THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 DECEMBER 1968

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005976531
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2015
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 26, 1968
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 - The President's Daily Brief 26 December 1968 23 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 OW\ I?,4 THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 26 DECEMBER 1968 1. Venezuela-Guyana 2. South Vietnam the Venezuelan military, is getting ready for an operation against a large section of Guyana that the Venezuelans have long coveted. The Venezuelan move reportedly would come in response to an "appeal" from the Indians who inhabit the area. The Guyanese do not have the means to resist a Venezuelan incursion. 'They probably would move as quickly as pos- sible to secure UN condemnation of the "aggressors" in Caracas. 50Xlm 50X1 .50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001:9uxi 3. Soviet Union Middle East 4. Italy - Communist China The new Italian Government has de- cided to recognize Peking in the fair- ly near future, according to Foreign Minister Nenni. The government will be implementing a decision which was announced in principle five years ago. 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 ? Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Top Secret FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY 1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam .) North Vietnamese Reflections of US Political Attitudes Top Secret 50)" _ 16 26 December 1968 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for ?the President's Eyes Only 26 December 1968 I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION _Reaction to American. and South Vietnamese State- :ments: There has been-almost no authoritative Viet- namese Communist response to recent. US and South ? Vietnamese statements about separating military and political problems in the course of negotiations and leaving the burden of a political settlement to Sai- gon and .the Liberation Front. Hanoi probably is acting cautiously in part .to avoid jeopardizing po- tentially useful openings for the negotiations. At the same time the Communists are well aware of the .divisive influence Some recent statements have had on the allied side, and 'they may feel that anything they say woUld only serve to closeranks between Sai- gon and Washington, . The only significant Communist reaction to Sec- retary Clifford's television remarks about mutual troop withdrawals on 15 December has been a Libera- tion Radio broadcast of 19 December. Avoiding the substance of the remarks, it simply castigated Clif- ford.for using "shamelessly deceitful and provoca- tive arguments.," There has been no reporting in Communist media on Henry.Kissinger's Foreign Affairs article concerning Vietnam. .The French news agency reported. that a Liberation Front Spokesman in Paris on 19 December "rejected" the idea of separate nego- tiations on military problems.between North Vietnam and the United States and political, negotiations be- tween Saigon and the Liberation Front,-which had been "suggested successively" by Clifford and Kissinger. Hanoi's version.of the Front spokesman's remarks omitted any reference to this subject. Tran Buu.Kiem, head of the Front delegation in Paris, "categorically rejected" Vice President.Ky's statements on television last weekend, according to an."exclusive interview" by the.French press. agency. Klein's' interview has been quoted widely in the West- ern press, but its accuracy is at best ?dubious and Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0_xi the Communists clearly do not consider it an authori- tative release. Kiem allegedly said, for instance, that the Front does not have the "direct means" to overthrow the Saigon government and that the Front would not be opposed to a "peace cabinet" headed by General "Big" Minh. These comments almost certainly are distorted and they cast doubt on the reliability of the rest of the interview. No Communist broad- casts have carried the statements attributed to Kiem, and none has so far responded to Ky's remarks on television. This gingerly treatment of these issues almost certainly indicates considerable Hanoi interest. Some of the general ideas expressed by Secretary Clif- ford, Kissinger, and even Vice President Ky mesh fair- ly well with long-standing Communist scenarios for separate handling of problems concerning North and South Vietnam and for a political settlement "without outside interference." Many of the details in these statements are clearly unacceptable to the Communists, particularly Ky's suggestion of political negotiations after North Vietnamese troops have been withdrawn, but Hanoi probably sees in them at least some poten- tial for future productive bargaining. * * * Giap's Address: General Vo Nguyen Giap delivered the keynote address at 'a major holiday rally in Hanoi on 21 December. The ceremonies, attended by Ho Chi Minh and other, high officials, jointly celebrated the anniversaries of the establishment of the North Viet- namese Army in 1944 and the start of the anti-French resistance in 1946. In his speech, as broadcast by Radio Hanoi's international service, Giap presented a generally optimistic review of the situation but without much of the bluster and exaggeration commonly used in Com- munist propaganda. This fairly low-key approach is Giap's trademark, but at this time it probably also reflects the leadership's sober assessment of Commu- nist military prospects and the heavy reliance Hanoi is placing on its hopes that Washington is interested in negotiating an early reduction in the US commitment to the war. -2- 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Giap argued that the bombing halt, and what he termed US reassessment of its position With a view to- ward 7de..Ametioanizing" the war, clearly demonstrated that the Communists are prevailing,. But, citing con- tinued aerial reconnaissance over the North and a large military presence inthe South as evidence of . .US intentions to hang on, Giap urged continued efforts to press forward along the lines of the party's "cor- rect" revolutionarywar strategy. He asserted that past successes Stemmed from that strategy, Giap described this 'strategy as "combining armed struggle with political struggle to launch,,. offensives in all forms," bringing to bear Communist "moral and political superiority" against US mili- tary and economic power. On the military front, the strategy calls for "stepped up big-unit fighting and ...widespread guerrilla warfare at the Same time." II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR day. There is nothing of significance to report to- -3- 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0 ? Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006600310001-0