THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 NOVEMBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976487
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: November 29, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
29 November 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
29 NOVEMBER 1968
1. Pakistan
2. Cambodia
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Assessing the political situation,
the turmoil of the past two weeks
suggests a more widespread opposition
than anyone--including Ayub--had sus-
pected.
There is little doubt that Ayub
can keep control, using the police and,
if necessary, the army. But rough
methods themselves will tend to cement
the opposition, perhaps around the
popular ex - air force chief Asghar
Khan who stepped onto the political
stage last week. The forecast is for
a real test of strength between Ayub
and his opponents before the national
elections in September 1969.
Terror as a technique for control-
ling the population of isolated vil-
lages is becoming more prevalent as
Cambodian guerrillas seek to secure
base areas in widely separated parts of
the country. Assassination, kidnaping,
and forced propaganda meetings are all
on the upswing despite the government's
greater effort to root out the insur-
gents.
Cambodia's dissidents run a wide
range from disaffected tribesmen to Com-
munists, but officials in Phnom Penh
suspect the Viet Cong may be aiding and
abetting some of the trouble. There is
growing evidence to suggest these fears
are well founded.
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3. South Vietnam
4. France
The resignation of information
minister Thien could be the first of
several cabinet changes. The next may
be the foreign minister, Tran Chanh
Thanh. Both men have turned in less
than sparkling performances and Thieu
has lost confidence in them.
Cancellation of the 1969 nuclear
tests for austerity reasons is not
likely to affect development and de-
ployment of strategic missile systems
using fission Warheads.
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The cancellation, how-
ever, will delay development of thermo-
nuclear hardware.
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
.) North Vietnamese Reflections of US
Political Attitudes
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29 November 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
29 November 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Logistical Developments Since the Bombing Halt:
The North Vietnamese have been quick to capitalize on
the opportunities presented by the bombing halt since
1 November.
As ?yet there is no firm evidence that
the North Vietnamese are undertaking a major logistical
resupply effort in Laos that would jeopardize allied
forces in the I or II Corps areas. More evidence is
needed before the significance of the resupply effort
north of the Demilitarized Zone can be fully evaluated.
Large North Vietnamese coastal ships of up to
2,500 tons have been observed in southern waters for
the first time since the bombing began in 1965. By
using such coasters, the North Vietnamese are employ-
ing the most direct and effective method of moving
-large amounts of materiel from Haiphong to the south-
ern Panhandle. Communications indicate that North
Vietnamese Coastal tracking stations since 1 November
have tracked an average of 90 "supply vessels" a day
south of the 20th Parallel, compared with:about ten a
day before the bombing halt.
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Status of US Airmen Downed in North Vietnam: The
North Vietnamese captured two US pilots from the two
aircraft shot down last Monday and a third airman was
found dead, according to intercepted messages. In a
conversation on 26 November, one speaker said that a
US "spy" plane had been shot down by a missile; one
of the pilots had been picked up and the other had
died. The speaker also said that another aircraft had
been shot down and the pilot had been picked up. The
speakers discussed bringing the prisoners back to Hanoi,
perhaps in an AN-2 transport. Other intercepts showed
an AN-2 making a trip down to Vinh on 26 November, .pos-
sibly in connection with the prisoners.
Army Paper on "Acts of War": Hanoi's army daily
on 28 November denounced the US for continuing its
"encroachments on the ?sovereignty and security" of
North Vietnam. The article singled out alleged US
rocketing and bombing of areas in the North after two
aircraft were shot down on 25 November. It details
the "dark schemes" of the US by pointing to continued
reconnaissance "over various parts of North Vietnam in-
cluding Hanoi and Haiphong," to artillery and naval
gunfire against the northern part of the DMZ, and to
bombings and strafings in southern North Vietnam on
25 and 26 November. The article concludes by promis-
ing that these "acts of war" will received "due pun-
ishment." Like other North Vietnamese statements, it
avoids saying these actions will prevent opening of
the next stage of talks in Paris.
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Allied Statements Called "Unacceptable" Basis for
Talks: US and South Vietnamese statements issued on
26 November are an "unacceptable" basis for the Paris
talks and "must be rejected," according to a hard-line
story filed by a Soviet correspondent in Hanoi and
carried by TASS yesterday. The report repeatedly
cites "Hanoi circles" and "Hanoi observers" and almost
certainly was approved by North Vietnamese authorities.
It says that the US statement shows that Washington is
not yet ready to "renounce its aggressive schemes in
Vietnam and is not yet prepared for a correct solution
of the Vietnamese problem." The story probably is
North Vietnamese-inspired rhetoric of a kind that will
be heard frequently in the days immediately ahead.
North Vietnamese Propaganda: Hanoi's propagan-
dists seem more comfortable now that Saigon has agreed
to go to Paris. They had trouble earlier grappling
with the idea of a "puppet regime" balking at US
wishes. Now, true to form, a Hanoi Radio commentary
on 28 November says that Saigon has finally "complied
with its master's order to attend the conference." In
Hanoi's words: "A tail remains a tail. It cannot wag
the dog's body." The rest of the commentary is the
predictable line denigrating the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment and rejecting the concept of "two-sided" talks.
* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTI-
TUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report today.
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