THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976628
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 20, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
20 February 1969
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21 February 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
20 FEBRUARY 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
French UN delegate Berard yesterday confirmed to
Ambassador Yost that Paris was opposed to using the four-
power talks merely as a device to revitalize the Jarring
mission. He said the French believe that the four powers
should get into substance, that "public opinion" would
conclude the talks were not worthwhile if they were con-
fined to a restatement of previous positions. Berard also
said Paris attached great importance to President Nixon's
upcoming talks with De Gaulle, which will offer a further
opportunity to clear up "misconceptions" about the French
attitude.
EUROPE
In Bonn's initial reaction to Moscow's announcement
of the military exercises to be staged in East Germany in
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POK "1 HE PRESIDEN1 UN LY
early March, a spokesman confined himself to a terse
statement that West Germany "is not surprised."
SOVIET AFFAIRS
There is nothing significant to report.
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
COMMUNIST CHINA
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The embassy in Warsaw suspects that, barring the
development of a critical new situation which the Chinese
might feel calls for special contact, there will be a pro-
longed suspension of the Warsaw meetings. The Chinese told
a British correspondent Thursday that they had no present
plans for resuming the talks.
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
There is nothing of significance to report.
EUROPE
Herve Alphand told Ambassador Shriver on Tuesday
that the British wanted to "paint the French into a cor-
ner and isolate them within Europe" and admitted that
London had succeeded.
French statements following the cabinet meeting on
Wednesday suggest that De Gaulle principally wants to
prevent any further coalescence around the British and
does not at this point wish to let the crisis develop
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further. At the same time, in confirming France's boy-
cott of WEU Council sessions. Paris has taken a hard
position from which it may be difficult to retreat. The
French say they will stay away until all WEU members
agree to institute political consultations only on the
basis of unanimity.
The Annex today deals with the European Communi-
ties and European unity.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The Berlin scene remained quiet today except for an-
other temporary slowdown in traffic early in the day.
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The Eastern Europeans, through various nongovernment con-
tacts, are continuing their efforts to reassure us that
no Berlin "crisis" is imminent and that Moscow will not
tolerate any "nonsense" from the East Germans.
VIETNAM
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II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
NIGERIA
Federal leader Gowon has made his first visit to a front
line divisional command headquarters, probably to try to en-
sure some coordination by Lagos of the three federal divisions
and to shore up sinking morale among the troops. The division
that the
federal failure to launch a coordinated attack on the Biafrans
resulted from a lack of direction from Lagos.
deteriorated among
flicted wounds are
morale has seriously
federal forces and desertions and self-in-
on the increase. There is also evidently
some dissension among the three division commanders.
USSR-PERU
The recent Soviet-Peruvian trade agreement fails to live
up to Lima's expectations in that it does not include any
specific trade goals. The Soviet delegation told the Peruvians
that it was not authorized to discuss any significant expan-
sion of trade or conclude any agreements for technical as-
sistance or for commercial credits. This strongly suggests
that while Moscow is willing to lay the groundwork for closer
economic relations, it still wants a better idea of the Velasco
government's policies before undertaking any major commitments.
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1-40K 11-1E PRESIDENI UN LY
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND EUROPEAN UNITY
The European Communities--the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), the Coal-Steel Community (ECSC), and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)--are still in the
throes of becoming a full-fledged economic union. They are
a long way from realizing their original intention of evolv-
ing into a political union. The progress made so far has
given the six members a strong vested interest in continuing
the integration process. If they are blocked at the present
stage of development and membership, however, the Communi-
ties would hold little promise of evolving into a valid "part-
ner" of the US. Moreover', unless effective "European" insti-
tutions emerge, the member states will be tempted either to
"go their own ways," or the stronger among them--France or
West Germany--will. seek to dominate the grouping.
Over the past decade, the Community has made remarkable
economic progress, as a 56 percent growth in GNP between
1958 and 1967 indicates. .(The comparable figures for the US
and the UK were 51 percent and 35 percent, respectively.)
The Community has experienced a decade of expanding industrial
output and generally high employment. Farm output, moreover,
is 29 percent greater than in 1958, the unit size of farms
is increasing, and 500,000 persons are leaving agriculture
every year. In 1968 the customs union was completed--18
months earlier than provided for in the Rome Treaty; the free
movement of workers, with social security benefits and pro-
tection, was assured; agreements were reached benefiting
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transport and agricultural workers; and the Community ad-
vanced toward the goal of a common commercial policy at
the end of the transition period in 1970.
These achievements seem less impressive when compared
with the remaining obstacles to full realization of economic
and political union. Despite the basically favorable farm
trends noted above, the EEC's farm policy poses serious
difficulties for world agricultural trade and continues to
confront the Community with its gravest internal problem.
Support prices--set at high levels in large part because
of pressure from German farm interests--have led to mount-
ing surpluses in grain, dairy products, fruits and sugar.
These surpluses generate pressures for increased protection
against imports and subsidies for exports. The enormous
burden of financing and marketing these surpluses has led
to increasing friction among the members, especially France
and West Germany. Paris, more and more frequently, is re-
calling that the initial "bargain" underlying the Common
Market--expansion of the market for German industry in re-
turn for guaranteed outlets for French agriculture--will be
jeopardized should Bonn balk at making continued high pay-
ments to the common farm fund. Ironically, however, it is
France which, because of the political implications, resists
giving the community sufficient tax resources to finance the
fund; Paris knows the other five would insist that the Euro-
pean Parliament be given real powers over the management and
disposition of these "European" revenues.
In 1969 the Community will have to negotiate a new
financing arrangement for the post-1970 era. The disputes
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will be stormy. Since "constitutional" questions are in-
volved, the outcome will have implications for the Commu-
nity's political development going far beyond the issues
of agricultural policy. The financing question is already
bound up with the Commission's proposals for land reform,
which aims at radically fewer farmers and bigger farms.
The Commission argues that such a reform is the only escape
from the exorbitant burden imposed by the present agricul-
tural policy. Commissioner Mansholt--perhaps the most ar-
dent "European" in the Commission as well as its agricul-
tural czar--wants to bring Community agriculture into equi-
librium by 1980. The proposed reforms would involve dangers
for US exports, but Mansholt is seeking US understanding for
his proposals, contending that without them, the US and
other outside suppliers of the Community will eventually
have even more problems in selling in the Community market.
The same strains which are evident in the debate over
agricultural policy pervade almost all areas of Community
activity. The competition between national and Community
solutions to common problems runs through discussions of
economic and financial policy coordination, nuclear and
technological development, commercial policy, and social
affairs. Opposition by the French to community solutions
is reflected in their dislike of a strong Commission, their
scorn for the principle of majority voting, and their re-
sistance to any meaningful role for the European Parliament.
They are not alone, however, in seeking national solutions
and insisting on getting a fair return for the money they
contribute. The work currently being done on technological
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cooperation among the Six, for example, does not point to-
ward an integrated approach.
The Commission in its recent annual report assigned
prime responsibility for the Community's malaise to the
failure to open negotiations with Britain and the other
candidates for membership, noting that "one member" blocked
these negotiations. This is not the first time the Commis-
sion has pointed a finger at France, and it has taken action
against Paris when infractions of community regulations were
clear. On balance, however, the Commission's performance
under President Jean Rey has been an uninspired and cautious
one. This is in large part a result of the 1965 crisis when
France sought by boycotting the Community's institutions to
reduce the Commission's powers to those of a secretariat.
In consequence the Commission--with the notable and vocal
exception of Mansholt--is doubly eager to avert another
great crisis which might destroy the Community as the focus
of European unity.
Other and equally convinced Europeanists believe, how-
ever, that a flanking strategy is necessary in order to up-
hold the larger goal of political unity during this period
when Britain's exclusion has in any event slowed the Com-
munity's development. Hence the various Benelux and Italian
plans to maintain and expand contacts with Britain--with or
without French participation. With the German proposals
for "commercial arrangements" between Britain and the commu-
nity coming to nothing, the British have eagerly backed
Italian Foreign Minister Nenni's proposal for using the
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Western European Union (WEU) as a point of increased contact
between Britain and the Continent. London has also seized
on the opportunity provided by the Italian proposal to call
for political talks on a subject--the Middle East--in which
London has a natural leadership role. France's boycott of
WEU until further notice is basically a reaction to London's
success in thus acquiring some European credentials, rather
than to the alleged illegality of the WEU meetings. Should
the French be unable to prevent continuation of these dis-
cussions, another Community crisis may be in the offing.
An all-important difference, however, between the present
situation and 1965 is the active presence of the British in
the game. A repetition of overt French attacks on the Com-
munity might well encourage just the kind of solidarity be-
tween the Five and the British which Paris seeks to avoid..
As always, the important swing vote belongs to the Germans,
and Kiesinger has up to now refused to cast it against D
Gaulle.
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