THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF (AFTERNOON) 3 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976597
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 3, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
3 February 1969
(Afternoon)
19
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32
CYPRUS
*Nicosia(
Israeli-controlled areas following
June 1967 hostilities
?32?
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Cairo
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UNITED
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REPUBLIC
(E c Y P T)
50 100
MILES
32
Port Said
Suez
Canal
Suez
Haifa
'ISRAEL
Tel Aviv-
Yafo
GAZA STRIP
SINAI
PENINSULA
Latakia'
Beiru
36
LEBANON
.Hamah
SYRIA
*Damascus
-OLAN HEIGHTS
Yarmuk R.
I WEST
\ BANK .g
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(
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r Aqaba
, Amman
alem
Dead
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JORDAN
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Red
Sea
SAUDI
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ARABIA
36
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93478 1:69
ILLEGIB
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1;OR PIOSIDENT ONLY
4 February 19691
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
MAJOR PROBLEMS
3 FEBRUARY 1969
MIDDLE EAST
The British have told the US UN Mission that the
principal topic of discussion between U Thant and For-
eign Secretary Stewart Saturday was the proposal for a
four-power meeting. Thant made clear he favors the
four-power consultations as away of giving the Jarring
mission fresh guidance and impetus.
Thant was dead set against his or Jarring's at-
tendance at these sessions, since he thought neither
could avoid being brought into the disclthsions. He
feared this would undercut Jarring's status and make
it impossible for the latter to continue. Thant was
also lukewarm to Stewart's' suggestion that in any event
perhaps some UN "observer" could attend, although he
did .not rule it out completely.
EUROPE
There is nothing of significance to report.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
There is nothing of significance to report.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
There is nothing of significance to report.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
The Shah is already trying to put pressure on the
Consortium. The prime minister, at the Shah instruc-
tions, has warnedthe ambassadors of the four countries
(including the US) represented in the Consortium that
unless the $1 billion in oil revenues is forthcoming
next year, Iran Will pass legislation either depriving
the Consortium of 50 percent of its interests or making
cost oil" available for marketing by the Iranian Gov-
ernment.
HUNGARY
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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EUK 1 RE P.KESIDEN1. ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
There is nothing to Radio Baghdad's claims of mas-
sive assaults on Iraqi positions in northern Jordan but
the almost daily Israeli overflights, both for purposes
of reconnaissance and to keep the Arabs on edge, help
keep tensions high. Occasionally, as was the case to-
day, these overflights draw Iraqi antiaircraft fire.
that this had happened, adding that two artil-
lery positions had been knocked out by subsequent Israeli 50X1
suppressive fire.
In other areas along the Jordan River and in a re-
mote area south of the Dead Sea the Israelis have again
carried out limited retaliatory air sttikes against ter-
rorist positions.
EUROPE
There is nothing of significance to report.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Tito's well-publicized visit to Rumania over the
weekend indicates that neither he nor Rumania's Ceausescu
have been entirely intimidated by the latest round of
pressures from Moscow. We do not yet know much about
what was discussed, and the communique issued by the
two leaders is longer on atmospherics than on substance
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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CHINA
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93465 1-69
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1-4VK 11-IL PKLSIDLIVI UAL Y
Its careful avoidance of language needlessly antago-
.Iiistictc-, the USSR shows their concern with the situa-
tion, however, and balances their "determination" to
continue on an independent path. Perhaps the best
guide. to their thinking lies in the promise to deepen
economic cooperation a defensive hedge against more
pressures from the USSR and its allies.
VIETNAM
There were no new developments over the weekend
which point to any impending change in
at the talks. There are Some signs in
by North Vietnamese leaders that they
Communist tactics
recent statements
are somewhat un-
certain over just how to proceed. Some of the leaders
are evidently urging a major escalation in military
activity in the hope of putting greater pressure on the
US to take up political issues in Paris.
The politburo, however, cannot be certain of the
reaction of the US to another Tet-like offensive or
even a major assault somewhat short of last year's Tet
effort. Some in Hanoi might argue that such an effort
would stiffen the US attitude in Paris.
Current Communist military moves suggest that the
enemy is trying to put himself into a position from
which he can exercise a fairly wide range of options.
These run from a major assault including at least limited
sapper attacks and shellings of major urban centers,
down to a continuation of the limited kind of action
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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LAOS: Current Situation
NORTH 4\
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Communist-controlled territory
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93746 2-69 CIA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
we have. seen over the past several weeks. On balance,
,however, some sort of upsurge in enemy activity seems
likely before Tet.
No major military activity has been reported today.
OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
North Vietnamese forces on Sunday renewed their at-
tacks on the government base camp at Thateng. Although
the 400-man garrison repulsed several ground probes, much
of the base's barbed wire perimeter was destroyed. It is
doubtful that the defenders could withstand an all-out as-
sault.
While most of the recent fighting in southern Laos
has centered on Thateng, there are continuing reports of
an enemy buildup in other areas of the Bolovens Plateau.
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These latest developments are consistent with the tradi-
tional pattern of engagement in the area; probe and fall
3
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FOR TI RE PRESIDENT ONLY
back; attack and withdraw. Nevertheless, the already
slim resolve of government military commanders in the
south is being eroded. Without significant reinforce-
ments from other regions, they may abandon important
positions to the Communists, including the politically
sensitive provincial capitals of Saravane and Attopeu,
and this in turn would shake the aging Souvanna's con-
trol of the situation.
IRAN
Iran's latest and most ambitious five-year plan,
which only began last year, may already be in trouble
because oil revenue for the next two years will be lower
than anticipated. The plan had been based on expecta-
tions of sharply rising receipts from the western Consor-
tium which markets most of Iran's oil. The Consortium
(which includes a wide variety of the major companies)
now predicts a $7 million shortfall from a projected $865
million in the Iranian treasury take this year and $100
million shortfall next year.
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/Because of current
sluggishness in world demand for oil and because of the
Consortium's heavy production commitments elsewhere, it
will be hard put fully to meet the Shah's demands. For
his part the Shah can make a lot of noise and to some
extent harass the Consortium, but his freedom of action is
very limited.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
HUNGARY
BRAZIL
Thegovernment has assumed more dictatorial powers. A
new institutional act, signed on Friday, has stripped the
Supreme Court of its powers in those areas most sensitive
to Brazilian security forces--such as the right to review
major decisions of military tribunals. The new decree also'
reduces the court from 16 to 11 members, and paves the way
for governmental decision-making unhindered by judicial in-
terference.
These moves will probably provoke only mild reaction.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
COMMUNIST CHINA
The Annex discusses prospects for the talks between
the US and Communist China in Warsaw later this month.
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FOR '1 RE PRESIDENT ONLY
PROSPECTS FOR THE WARSAW TALKS'
SIGNIFICANCE: Peking is setting the stage for the next
Sino-US meeting in Warsaw--now sixteen days away--with
a heavy barrage of anti-American propaganda and a series
of violent attacks on the President. It seems likely
that the principal objective is to provide a hard-line
"revolutionary" background against which the Chinese can
resume diplomatic contact with the US, suspended since
January 1968, with as little damage as possible to their
claim that Communist China is the leader in the world
struggle against "imperialism."
The official Chinese statement issued on 26 Novem-
ber, which set the date for the February meeting, touched
off considerable speculation, in the press and elsewhere,
that Peking might be considering a fundamental change in
policy toward the US. This rested in large part on the
reference to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence"
in the context of Sino-US relations--the first such men-
tion since 1964. The Chinese declared that agreement on
these cryptic and ambiguous formulations was one of two
fundamental requirements for progress in settling differ-
ences between Peking and Washington. (The other require-
ment is'that the US must "get out of Taiwan.")
It now seems clear, however, that neither the language
of the statement nor the Chinese decision to resume the
talks had anything to do with a shift in Peking's attitude
or intentions with regard to the US. The statement was
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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PUK 1 HE 1'KESIDEN1 UNLY
issued in response to US action in publicizing postpone-
ment of the talks--put off by the Chinese for the second
time in less than a year. It defensively portrayed the
US as obstructionist and sought to present the Chinese
as reasonable people willing to go ahead with efforts to
work out long-standing problems. The decision to meet
with US representatives again appears designed primarily
to achieve objectives having little to do with Sino-US
relations.
Peking is, of course, interested in probing the at-
titudes of the new administration. The proposal to hold
the next (135th) meeting on 20 February specifically noted
that by that time "the new US President will have been in
office for a month, and the US side will probably be able
tomake up its mind." By seeming to take a somewhat more
conciliatory position they probably hoped to test US in-
tentions at minimum cost while at the same time preparing
the way for new attacks on US alleged intransigence.
A more important Chinese objective is to refurbish
Peking's international image, badly tarnished by the ex-
cesses of the Cultural Revolution and Red Guard diplomacy
during ?the past three years./
Last fall Peking reacted compara-
tively moderately to the Chinese setback in the UN. The
Chinese condemned the organization in standard terms but
did not disclaim interest in joining it, or threaten to
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POI< "11-1E PKESIDEN1 UNLY
sponsor a new "revolutionary" international body as they
did in 1967.
Another probable Chinese objective in agreeing to
resume the ambassadorial meetings is to put Peking in
a better position with regard to the expanded talks in
Paris. While urging the North Vietnamese
to avoid negotiations of any sort with the US
the Chinese could hardly engage in discussions with US
representatives in Warsaw. By November Peking apparently
concluded that further resistance to the Paris negotia-
tions was futile and decided to back off from a stand
which would make it difficult if not impossible for the
Chinese to take part in possible multilateral negotiations
at a later date.
These indications of tactical flexibility, however,
do not appear to foreshadow any change in Peking's basic
position. Nothing the Chinese have said or done suggests
that they intend at this time to budge from the intrani-
gent stand they have taken on basic issues ever since the
talks began in 1955. Peking continues to insist that the
US "withdraw" from Taiwan before other problems can even
be discussed. It is possible that the Chinese may initiate
some procedural maneuvers at the upcoming meeting, calcu-
lated to keep alive speculation that Peking intends. to
adopt a more moderate posture--particularly for the bene-
fit of those states now considering recognition. Beyond
this there is likely to be little substance in the Warsaw
exchange.
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