THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 NOVEMBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976489
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: November 30, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
--rorST f-r-e-t, 30 November 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
, DAILY:BRIEF ,
30 NOVEMBER 1968
1, Laos
2. Communist China
The opening of the enemy's annual
dry season campaign around the Bolovens
Plateau has inspired the annual pan-
icked reaction in Vientiane. The North
Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao auxil-
iaries invariably press toward the
plateau and the provincial capitals of
Attopeu and Saravane as soon as the
roads are dry and the rice harvest is
in, but Hanoi's policy has always been
to stop short of occupying the plain
or the towns.
We think the same political con-
siderations apply this year, although
Hanoi may eventually choose to im-
prove its future bargaining position
on Laos by seizing a number of the gov-
ernment's advanced military bases.
Peking's about-face in rejecting
a US proposal for a Warsaw meeting in
November and then, ten days later, ac-
cepting a February date probably re-
?flects a desire to establish early con-
tact with the next US administration.
The Chinese are taking a_more ac-
tive interest in European affairs as
well. Their army chief of staff ar-
rived in Albania Tuesday for a two-week
visitr
/ The
visit serves to underscore Peking's cur-
rent propaganda pose as the champion of
Communist countries oppressed by Soviet
? revisionism. It could also mean a gen-
eral revival of Chinese activity in
foreign affairs and a return to the
pragmatism and "personal diplomacy"
that once marked Peking's foreign policy.
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3. Soviet Union
4. Rumania
"Hooligans," drunkards, ?scofflaws,
and other antisocial elements will be
the main target of Russia's strength-
ened and renamed Ministry of Internal
Affairs. Khruschev's experiments with
auxiliary police, workers' courts, and
other amateur law enforcement agencies
have failed to stem the rise in common
crime, juvenile delinquency, and alco-
holic absenteeism. From now on the
domestic police--reinforced with re-
cruits from the best of the volunteer
auxiliaries--will probably be cracking
down hard on "non-political" crimes.
Political offenses continue to be the
responsibility of the security and in-
telligence service--the KGB. Indica-
tions are that these, too, are going
to be dealt with more severely.
Ceausescu has struck back publicly
against the pressures Moscow and the
Warsaw Pact powers have been putting on
Rumania. Even as senior Pact officers
were meeting in Bucharest, Ceausescu in
two published speeches stoutly defended
Rumania's political and economic rights
against the "supra-national" concepts
of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance.
In almost belligerent terms, he
spelled out Rumania's interpretation
of its responsibilities and rights un-
der the Warsaw Pact, refused to go
along with any tightening of East Euro-
pean economic integration, and impli-
citly rejected the Soviet-proclaimed
right of intervention to preserve the
status quo in socialist states.
Meanwhile, Rumanian officials are
being wrung through the rumor mill, and
some of the wilder reports they have
heard suggest that Moscow's disinforma-
tion specialists are doing the cranking.
Among their genuine concerns is the pos-
sibility that Soviet troops will remain
in their country after the projected
joint exercises, and they are doing
their best to determine the circumstances
under which this might occur.
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5. Mexico
6. Argentina
7.. Venezuela
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Hard-line student strikers in
Mexico City are still holding out
against the general back-to-class move-
ment, and they could provoke further
violent attacks on returning students.
But security authorities remain firmly
in control, and President Diaz? Ordaz
has resumed his normal schedule of
visits around the country.
Air ?force officers are in a state
of shock over the Ongania government's
denial that it would purchase the
French Mirage III interceptor aircraft,
a decision?they thought was firm. The
political leaders will now be looking
to Washington for a satisfactory solu-
tion to their requirement for new
supersonic interceptors.
Voters tomorrow will be choosing
from among four evenly matched presi-
dential candidates, none of whom is
expected to win more than 30 percent
of the vote. A plurality is sufficient
to elect, however. All the seats in
the National Congress have to be filled
at the same time, and the winner in the
presidential race will be spending the
?time between December and inauguration
on 14 March putting together some kind
of congressional majority. The tight-
ness of the race and threatened ter-
rorism have put the security forces in
a high state of alert.
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of US
Political Attitudes
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16
30 November 1968
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;Jun I
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
30 November 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
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Possible Nationwide "Administration" in the ?
South: The enemy is continuing to lay the ground-
work for a possible national "administration" in
South Vietnam. Liberation Radio on 26 November pro-
claimed the establishment of another provincial
level liberation committee in South Vietnam. The
latest addition to the growing list of such adminis-
trations is Quang Nam. The broadcast also mentioned
Dinh Tuong and Go Cong provinces for the first time
in its list of provinces with similar administrations,
although it left out Kontum and Quang Tri, which have
been claimed in the past.
Liberation Radio went on to state that the build-
ing of province level "revolutionary administrations"
is leading toward the creation of "favorable condi-
tions for forming A higher echelon revolutionary ad-
ministration." -A Hanoi Radio broadcast of 27 Novem-
ber quoted a statement by the Mongolian foreign min-
ister that "the NLF. ., in fact. ..is assuming the func-
tion of a government." This kind of statement is
being made more frequently asthe Communists continue
to build up the diplomatic stature of the Front.
* * *
Communist Military Aid Deliveries: The value of
Communist military aid to North Vietnam during the
first half of 1968 is estimated at about $275 million,
somewhat below the level for the same period in 1967.
The 'estimated drop in the value of military aid re-
flects the lower requirements for ammunition and
-3-
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surface-to-air missiles that resulted from the US
bombing standdown in the northern portion of the
country. Despite this decline, the continued re-
ceipt of additional jet fighters and equipment for
missile-firing battalions during the first six
months of 1968 emphasized the continued willing-
ness of the Communist countries to meet North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong needs for armaments.
. The-Soviet Union is the major supplier-of mill-
taryaid, providing about three-fourths of the-
,t0tal; -Communist China provides most of. the remain-
der,. withsmall amounts Iron.' Eastern,Eutopean coun-
tries and North Korea, Military aid from Eastern.
Europe increased in the first half of1968 but,still
is onlyra small part .of the total. The, Soviets con-
tinue to supplY.ammunition and most of North Viet-
nam's.air defense equipment; Communist China's aid
is principally irLammunitionand infantry weapons;.
In addition, Chinese, Soviet, and North Korean
military personnel have been stationed in North
Vietnam to assist in training, maintenance, and
construction activities; and North Vietnamese have
gone to Communist China, the Soviet Union, and
Czechoslovakia for military training.
* * *
Delegation in Eastern Europe: The North Viet-
namese Communist Party delegation to the recent Po-
lish party congress apparently has been looking for
tips on reconstruction from their East European
allies. A Warsaw broadcast said that the Poles as-
sured their,Vletnamese visitors that they would
share their own experiences, making specific ref-
erence to the reconstruction of Hanoi. The North
Vietnamese delegation, which includes Hanoi's min-
ister of construction, then moved to East Germany
where another broadcast indicates the delegates in-
spected new buildings in Berlin.
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- II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF .US 'POLITICAL
?..ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report
today.
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Top Secret
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