THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976599
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 4, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
4 February 1969
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93478 1-69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
5 February 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
9FEBRUARY 1969
MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
There is nothing of significance to report.
EUROPE
There is nothing of significance to report.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
There is nothing of significance to report.
VIETNAM
Vice President Ky has told Ambassador Lodge that he in-
tends to return to Saigon on Saturday, 8 February. His pur-
pose is to put more pressure on President Thieu to reorgan-
ize the South Vietnamese government and in particular to re-
place Premier Huong.
Ky has been telling American officials for some time
that the government of South Vietnam cannot deal effectively
with all the problems it will face in a post war competition
with the Communists unless the cabinet is strengthened. In
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Ky's mind, strengthening the cabinet means ousting his per-
sonal enemy Huong and several other cabinet members and re-
placing them with Ky's own supporters.
OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
CANADA
The Canadian Ambassador in Washington said yesterday his
government is considering advancing the timing of its initial
contact in Stockholm with the Chinese Communists from 7 Feb-
ruary to today, in view of press leaks in Japan about the
intended approach. There would also be an acceleration of
the public announcement, originally planned for 10 February.
CUBA
Havana, in reply to US queries, has given the Swiss a
note setting out its views on the hijacking problem and the
use of Miami-Varadero flights by Cubans wishing to return to
Cuba. The main points are:
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
--The Cubans are not willing to approve unrestricted
entry of all Cubans who might wish to return home
from the US; they are willing to consider any list
of names given them, but in no case could any person
who left Cuba illegally be permitted to return.
--The Cubans would be willing to permit passengers on
hijacked planes to return to the US on the same plane
provided the crew, airlines, and US authorities are
willing to take all responsibility.
--Havana does not consider it possible under present
circumstances to conclude a bilateral agreement with
the US.
--If the problem continues, Havana will consider taking
any measures it considers appropriate to resolve it
"in an adequate and just manner."
In a subsequent conversation with the Swiss Ambassador,
Castro's main argument was that the US is to blame for the
hijacking problem, since hijackers were usually individuals
who had left Cuba illegally, and the US had encouraged this
by receiving such people with open arms.
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PUK 1I-I1 I'Kh).11J1lN 1 U1N L Y
MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
The influential Jerusalem Post, which often reflects
Israeli Government thinking, recently suggested that for
any meaningful settlement Israel might better deal with
the terrorists than the Arab governments.
The fact that nothing came of last month's Jorda-
nian economic mission to Moscow was, oddly enough, pleas-
ing to both sides Both,for-teasons of their own, went
through the ritual of negotiations, seemingly only for
purposes of arriving at a congenial communique'. The So-
viets, of course, were interested in preserving". their
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POI< '1 Lit PKEVULIVI ONLY
image as friends of the Arabs. The Jordanians appar-
ently wanted to make their Western friends nervous
about their
the Soviets
for nothing.
future orientation, as well as to see if
could be induced to give them something
EUROPE
There is nothing significant to report.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The Soviets? failure to orbit a weather satellite
on 1 February leaves their program limping with only
one active monitoring system in orbit--and its useful
lifetime is probably about over. This will make it
more difficult than ever for Moscow to live up to its
obligations under a series of US-USSR agreements dat-
ing back to 1962 for timely exchange of meteorological
data.
The first successful Soviet weather satellite was
not orbited until 1966,.a year after the date set in
the agreement for exchange of information. Since then,
the USSR has sent only limited data to the US, most of
it late and of poor quality.
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FUR TI RE PKESIDENI ONLY
VIETNAM
A preview of Hanoi's initial substantive position
in the Paris talks may have been surfaced in Ambassador
Lodge's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Zorin in
Paris on 31 January. We share Ambassador Lodge's view
that the Soviets are right on top of events. in Paris.
In fact, it seems likely that Zorin was leading with
openers suggested by the North Vietnamese.
He suggested that the US should take the initiative
by starting to pull out US troops and then consider po-
litical matters. On the latter, Zorin baldly suggested
that Lodge should use his "influence" in Saigon to bring
about changes in the government so that talks could move
forward. This is a fine scenario from the Communist
point of view and precisely parallels their propaganda
line about a "peace cabinet" and the need for the US to
end its "aggression" as a first step toward a settle-
ment. Hanoi almost certainly believes, however, that
it will have to climb down from this position eventually.
Zorin's comments were another attempt to stake out a
maximum position at the outset of the.talks.
The Vietnamese Communists seem concerned about the
implications of partial US troop withdrawals prior to
some understanding on broader political issues They
would, of course, like to see the US withdraw unilater-
ally and completely without making the Communists pay a
price in return. But not only do they realize that this
3
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22-
CHINA
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93465 1-69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
is unlikely they also seem apprehensive about suggestions
that the US plans only a gradual withdrawal of its forces
as the South Vietnamese take over the main part of the
job. They realize that if this changeover were success-
fully executed, it would undercut what they consider to
be an element of prime leverage on the US--domestic US
pressure for political concessions to the Communists in
order to end the war and get US troops home. Le Duc Tho
Old Ambassador Harriman last month that the Communists
would have none of this,-and he strongly implied they
would try to prevent it with military force if necessary.
A recent Hanoi broadcast concludes on a similar note by
saying that the US cannot "de-Americanize" the war.
Ground'activity remained at a generally low level
yesterday. One rocket round landed in the Hue Citadel.
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1-1(J1( 1 tih t'K1,)11JJCIN 11 (JINL I
II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
KOREA
North Korea may be readying more guerrilla groups to
infiltrate the South. We have indications
that approximately four 15-man teams are taking
operational training. These may be the same four that
trained earlier with--but did not accompany--the eight
teams that landed on South Korea's east coast in November.
PANAMA
The current situation in Panama is the subject of
today's Annex.
PERU
Some government officials have finally become con-
vinced that the danger of US sanctions in the dispute over
the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company is
real, and the government is trying to trim its propaganda
sails accordingly.
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PUK PKESIDENI UN L Y
To us this seems in large measure a cosmetic change.
We believe Velasco and his nationalistic advisers are too'
heavily committed to the prosecution of their case to make
any significant concessions on the substance of the dis-
pute itself.
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GULF OF MEXICO
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93760 2-69
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1-VK "11-1E l'KE,S1DEN1 UINLY
PANAMA*
SIGNIFICANCE: Panama, closely linked to the US by its depend-
ence on benefits from the interoceanic canal and the sizable
US presence on the isthmus, is currently saddled with the first
direct military government in the 65-year history of the repub-
lic. US relations with the junta government have been correct
but cool since the coup last October and economic assistance,
programed at about $20 million in FY 1969, has been resumed
only on a limited scale. The government has not been anti-
American but the colonels now in control are likely to be more
nationalistic--and thus more difficult to deal with--than their
civilian predecessors. Prospects for the draft canal treaties
look exceedingly dim at this point.
Internal Political Situation
The Panamanian political system, long dominated by a
small group of wealthy and often warring families, almost
broke down during a series of crises last year associated
with the chaotic election that brought Arnulfo Arias to the
presidency for a third time. After only eleven days in of-
fice Arias was ousted--as he had been twice before--by a
military coup when he attempted to dislodge opponents in
the ranks of the National Guard, the country's only mili-
tary and police force.
Power relationships in Panama are still extremely fluid.
The 5,000-man guard is now struggling with the unfamiliar
task of running a government. Colonels Torrijos and Martinez,
*A Special National Intelligence Estimate (Number 84-69)
entitled "The Situation in Panama" was approved by the US
Intelligence Board on 30 January 1969.
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PUK 11-IE PKESIDENI UAL Y
guard commandant and chief of staff respectively, were the
authors of the coup, and the reins of authority within the
government have rested almost exclusively with them from
the beginning.
Both men have publicly given an appearance of unity,
but there are recurring reports of rivalry between them.
Both are ambitious, though Martinez
gressive and has adeptly placed his
mand positions.
seems to be more ag-
followers in key com-
Torrijos and Martinez have both expressed antipathy for
the country's wealthy oligarchy, whose privileged political
position has diminished considerably since the coup. How-
ever, the strong call for reform espoused by the government
appears to stem principally from Martinez, who has a reputa-
tion for honesty that is rare in Panamanian politics. A gov-
ernment dominated solely by Martinez would probably push the
pace of reform, making coexistence between the upper-class
elite and the military establishment more tenuous. Tort.ijos
i?ore prone to deal with the old-line politicians and less
inclined to press?for wholesale changes. Martinez, on the
other hand, would probably resort to strong-arm methods to
get what he wanted.
Since the military take-over, the government has isused
a number of pronouncements on intended reforms, but its
program to date has been vague and one of improvisation.
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.1-11K HE IIKESIDEN1 UN LY
Indeed, there are no indidations that the colonels as yet
have a well-defined concept of what they seek to accomplish
under, their military-directed "revolution." Elections of
some sort have been promised in 1970 presumably after the
electoral machinery has been overhauled to clean up the
gross manipulation practiced by the oligarchy in past elec-
tions. The outlook for an early return to anything ap-
proaching a democratically functioning political system,
however, appears bleak.
Panamanians have long regarded the military with con-
siderable disdain, and the junta government has had little
success in eliciting popular support. Indeed, almost all
opposition has been either curtailed or crushed. Politi-
cal parties have been intimidated and neutralized, ,stringent
controls have been laid on the country's news media, and
the two largest educational institutions have been shut
down to thwart possible student disorders. Panama's small
and disorganized extremist groups have been suppressed, and
the government has publicly disavowed Communism or any
other extremist ideology.
Consequences for the US
In this inherently unstable situation, the US is ex-
posed because of the canal. Panama's leaders know that
the US stake in the present lock canal and in any future
sea-level canal can be used as a lever to apply pressure
on Washington. It is doubtful,, however, that the gov-
ernment would encourage blatant anti-Americanism except
as a last resort. Only if confronted with serious political
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POK 11-1E PKESIDEN1 UNLY
or economic difficulties would the military leaders risk
using the inflammatory canal issue to deflect criticism
from themselves. The guard officers are surely aware that
if they stimulated the public over some real or imagined
issue involving the canal they would be riding a tiger.
An aroused populace could easily get out of hand and threaten
the junta's rule.
Differing concepts regarding the future of the canal
underlie all relations between the US and Panama. The cur-
rent government has taken no stand on the draft treaties
negotiated by the Robles government during 1964-67, prob-
ably because it recognized that the US Government, beset
with political problems of its own regarding any diminution
of its exclusive rule of the canal, would not settle such
a basic matter with a nonconstitutional government. More-
over, the new and inexperienced leadership probably does
not feel secure enough at present to raise the complex and
controversial treaty issue. The Robles treaty drafts were
widely criticized in Panama when details were leaked in 1967.
If the junta government accepted these drafts, it would be
open to charges of selling out to the US. The colonels may
be content to let the matter ride until a new legislative
assembly is restored under some kind of constitutional trap-
pings. In this case, however, the successor government would
push hard Panama's long-standing demands for a larger share
of canal revenues and the exercise of sovereignty over the
zone. In the meantime, the junta may seek to attain through
executive agreement concessions of immediate interest to
Panama, such as transfer of some canal zone properties or an
increase in the present annuity of $1,930,000.
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PUR PRESIDENI LI'
Thus far, the military government has professed friend-
ship toward the US. Some resentment over aid restrictions
will probably continue and the current US position of re-
straint is likely to be reciprocated. Barring some unfore-
seen incident--always possible given the extent of the US
presence in the country--no abrupt deterioration in rela-
tions is likely. The government may seek to demonstrate
its independence from the US to gain more popular support,
but the current leadership is not likely to go as far as
the Peruvian junta.
? While a more nationalistic attitude can be expected
in dealings with the US, there are indications that the
guard wants to restore the full flow of economic assist-
ance. There is no reason to believe, however, that the
junta would be particularly responsive to US pressure for
an early return to elected government. Reduction or pro-
longed delays in US assistance could damage business confi-
dence, increase economic difficulties, and encourage po-
litical opposition. This, in turn, might provoke the
colonels into adopting an even more independent stance,
which would strain traditionally close ties between the
two countries and perhaps prompt the government to resort
to blackmail against the US by threatening disorders against
the canal.
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