THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 JANUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976559
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: January 13, 1969

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?F".
The President's Daily Brief
cret 13 January 1969
23
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
13 JANUARY 1969
1.. Middle East
2. Israel-France
3. South Korea
Lebanese nervousness over the
Israeli threat is incteasing. Some of
this may stem from fear that De Gaulle
may not make good on his promise of
"total support"--which the Lebanese ap-
parently believed included French troops
if necessary.
We are not certain .that French..
troops were indeed Offered. As former
colonials of the French, the Lebanese
would have highly mixed feelings about
accepting them. Their misgivings might
fade, however, if the crunch became
greater.
Those two French-built patrol
boats that the Israelis recently spir-
ited away, under the pretext of a pre-
delivery test, arrived at Haifa last
Friday.
Pak is setting the machinery in
motion for a third-term try in 1971.
A nationwide campaign to generate pub-
lic support for removing the two-term
constitutional limit will start soon.
To undercut criticism of the regime's
most glaring fault, the campaign's
first step is said to be an anticorrup-
tion drive aimed at civil servants, the
press, and perhaps some politicians.
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4. Czechoslovakia
5. Brazil
6. Nationalist China
L.?
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movements 50X1
at present of unknown size--probably
have to do with joint Soviet-Czechoslo-
vak maneuvers, possibly in reaction to
NATO exercises in West Germany. While
they do not appear related to internal
Czechoslovak political developments,
they may raise further fears among the
populace of renewed Soviet intervention.
Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto
is reported ready to hand in his resig-
nation as a protest against the govern-
ment's assumption of dictatorial powers
last month. He is no doubt aware that
his popularity among the military is
waning, and he may want to jump the gun
on his ouster. More than that, his
long-standing presidential ambitions
may have persuaded him that now is the
time to establish himself as a rallying
point for the moderates.
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of US
Political Attitudes
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16
13 January 1969
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
13 January 1969
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi's Plans for Paris:
the Communists do not expect any significant prog?
ress in the Paris talks for at least another month
while the new US adininistration reViews the Vietnam
situation.
the Communists will use this
interim period to launch several strong military
offensives. The targets will be Americans,
not South Vietnamese.
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* * *
First Liberation Front Commentary on Appoint-
ment of Ambassador Lodge: In contrast to the guarded
reaction of Communist spokesmen in Paris, Liberation
Radio broadcasting in Vietnamese on 12 January was
harsh and denigrating. The broadcast belittled Am-
bassador Lodge's past experience in Vietnam and took
the line that Saigon instead of rejoicing ought to
remember that under Lodge the US "changed horses" and
overthrew the Diem government. Using this lead, the
commentary launched into the Communists' favorite cur-
rent theme that it is time for the US to replace the
present Saigon government.
The commentary called both Lodge and Harriman
"old foxes" and said that President-elect Nixon had
chosen a man known for his defeats on the battlefield
to replace another known for his defeats at the Paris
talks.
-2-
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-North Vietnamese Air Defense Exercise: On
11 January, the North Vietnamese conducted what:ap-
pears to have been the first air defense exercise
involving the entire air defense network at one
time. They, appeared to be testing some sophisti-
cated new radars against all types of simulated US
aircraft. The results were good; activity,was Well
coordinated, information was passed smoothly and 011
a timely basis
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
day.
There is nothing of significance to report to-
-3-
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Top Secret
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The President's Daily Brief
13 January 196911
Top Secret
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
EUROPE
Mindful of last November's run on the franc, the
European Community is considering a proposal for greater
monetary cooperation among the Six. The draft before the
Monetary Committee envisages that members running into pay-
ments troubles could first draw on automatic credit facili-
ties; if these proved insufficient, further credits would
be available on certain conditions. Progress in the Committee
is likely to be slow, and the finance ministers are unlikely
to agree on any cooperative mechanism of this sort before the
latter half of 1969.
Like all such schemes, this one confronts the chronic
question of whether the Six would prefer to consult and act
together as individual states, or to delegate new powers to
the EC Commission and thus take a further step toward real
integration. The current monetary proposal stresses the
first of these methods, but this tendency is under continu-
ing fire./
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese rejected Vance's offer on Saturday
of a table divided by a strip of baize coupled with an offer
that the Communist side can speak first at the opening ex-
panded meeting. Lau also turned aside our second proposal
of a table divided only by a line and a speaking order of AA
BB to be determined by drawing two lots. The Communists are
aware that the US is putting heavy pressure on Saigon to
agree to the North Vietnamese proposal and they probably be-
lieve that Saigon will soon give in. If the allied fallback
position on a round table and on a two-sided draw for speaking
order is proposed to the Communists, our bet would be that
they will buy it and that the way will be opened for the
first expanded meeting.
* * *
Liberation Front officials in Paris are now promoting
the idea of a "peace cabinet" in which Thieu, Ky and Huong
would be repladed by men with whom the Front would be able
to deal.
Vietnamese Communist spokesmen around the world have
recently been holding out this same bait on the chance that
US unhappiness with the Thieu government might have reached
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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the point where a Communist hint of being ready to deal
with some compromise figure would spark a response from
Washington. General "Big" Minh's name has cropped up in
several of these conversations but the Communists clearly
do not want to pin themselves down on any one name.
* * *
Numerous reports continue to point to an imminent
Communist military offensive. Thus far, however, the
Communists have limited themselves to a series of shellings
of allied bases on 11-12 January. The enemy probably plans
to step up the level of his attacks over the next few weeks
in order to demonstrate his capability to stay in the field
despite heavy allied military pressure.
Thus far in January about one new infiltration group
per day has been noted entering the pipeline in North Vietnam.
This is the same rate noted in early December and is good
evidence that the Communists anticipate taking heavy casual-
ties for which they will need replacements during the next
few months.
SOVIET SPHERE
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Soviet space
support ships, which are on station in the Atlantic Ocean
to support a manned space launch, may accomplish or rehearse
some phase of the operation today. Soviet instrumentation
ships are 'also on station in the Pacific and recovery forces
have been deployed in the USSR.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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32
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MIDDLE EAST
Arab news media are now reporting that Israel is
massing troops for a large-scale raid into Jordan, timed
to present the incoming US administration with a fait
accompli. There seems to be no evidence substantiating
the Arab claims.
This mounting Arab
hysteria will surely be fed by any incidents such as last
weekend's attack by Israeli jets on suspected Arab commando
positions in Jordan.
The Israelis
-now fear that the Arabs are
becoming trigger happy. An Israeli spokesman has explained
the situation to US officials, assured them that no such
plan is in the offing, and asked them to "let the other
side know they can relax." The Israelis allege that the
Soviets are responsible for inciting Arab countries into
this state of alert, .but we have no information to support
this claim. The Arabs are fully capable of working them-
selves into a frenzy, with the help of recent Israeli
actions against Lebanon and Jordan. Israeli statements
are also helping fan the flames; Deputy Premier Allon today
warned that if the Arabs did not cooperate in finding accept-
able Arab-Israeli boundaries, then "Israel can achieve those
secure boundaries herself."
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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The Lebanese are still convinced that an attack is
coming, although the arrival of De Gaulle's personal envoy,
Georges Gorse, on 11 January may have had a calming effect.
Initial Lebanese impressions of the extent of French offers
of aid seem to have been overly optimistic, and no public
statements spelling out the details have been made since
Gorse's arrival. He has, however, announced that France
will not remain idle if Lebanon's security is endangered.
* * *
The Lebanese continue their efforts to crack down on
-terrorist raids and deprive Israel of any pretext Loran
attack.
Their failure illustrates the growing
power of Arab commando organizations.
* * *
Eban has agreed to meet secretly with Jarring in Zurich
this Tuesday and Wednesday. Jarring is telling only the US
and the Soviets about the meeting. He hopes word will not
get back to the Israelis that we have been informed.
* * *
_ At annex we take a look at some of the ingredients that
make the Middle East so explosive at this time.
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LAOS: Current Situation
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II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
North Vietnamese forces positioned along the eastern
rim of the Bolovens Plateau yesterday attacked the govern-
ment garrison at Ban Thateng with heavy mortar fire and
limited ground probes. This appears
after a three-week respite, to force
this strategically located position.
to be a fresh campaign,
the government out of
Evidence continues to mount that the Thateng opera-
tion is part of a wider Communist effort to reduce the
government's presence around the Bolovens.
? In the north, the enemy is consolidating his hold in
the Phou Pha Thi area. North Vietnamese reinforcements
have overrun several outlying government bases in recent
days and it appears to be only a matter of time before
most of the government's gains of the. past several months
will be lost. The situation at Na Khang, where the next
major Communist effort in the northeast may come, is quiet.
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III, ANNEX
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
The rapid growth of irrational Arab terrorism has
become the most aggravating problem in the Arab-Israeli
impasse. -:Terrorist actions are expanding in both fre-
quency and scope. Rivalries between the several terrorist
organizations and the irresponsibility of their leadership
compound the problem. The growing public popularity of
the terrorist movement has left Arab political leaders,
such as NaSit and King Husayn, on the sidelines helplessly
watching their own influence and power erode. Meanwhile,
the terrorists' popularity has forced all Arab leaders
into greater cooperation with the terrorists.
Lebanon, which up to now had managed to remain un-
involved, is the latest victim of this expanding disruptive
force. Caught between militants, mostly Muslim, Arab
Nationalist elements, and the traditionally pro-Western
Christian sector, the country's political leaders have
become increasingly paralyzed while awaiting what they
believe to be an inevitable Israeli strike. Such an attack
could only increase their ineffectiveness and could result
in the loss of territory in southern Lebanon.
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The French arms embargo has brought about a contemp-
tuous anger toward France, Israel's old ally and arms
supplier. At the same time Israel sees itself threatened
by a Soviet-US "peace" deal. Israel fears that the Soviet
Union aims at getting it to relinquish the Arab territory
it now holds without a firm and durable peace treaty with
the Arabs.
Moscow probably has several motivations in proposing
its peace plan. It wishes to minimize the posibility
of another outbreak of war, which could well create a
crisis between it and the US. It may also wish to lessen
the threat that Moscow's Arab client regimes might be
toppled as a consequence of the continued stalemate and
the rise of terrorist influence. Of course the USSR
would also benefit if the Suez Canal were reopened. What
Moscow may not realize is that it may be too late to cut
down the terrorist menace to the Arab regimes and that,
even if Nasir and Husayn were to make peace, they are not
likely to be able to make it stick with the terrorists.
Many elements in the several Arab armies sympathize with
terrorism. The general Western and US view is that,
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while the plan cannot be accepted in toto, it may provide
a basis on which to build.
Jarring's Mission, long nearly moribund, might get a
new lease on life because of the Soviet peace proposals.
With the active support of the Soviet Union in the peace-
making process, Jarring may feel sufficiently encouraged
to continue his conversations with the parties. Thus
Moscow's plan may serve to slow temporarily the rapid
deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, but the
prospects are slim that it can be anything but a palliative,
and it may end in hardened positions all around. There will
be no letup in terrorism, since the terrorists have no
intention of making peace with Israel and the Israelis will
stick firmly to_their reprisal formula. Thus, a somewhat
expanded irregular military action probably will develop.
The chance of another war may increase in the months
ahead Unless the Soviets intervened, any all7out war in
the next few months would be lost by the Arabs. The dis-
persal of aircraftand the extensive building of aircraft
shelters by Egypt would probably make an Israeli victory
more costly and the war would last much longer than in
June 1967. This would open the possibility of an expansion
of the conflict./ 50X6
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