are trying to make
political capital of it. There is no evidence thus far
that the militants have been able to generate much popu-
lar indignation against the government.
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MIDDLE EAST
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EUROPE
The French government has been holding firm in its
decision to keep wage increases to about four percent,
and so far the unions have been unable to Mount an ef-
fective counter-attack. Although the recent one-day-
general strike drew an impressive number of participants,
it did not give labor the leverage it hoped to get
against the government Privately owned industries are
3
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evidently moving toward negotiations--a move supported
by the government and the employers' association. For
the moment, at least, De Gaulle seems to have won the
battle and labor is in retreat.
Nevertheless, wildcat strikes in the railway in-
dustry have served to illustrate general uneasiness in
the nationalized sector, which is now the most fragile
area on the French social scene. Unions representing
the nationalized industries have been meeting this week
to chart a course of action.
According to his chief aide, Willy Brandt wants to.
resume his dialogue with the Soviets in,Bonn.,and hopes
to schedule a meeting with Ambassador Tsarapkin before
Easter: The West Germans .do not have a clear idea of
what tdpics to raise at the meeting, but feel the re-
nunciation of force issue 'offers a point of departure.
SOVIET AFFAIRS'
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II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
PAKISTAN
The transition to martial law in Pakistan seems to
be going smoothly so far. Army rule is being greeted with
considerable relief in much of West Pakistan, and available
evidence (not much of the countryside has been heard from)
suggests the East Pakistanis are at least acquiescent. The
military in the east is trying not to offend the populace.
It is still not at all certain that the lid can be kept on
there, particularly if. East Pakistani leftists decide to
provoke a clash with the military.
NIGERIA
Radio Biafra has now announced Ojukwu's willingness
to receive Prime Minister Wilson during the latter's visit
to Nigeria. This is a more forthcoming attitude than the
Biafrans have taken up to now.
We still do not believe that either
Biafra or the federal government is willing to modify its
basic war aims, however.
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Intercepts indicate that the Biafrans are about to retake
Owerri, an important road junction and the closest point of
federal approach to Ojukwu's capital at Umuahia.
PERU
NATIONALIST CHINA - SOVIET UNION
Chiang Kai-shek has shown growing interest over the
past year in developing contacts with the Soviet Union.
His initial overture toward Moscow was a directive to tone
down Taiwan's propaganda attacks against the USSR. There
have been subsequent meetings between representatives of
the two countries, and Chiang has recently instructed one
of his most trusted diplomats to develop contacts with So-
viet officials in Europe.
Chiang apparently is seeking to exploit Soviet hostil-
ity toward Maoist China, and Moscow's consequent willingness
7
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to engage in at least semi-official contacts with the Na-
tionalists, to dramatize Peking's isolation and to enhance
the Nationalists' international position. Taipei presumably
hopes a display of Soviet interest in such contacts will
discourage non-Communist governments from seeking diplomatic
relations with Peking.
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