THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF (MORNING) 24 MARCH 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976683
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 24, 1969

E
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The President's Daily Brief
24 March 1969
(Morning)
19
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
In his private meeting with Ambassador Lodge on 22 March,
Xuan Thuy indicated that the North Vietnamese are in no hurry
to open private four way talks or to use the two-Way talks to
get immediately into any meaningful dialogue. North Vietnam's
procrastination in accepting the US invitation and its appar-
ently deliberate avoidance of any private contact during the
public session on. 20 March seem designed to dispel any impres-
sion that, the Communists are eager to get on with.a settlement.
Although it is possible that Xuan Thuy had to wait' for new in-
structions from Hanoi, this seems unlikely in view of the rou-
tine nature of his remarks. He did not depart from well es-
tablisheclhardline positions on any of the issues presented by
Ambassador Lodge.
Although he insisted on a unilateral US withdrawal, Thuy
said if the US expressed a "willingness to withdraw," the
North Vietnamese would "Create conditions" that would enable
it to do so. This is similar to the language used by the
North Vietnamese in their efforts to obtain a bombing halt.
It may have been intended to suggest the possibility of un-
acknowledged NVA withdrawals.
Thuy was especially hard on Saigon, perhaps in an effort
to promote direct.US talks with the Liberation Front. Here
again, however, the Communists probably thought it necessary
to take an initially hard line. There are other indications
1
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that the Communist attitude toward Saigon has some give in it.
Even Liberation Front delegate Tran Buu Kiem in last Thursday's
public session left room for Saigon when he said all four parties
could discuss a settlement (on the basis of the Front's five
points, of course, and after unconditional US withdrawal).
The Soviets do not seem to boggle over including Saigon
in private talks. Soviet Counselor Tchernikov strongly im-
plied to Assistant Secretary Bundy on 19 March that if the US
was interested in talking only. to Hanoi, then the Liberation
Front ought to be talking concurrently with Saigon in private.
Thuy, however, ignored Ambassador Lodge's challenge that
Hanoi and Washington could hardly deal with the Communists'
four and five points when some of these points involve the in-
ternal affairs of the South Vietnamese, When Ambassador Lodge
pointed out that the Communists' own rule book insists these
matters can be. settled only by the South Vietnamese, Thuy took,
refuge behind the Communists' traditional public position--
the Front. is the true spokesman of the South Vietnamese and
the US.must."deal" with it.
The North Vietnamese also revealed some nervousness over
the possibility that Peking might interrupt Soviet aid ship-
ments. Thuy warned the US not to take
tension between Peking and Moscow, but
sibility of,interruptions of military
prehension on the part of Hanoi. The
comfort from the renewed
his allusion to the pos-
aid strongly, implied ap-
Soviets showed the same
nervousness in the 19 March conversation with Bundy. Tcherni-
kov insisted that the Chinese have interrupted air shipments
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32
CYPRUS
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during the current border flare-ups and will probably con-
tinue to do so. He maintained, however, that aid would get
through even if it had to be sent by sea.
There is still no firm evidence that the Chinese have
significantly interfered with aid shipments.
Tchernikov's remarks about sea shipments are at variance
with Moscow's previous reluctance to send identifiable mil-
itary aid to Vietnam in this manner.
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MIDDLE EAST
For the first time in six days there was an artillery
duel at the southern end of the Suez Canal today. An Israeli
army spokesman said Egyptian and Israeli guns were exchanging
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heavy fire along a 15-mile front. There was no report of
casualties. The recent lull in fighting in this area has
been attributed to sandstorms.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The East Germans sent out "high-level feelers" during
the past week suggesting that an improvement was possible in
relations with West Germany. Pankow was willing to stop
writing about arms production in West Berlin, to reopen the
Rothensee Lock and Mittelland Canal, as well as stop the
harassment of traffic. In return the West Germans were
asked to unfreeze East German savings accounts in West Ber-
lin and settle East German postal claims. The West German
cabinet will consider the question at its session next Wed-
nesday and our embassy thinks Bonn will probably grant some
concessions in the postal or economic field if anti-West
German propaganda and traffic harassment continue to taper
off.
EUROPE
There is nothing of significance to report.
II. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
army.
INDONESIA
President Suharto is consolidating his control over the
ihe wishes to restore primary military authority
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to the army general staff; in recent years much authority has
been assumed by regional commanders. With the anti-Communist
security program well in hand, Suharto apparently sees a tight-
ened army structure as a practical move both to increase his
own political control and to achieve greater consistency in
government adminstration. He is especially interested in
strengthening central direction of the government' five-year
economic development plan.
In a farewell meeting with Ambassador Green, however,
Suharto gave the impression that. he was aware that:economic
stability and progress will not automatically resolve the.
Communist threat and that the influence of the Communist
Party of Indonesia is greater in certain quarters than pre-
viously suspected although recent insurgencies in Java have
been crushed. He expressed to the Ambassador his concern
over the deteriorating condition:, of his military equipment
and the capabilities of the army to cope, with the insurgency.
threat.
5
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Top Secret
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