THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 14 JANUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976561
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: January 14, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
4 anuary 1969
.33
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
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14 JANUARY 1969
1. Middle East -
A high-ranking
Israel
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that his country
has no intention
of attacking any of its neighbors. He
asked that the US pass this information
to the Arabs in the hope that tensions
will subside. Israel's ambassador'ln
Washington has said that the Lebanese
military have been given,similar:assur-
ances by his government.
Despite these Israeli promises,
Iraq has placed its armedforces on
alert.
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Lebanon is heading toward an even
deeper political crisis. The new
prime minister has been unable to form
a cabinet because of Christian-Muslim
wrangling.
We think President Hilu.could be-
come so disgusted that he may submit
his resignation again, as he did in a
similar crisis last October. At that
time, the army's readiness to take over
the government brought the politicians
back together. Now, however, the after-
shock of the Israeli raid on'Lebanon
airport is so great, there is a distinct
possibility that political factions will
not be able to compromise. The army
might then step in.
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Communist Pressure Returns to Southern Laos
122
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2. South Vietnam
3. Laos
4.-Turkey
Top South Vietnamese leaders are
aware that pressure could develop soon
in the US for American troop.withdraw-
als from Vietnam.
Both Thieu and his knowledgeable
emissary in the US, Bui Diem, see a
South Vietnamese initiative along these
lines as dampening criticism in the US
of Saigon's intransigent attitude toward
political concessions to the Communists.
Renewed North Vietnamese attacks
on Ban Thateng appear to be part of a
wider Communist effort to dislodge the
government from the Bolovens.Plateau.
Harassment of Saravane, the provincial
capital, has increased. Government po-
sitions in the Se Done Valley are threat-
ened.
In the north, the North Vietnam-
ese-are consolidating their hold on the
area around Phou Pha Thi. We expect Na
Khang, in the northeast, to come under
attack soon.
?A new wave of student violence and
labor unrest is under way. There is an
election scheduled for October, and
this could generate additional tensions.
In the meantime, the Turkish Government
will probably get tough in an effort to
keep the unrest from snowballing.
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5, Soviet Union
6. 'Czechoslovakia
The Soviets launched another man-
ned space flight early this morning.
It was dubbed Soyuz 4 by TASS, which
announced that a one-man crew was aboard.
One objective of this mission could
well be to perfect the docking proced-
ure, something the Soviets failed to
accomplish during the flights of Soyuz 2
and 3 last October. If docking is an
objective, a second space vehicle prob-
ably will be launched early tomorrow.
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The government's new commissioner
for relations with Soviet troops sta-
tioned in Czechoslovakia has told a
press conference that contrary to ru-
mors, no new Soviet troops have entered
the country in response to NATO maneu- 50X1
vers in West Germany.
He appears to be right.
We expect to see the Soviet forces
stationed in Czechoslovakia begin exer-
cises after they are more settled. The
continuation of incidents between the
populace and the Soviet forces, however,
could mean that such exercises will be
rather restricted and out of the public's
view.
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7. Italy
The Rumor government is intrigued
with the possibility of being the
first to have a successful "two-China
policy."
This is the pitch the Italian For-
eign Ministry is taking to sell the
idea of simultaneous recognition of
Communist China and "Taiwan." The
scenario is terribly complicated, as-
suming as it does that Peking will buy
the idea willingly and that Taiwan can
be forced into accepting it. Neither
is at all likely.
This elaborate scheme is probably
no more than window dressing. however.
Exploratory talks
could begin in February or March.
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_
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
.) North Vietnamese Reflections of US
Political Attitudes
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I 8
14 January 1969
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
14 January 1969
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
...Hanoi Reaction to Swedish Recognition: A Hanoi
International Service item in English-on 12 January
quotes from a Nhan Dan commentary of the same date
"acclaiming the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the
Kingdom of Sweden." .Nhan Dan states that the event
"constitutes a new political success of the Vietnam-
ese people who are struggling resolutely for inde-
pendence and freedom." The paper cited three -other
manifestations of the Swedish Government's friend-
ship:
--the permission it gave the Russell Tribunal
in 1967 to meet in Stockholm;
--the statement in March 1968 which "condemned
the US aggression in Vietnam, voiced support for the
political program of the South Vietnam National
Front for Liberation, and demanded an unconditional
halt to the US bombardment of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam"; and
--the permission given the Liberation Front to
set up an information office in Stockholm.
* * *
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Achievements in Local and Central Light Industry:
A Hanoi International Service broadcast of 10 January
claimed that "nearly as many" local industrial es-
tablishments went into operation in 1968 as during
the previous two years, including "a dozen" new
plants in the three southernmost provinces. Accord-
ing to a domestic broadcast of 8 January, total value
of consumer goods produced by local industry in 1968
was 8.2 percent higher than in 1967 but fell short
of the plan. Central-level light industry reportedly
overfulfilled the entire 1968 plan by 9 percent," an
increase of 15.5 percent over 1967. The 1969 plan
is said to call for a 20 percent increase in the total
value of output by both central and local light indus-
try and a 2 percent reduction in prices.
The base against which these improvements are
measured is unknown but is doubtless very low in-
deed. There is no reason to doubt, however, that
the indices have risen since the US restricted its
air attacks last March.
* * *
North Vietnam's Draft Policy Since 1965: The
steadily increasing demand in North Vietnam for mili-
tary manpower has been met since 1965 by the pro-
gressive broadening of the scope of compulsory serv-
ice. In 1965 an estimated 800,000 males were eligible
for military service, according to age and physical
criteria then in use. Changes in draft regulations
by mid-1967 had extended the length of service in the
army from a tour of three years to the duration of the
war, had raised the maximum draft age from 25 to 30
years, and had subjected to recall former servicemen
up to the age of 35 and officers up to age 45. The
criteria for exemptions from service also were re-
stricted, permitting additional cal1-ug5 within the
eligible age groups. By 1967 these measures had added
more than 600,000 to the number of males that were
eligible for military service.
Draft regulations in North Vietnam are promul-
gated at the national level but executed by adminis-
trators at the local levels. Exceptions apparently
are made at the discretion of district and village
authorities who are responsible for filling allotted
quotas. This probably accounts for the occasional
reported drafting of the unusually young and those
in poor physical condition.
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II, NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
?Hanoi Flays Alsop: In an unusual display of
sensitivity about US press treatment of the war,
North Vietnam's party daily on 10 January accused
US newspapers of "distorting the truth" about the
military situation and "openly opposing" a peaceful
settlement. It singled out Joseph Alsop, presum-
ably for his recent series from Vietnam, as a "war-
like, blockheaded scribbler who dares call himself
a journalist." It refuted charges that the Commu-
nist position is deteriorating by citing all the
usual statistics and claims about Communist "vic-
tories" in the past year. The article concluded
that because of these alleged successes, the pres-
sure on the US to end the war is becoming irresist-
ible.
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