THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976636
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 26, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
26 February 1969
19
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
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50
EU.W.PE,
Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn-, who has been seeing
a lot of the French recently, has his own ideas about the
genesis of the "Soames affair." Thorn says both:Debre and
State Secretary Lipkowski:had been trying for months to per-
SuadeDe-Gaulle that unless he made some,new initiative, the
British would be in the Common Market "on their own terms" in
1974.. The two allegedly Urged the General to make 'a proposi-
tion which would be. aimed at attaching the British. toone of
several "trading communities" while preserving their eXCIAISion
from the Common Market. Thorn sees De Gaulle's pitch to Soames
as a.sign that the French President accepted this advice.
This is not necessarily inconsistent with Ambassador Shri-
ver's view that concern about West German resurgence is what
2
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motivated De Gaulle. What seems clear is that for a combina-
tion of reasons--including recent trends in the European Com-
munities as well as the French decline vis-a-vis West Germany--
De Gaulle felt he was losing the initiative and was becoming
increasingly isolated.
A German foreign official tried a new tack last weekend
in discussing the nonproliferation treaty with US officials.
The conversation apparently reflected a West German effort to
develop an interpretation of the treaty which preserves the
possibility of a European nuclear force.
To do this the Ger-
mans have to get around Article 1, which binds the signatories
not to transfer nuclear weapons to other countries.
The official made it clear that the Germans had no inten-
tion of proposing a European nuclear defense system, but he
observed that Bonn does not consider such a-system inconsis-
tent with the treaty, Article 1 notwithstanding, He suggested
that Article 10, which recognizes that the signatories may in
"extraordinary circumstances affecting their security" take
actions otherwise prohibited by the treaty, might be used to
justify a. collective deterrent even under present cirCumstances
The Germans do not expect US approval of this position
during President Nixon's visit, but they are certain to bring
the subject up.
3
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ACCESS ROUTES TO BERLIN
Autobahn
Road
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--=--,? Canal
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20 40 /4i/es
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to Allied Military Liaison Personnel s
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auen
./ CZ ECHOSLOVXAKIA
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SOVIET AFFAIRS
West Berlin and. East German authorities have agreed to
meet on 26 February in East Berlin to discuss the question of
the presidential election. At the same time, East Germany
has publicly reiterated its position that it is willing to
negotiate an Easter pass agreement only if the West Germans
find a new site for their presidential election. A prominent
West Berlin Senat official has told the US mission that if the
East Germans are not prepared to go beyond the offer of wall
passes at Easter, there can be no basis. for serious negotiations
Meanwhile the commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East
Germany has imposed temporary restrictions on the travel of
Allied military mission observers during the period 24 February -
10 March. The restrictions apply to the area north, south and
west of Berlin extending to the West German border. The Berlin-
Helmstedt autobahn normally used by Allied personnel in West
Germany when traveling to Berlin ig not included in the ban.,
The restrictions are probably intended to cover the announced
Warsaw Pact exercise and to provide an opportunity for harass-
ing tactics if the election is held as scheduled.
The young man who set himself on fire in Prague's Wences-
laus Square yesterday may have been trying to dramatize the
anniversary of the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. The
suicide, however, is likely neither to generate public distur-
bances nor to precipitate a political crisis as the population
has been more or less numbed by over 30 self-immolation attempts
since Jan Palach burned himself last month.
FOR, THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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22-
CHINA
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93465 1-69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
The shape of the enemy's current offensive remains basi-
cally unchanged after more than three days of action, although
its pace has slackened somewhat. The Communists are continu-
ing to emphasize widespread but generally light rocket and
mortar attacks--occasionally accompanied by limited ground
probes--against province anddistrict capitals and allied mil-
itary bases.
Saigon and its environs remained free of enemy activity
during 24-25 February; the same was true of Hue. At Da Nang,
however, there has been some ground fighting on the outskirts,
and the infiltration of weapons and sappers into the city is
reported to be continuing.
Thieu's assessment of Communist plans and capabilities
as given to Ambassador .Bunker on 24 February was that we can
expect more shellings, harassment, and probably some ground
attacks in a few areas. He said that the pacification effort
in the country had been checked only in a limited way so far.
He admitted however, that with his military commanders pre-
occupied with the enemy offensive, there would be some loss
of momentum in the pacification effort.
In'general, Thieu was in a buoyant mood and pleased with
the way his forces and the people of South Vietnam were re-
sponding to the Communist attacks. He said there has been no
rushing back into the urban centers by the people as happened
last year. It was Thieu s impression that the Communists are
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
having trouble coordinating their offenaive and that our spoil-
ing operations and the uncovering of large caches of material
had neutralized the enemy's ability to move large units into
action.
Thieu's preliminary assessment may be somewhat optimistic,
however. Although it is correct that the enemy has scored few
tactical successes so far, he has demonstrated again the con-
tinued viability of the Communist military machine throughout
South Vietnam. Moreover, the generally limited nature of the
offensive to date has left the Communists with a number of op-
tions, including the commitment of regular combat forces which
have thus far been held in reserve. In addition, the extent of
Communist gains in rural areas cannot yet be assessed; in one
instance, somewhat at variance with Thieu's statements, contin-
ued pressure has forced the relocation of more than 5,000 per-
sons to the provincial capital of Song Be in III Corps.
Thieu also told Ambassador Bunker that he had instructed
Ky to take along Ambassador Lam when Ky meets with President
Nixon in Paris. Thieu is under, no illusions about Ky's ambi-
tions, and he probably is aware of Ky's current campaign to
convince the US that Prime Minister Huong and other cabinet
members ought to be replaced'with "strong" people, i.e, Ky
and his supporters. Thieu probably believes that as long as
his appointee, Ambassador Lam sticks close to Ky, the vice
president will be somewhat restrained from broaching the
subject of a cabinet change with President 'Nixon.
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II OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
CUBA
the Cubans 3.3(b)(1)
are preparing a "comprehensive policy to discourage hijackers.
Preliminary agreement has been reached with Mexico on a bi-
lateral hijacking treaty 3.3(b)(1)
jthe Cubans will soon issue a declaration
which might be used as the basis for other bilateral agree-
ments.
3.3(b)(1)
Havana is still
unwilling to work out an agreement with the US except on its
own terms.
PANAMA
Colonel Torrijos lost no time in assuring Ambassador
Adair that relations between Panama and the US will be much
smoother now that Colonel Martinez is out of the way. He
also says he plans to release most of the political prison-
ers now in Panamanian jails--with the possible exception of
the Communists.
Martinez and his three associates, meanwhile, arrived
in Miami two nights ago. They show no sign so far that they
intend to take up their posts on the Inter-American Defense
Board, and we understand they are thinking about chartering
a plane back to Panama.
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Top Secret
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