THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976626
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 19, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
19 February 1969
19
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32
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
20 February 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
19 FEBRUARY 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
Cairo's semi-official newspaper Al Ahram declared in an
editorial today that Arab commandos would mount attacks on
Israeli targets anywhere regardless of reprisal raids. It
asserted that Palestinian Arab resistance would not lessen
despite any countermoves by Israel. (Reuters, 20 Feb 69)
Iraq today executed seven more men accused of spying
for Israel. None apparently was Jewish. (Reuters, 20 Feb 69)
EUROPE
The US Embassy in Bonn reports that there were in fact
two West German statements on the WEU controversy Tuesday.
The first, presumably issued shortly after French Ambassador
Seydoux met with Kiesinger, stated that Bonn believed that
except in "exceptional cases," meetings of the WEU Council
"may only be convened by unanimous vote." The German Foreign
Ministry took umbrage at this, however, and succeeded in
forcing the issuance of a "corrective statement" which as-
serted that Council meetings which take place by turns "do
not need prior unanimous consent." Last Friday's meeting,
the statement said, was such a meeting. 50X1
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SOVIET AFFAIRS
There is nothing significant to report.
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VIETNAM
We share the US delegation's view that the French, by
telling us of their tete-a-tete with Le Duc Tho before he
left Paris, are trying to convey an impression that they have
a special relationdhip with the North Vietnamese. This also
may be part of a buildup for De Gaulle to approach President
Nixon with some ideas on the war which the French can pass
off as coming directly from the North Vietnamese. The French
have not been at all forthcoming concerning their contacts
with the Communists in the past few months. We cannot be
certain, but we sttongly suspect that Hanoi would not put
much trust in France as a channel to the US at the moment,
especially when out contacts through the Soviets are so well
established. Regardless of what case the French try to make,
the Communists probably regard their talks with the French
as just one more way to put pressure on the US to adopt such
ideas as the need or a "peace cabinet" in Saigon.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
There is nothing significant to report.
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MAJOR PROBLEMS .
MIDDLE EAST
Eshkol today convened his ministerial committee for se-
curity affairs to ponder the attack on the El Al plane at
Zurich. Israeli spokesmen have dropped contradictory hints
as to the possible target (or targets) of any retaliatory
strike. Transport Minister Carmel pointed a finger at Lebanon,
but he widened the range of possibilities when he told the
press, "the responsibility for such acts is not only with
the perpetrators, but with the Arab states in which these
acts are being planned and where the terrorists are being
equipped."
The French, who earlier had been anxious to get started
right away on four-power discussions, now want to delay them
until De Gaulle has met with President Nixon. Paris also
seems at-this point to have rejected the US bid to convene
the four powers for the limited purpose of giving Jarring a
new lease on life. The decision appears to have been made
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by De Gaulle, who is said to be "not at all pleased" at what
he considers American hesitancy to enter substantive discus-
sions.
The spectre of a peace "imposed" by the great powers has,
however, stimulated a more forthcoming Israeli attitude to-
ward the Jarring mission. They have hinted that they are
now willing to offer concessions to him if he renews con-
tacts with the Middle East parties free of great power influence.
The
today on the WEU crisis was that it
threaten a boycott of WEU meetings.
WEU members, including Britain, had
sibility of some threats from Paris
EUROPE
only surprise about the French statement issued
did not do more than
Several of the other
not excluded the pos'
against the? European
Communities. France may realize there is not much it can
do publicly in the present crisis. It may be concentrating
instead on diplomatic arm twisting. The French ambassador
in Paris was scheduled to see Kiesinger today, and Debre
summoned the Luxembourg foreign minister to Paris.
Embassy reporting from The Hague suggests that the Brit-
ish, Dutch, and Italians still have the bit in their teeth.
The Dutch reportedly have suggested that another WEU Coun-
cil be called to discuss Greece's membership in the Council
of Europe, and the British are said to have suggested a whole
list of initiatives, including the transfer of WEU headquart-
ers to Brussels and the appointment of full-time representa-
tives. One Dutch official, however, said he expected Brussels
and Bonn to make propitiating gestures toward Paris soon.
2
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? Bonn's position seems ainbiguous at the moment. Kiesinger's
office issued a statement last night which according to the
press lends support to France's argument that last week's
WEU meeting on the Middle East was "illegal." (The text of
the statement itself is not yet available, however.) On the
other hand, a ranking foreign office official in Bonn today
told the US Embassy that Kiesinger himself had approved the
German decision to attend the meeting on the Middle East.
The official reiterated that Germany strongly supports the
use of WEU for political consultation between the British and
the Five (as long as WEU rules are not broken), even if the
French do not want to attend. In fact, he said, it has been
France's own actions in the past which have weakened the WEU
structure and regulations.
Following the sharp increase in the Paris price of gold
on Monday, reports from Paris now suggest that the French--
in anticipation of the President's visit--are working over-
time to get De Gaulle's views on monetary questions into the
best light. Their line, as stated particularly by the influ-
ential financial writer of Le Monde, is that the new US ad-
ministration is basically in sympathy with De Gaulle's in-
ternational monetary views. He and other writers claim to
see the new Nixon administration progressively excluding
from consideration all monetary reform proposals except the
well-known French ones--an increase in the official price
of gold and a movement toward an international monetary
system based on a pure gold standard. A corollary of this
3
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is that the US and France must share the same leaky boat the
repair of which involves joint devaluation through an increase
in the price of gold.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
There have been no further harassments of Berlin traffic
since the two-hour tie-up early this morning.
VIETNAM
We are unable to make very much of the private conversa-
tions Mr. Jorden and Ambassador Vance recently held with their
North Vietnamese counterparts. With Jorden, Nguyen Thanh Le
used the familiar technique of promising good (but unspecified)
results if the US would agree to withdraw its forces from Viet-
nam. His statement that the Communists have "rejected" the
Manila formulation on troop withdrawals is the usual hyperbole
and should not be taken at face value.
Ha Van Lau's remarks to Vance constitute the most direct
invitation yet to the US to open substantive discussions on
specific issues. His suggestion that-we take up the Front's
standard "five points" as a beginning is undoubtedly the way
the Communists would like to proceed. His request for a
statement of the Nixon administration's objectives in Viet-
nam is a much more straightforward approach than the North
Vietnamese usually employ, but it has long been clear that
Hanoi wants to get a clearer idea how the US views the shape
of a final settlement.
4
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Despite Hanoi's emphasis on the importance of set-
tling political matters in Paris, the Communists prob-
ably are willing to tackle withdrawal of forces as one
of the first issues. As on other substantive matters,
the Communists have not tipped their hand to any sig-
nificant extent on this issue. Nonetheless, there is
considerable evidence of Communist thinking about with-
drawal of forces. Based on a review of this evidence,
we see the present Communist position roughly as fol-
lows:
,--The Communists want a clear US commitment to
the principle of complete withdrawal of all US military
forces from Vietnam within a specified time. They will
be seeking such a commitment early on in private talks,
but they eventually will want it made public in nego-
tiated agreements.
--They clearly are interested in the withdrawal
formulations used in the 1966 Manila Declaration, as
given to them repeatedly by Ambassadors Harriman and
Vance. They doubtless wonder at present if the sub-
stance of the Manila formulations remains US policy.
--The Communists are not likely to accept, much
less carry out, any agreements resolving this military
problem or any others without some parallel understand-
ings on broader political questions.
--Their demands for "unconditional" withdrawal of
US forces are propaganda and clearly intended for openers
only. They expect to bargain on.this issue, and they
know that they will eventually have to pull out substan-
tial forces of their own. They are unlikely to agree
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to any kind of solid inspection and verification arrange-
ments to monitor withdrawals, however.
--The Communists anticipate that the withdrawal of
US forces will be gradual, perhaps requiring several
years. There have been hints that they expect the US
to maintain military bases in Vietnam for some time af-
ter a settlement.
There is new evidence which adds to persistent in-
dications that the Communists are planning attacks in
6
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192 194
106 198
CHINA
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93465 1-69
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Saigon soon. /
Several recently captured Communist soldiers have
mentioned plans for early action against selected tar-
gets in and around the capital.
General Kerwin of II Field force believes an at-
tack in the III Corps area will come this weekend.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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CAMBODIA
Dissident Activity
1967
Sustained guerrilla activity
Sporadic guerrilla activity
0 100
MILES
1968-9
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
CAMBODIA
a sharp rise in insurgent ambushes, harassments
of villages, and propaganda activities. Armed clashes
have been almost as frequent as last year; much of the
fighting this time, however, has apparently been at the
government's initiative.
Most of the action is centered in the northeast, where
army units have destroyed several tribal insurgent camps and
large rice caches, and in the western provinces, where the
dissidence first appeared two years ago. Smaller scale
rebel adtivities continue, however, in almost every other
province.
PERU
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FRANCE
At Annex is the discusSion of internal problems affect-
ing the French Government.
9
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'PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Non-Communist Left
Communists
PDM (Center) , Independent. Republicans
42 43
UDR
199 '(Gaullist Party)
GOVERNM'ENT
COALITION
73
9 ,Unaffiliated
FOLLOWING MARCH 1967 ELECTIONS
Total 487
Independent Republicans
PDM (Center)
Non-Communist Left
61
293
GOVERNMENT
COALITION
UDR
(Gaullist Party)
Communists ( 34
' 9 Unaffiliated
( I
FOLLOWING JUNE 1968 ELECTIONS
Total 487
93889 2.69 CIA
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INTERNAL PRESSURES ON THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
SIGNIFICANCE: The setbacks of 1968 bruised France somewhat
but did not weaken De Gaulle's grip on the country and the
people. He remains firmly in the saddle. Underlying his
present strong position is the continued support of a major-
ity of the French population, a massive Gaullist majority in
the National Assembly, and the loyal support of his Prime
Minister and cabinet. Nevertheless, his government faces a
constellation of interrelated domestic political problems
arising from continued student and labor unrest and pressure
on the franc.
The government is not now, and is not likely to be over
the next few months, under significant pressure from organ-
ized and traditional political forces in France. Last June's
elections reduced to less than 25% the parliamentary repre-
sentation of all the opposition parties combined. In addi-
tion, there is considerable--and continuing--antagonism
within the opposition. De Gaulle's own party now holds such
a massive majority in the Assembly that it no longer requires
support from its allies, the Independent Republicans. Al-
though the Gaullist party is heterogeneous and often restive,
it is unlikely to oppose De Gaulle on? any major issue, much
less attempt to replace him. Parliamentary elections are not
due for five years, and De Gaulle's presidential term runs
until 1972. Thus, any serious challenge to the Gaullist re-
gime in the near future will come from outside the established
electoral and parliamentary system.
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Potential sources of such a challenge reside in the two
groups which precipitated last May's crisis--students and
workers. Student unrest continues to be one of France's ma-
jor political problems, despite a full-scale government ef-
fort to deal with the defects in the educational establish-
ment after last May's crisis. Minister of Education Edgar.
Faure, with the full backing of the general, is trying to
sap the strength of the minority left wing of the student
movement by inducing the student majority to give academic
reforms a fair test. De Gaulle is hedging bets, however,
and has also encouraged the Minister of Interior to beef up
security forces for use in the event that the radicals get
out of hand.
To date Faure's efforts have failed to win widespread
support in the student milieu. Radicals remain in control
of the student movement--in part because of the failure of
moderate elements to organize effectively--and can still stir
up minor campus disorders such as have occurred over the past
two months. Nevertheless, radical student leaders are acutely
aware of their political isolation, and are urging their fol-
lowers to avoid the "trap" of another major confrontation
with police. More importantly, the radicals have. had no luck
in enlisting workers to their cause; an isolated student re-
bellion without mass worker support would pose no serious
threat to the regime. Such support is unlikely unless work-
ers are made gravely dissatisfied by the outcome of scheduled
wage negotiations this March.
The enactment of the landmark trade union rights law in
December 1968 put the unions in a much stronger bargaining
A2
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position than a year ago. As a consequence, union leaders
are anxious to avoid a recurrence of the May disorders.
They calculate that they can gain more by moderate approaches
to their goals than by militant tactics which risk plunging
the economy into turmoil once again. The mood of the rank
and file is more difficult to determine, but the slim worker
response to last week's "day of action" suggests that, if
something close to their salary goals is achieved in March
negotiations with management, labor unrest is not likely to
reach crisis proportions.
Even if, as we expect, serious labor unrest is avoided
in March, the government still faces difficult problems.
Mainly because of restrictive monetary policies adopted to
shore up the franc, there will probably be an economic slow-
down in late spring which could cause at least a temporary
rise in unemployment. While these policies also have the
beneficial effect of reducing the trade deficit, the French
international financial position nevertheless remains pre-
carious. Factors not subject to government control such as
major strikes, student disturbances, monetary crises in other
major countries, or even a temporary increase in the trade gap,
could increase already shaky confidence in the franc and trig-
ger another wave of speculation. Present exchange controls,
although relatively effective to date, would probably not
hold up in a crisis situation.
If in that case external financial aid or other limited
measures failed to reduce pressure on the franc, De Gaulle would
be confronted with the choice of imposing further austerity
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measures or devaluation. Given his desire to avoid domestic
unrest, he would probably opt for devaluation, thus attempting
to export his problems--with all the implications this could
have for the international monetary community.
The outlook for France, then, is for various degrees of
social and economic instability ranging from sporadic labor
unrest and student disturbances to a renewed attack on the
franc and possibly its devaluation. It is unlikely, however,
that unrest will reach a level of intensity comparable to
that of last May or great enough to overthrow De Gaulle.
Neither last May's crisis nor the November franc crisis
forced a change in De Gaulle's foreign policy and defense
views. Nor are the problems which he will face over the next
few months likely to prompt him to alter significantly French
policy on NATO, nuclear strategy, the enlargement of the Euro-
pean community, East-West relations, the reform of the inter-
national monetary system, or France's mission to chart a
separate course in world politics. On such matters, he re-
mains convinced of the rightness of his conceptions and im-
pervious to any contrary advice from his colleagues.
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