THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 22 NOVEMBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976475
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: November 22, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
7------3--grr)Pa--22 November 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
22 NOVEMBER 1968
1. Rumania
Rumania appears to be coming under
renewed pressure from Moscow to permit
early Warsaw Pact military, exercises on
its soil. The Rumanians themselves
have denied this, though they acknowl-
edged that Warsaw Pact staff officers
have been meeting in Rumania to plan a
"future" exercise. Intensive efforts -
by the US and NATO intelligence appara-
tuses have been focused on the matter,,
producing fragmentary indications of
unusual military activity by various
Warsaw Pact forces, but nothing like
what we would expect to see if major
joint exercises--or an outright inva-
sion of Rumania--were imminent. A spe-
cial Watch Committee meeting of the
United States Intelligence Board last
night reviewed the evidence then avail-
able and concluded that:
--An invasion is unlikely, though
the necessary military deployments
could be carried out without our ob-
serving them.
--A Warsaw Pact exercise with Ru-
manian participation is equally unlike-
ly, since there have been no prepara-
tions by Rumania for such an exercise.
--Warsaw Pact exercises in areas
adjacent to Rumania look like the best
explanation of what has been seen so
far. The-purpose of such activity
might be to coerce the Rumanians into
scheduling a major joint exercise in
Rumania in the near future and, possi--
bly, into agreeing to the establishment
of a long-term Soviet military presence
there.
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2. Czechoslovakia -
?Soviet Union
3. France
The annual Moscow-Prague trade
protocol was signed Wednesday, tighten-
ing the checkrein on Czechoslovakia's
economic independence. The protocol
provides for a ten percent increase in
trade between the two countries, making
Czechoslovakia more than ever dependent
on the Soviet Union for its supply of
raw materials and for its marketing of
machinery and equipment.
Senator Mansfield's call on De
Gaulle Tuesday elicited a number of ob-
servations on the world situation.
Czechoslovakia: Moscow's main con-
cern is not Czechoslovakia; it is China.
Soviet actions in East Europe are de-
signed to strengthen ?their own defenses
against an eventual threat from China.
The Mediterranean: The Soviet
naval presence in the Mediterranean is
nota serious problem; nevertheless,
the US Sixth Fleet should be maintained
at its present strength.
Germany: "Never, never will Rus-
sia permit the reunification of Germany."
The next US administration: To
Mansfield's suggestion that a Nixon...
De Gaulle meeting in Paris next spring
would be a good thing, "Yes, it is es-
sential for our two nations to remain
close together. There are many things
to discuss."
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4. South Vietnam
5. Panama
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6. Nigeria
Civilian officials in Lagos are
pressing the military leaders to re-
quest immediate delivery of all types
of Soviet war materiel in order to push
the war against Biafra to a quick con-
clusion. The Federal government has al-
ready accepted considerable amounts of
Soviet equipment, including some 25
MIGs. It still prefers to rely on Brit-
ish and other Western sources for the
bulk of its armament. Delays in Brit-
ish arms shipments are being blamed for
the Nigerians' failure to overwhelm
Biafran resistance, however, and there
are fears that if the war is not ended
soon, the French may intervene in
Biafra's.behalf. A massive injection
of Soviet firepower could make a big
difference to the stalled Federal of-
fensive.
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...oLuxi
ANNEX
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? ?
Top Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
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22 November 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
22 November 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
More on Le Duc Tho: Hanoi's chief negotiator in
the Paris talks has had unusually long discussions
in both Peking and Moscow en route back to France.
Le Duc Tho's stopover in Peking seems to have in-
cluded a full dav's discussion with top Chinese lead-
ers.
Tho
moved on to Moscow on 17 November and presumably is
still there. There have been no announcements so far
about his activities in the USSR.
The length of Tho's stay in Moscow suggests that
Hanoi is counting heavily on strong Soviet backing
during the next phase of negotiations. The Soviets
may, also be counseling the Vietnamese on.some mat-
ters, such as how to evaluate the Nixon election vic-
tory. Soviet - North Vietnamese relations have been
cordial throughout the negotiations,,but Hanoi still
prefers to keep Moscow at arm's length. They are not,
for example, attending the current Communist confer-
ence in Budapest despite Soviet desires to have the
fullest possible participation from ruling parties.
t In both Moscow and Peking, Le Due Tho probably
has been trying to obtain maximum support from Com-
munist countries and Communist front groups for the
new North Vietnamese negotiations priorities worked
out in Hanoi during the past month. Now that the
bombing has stopped, the Communists are reorienting
their propaganda guidelines to support their new ne-
gotiating stance. If past actions are any guide, the
Vietnamese Communists probably will single out one
major objective--such as withdrawal of US forces--
from their total package of demands and hammer on it
until they obtain the last possible allied concession.
In this kind of campaign, they count heavily on inter-
national support to sustain pressure on Washington.
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Communist Maneuvering: Communist actions both
on the battlefield and in the political arena suggest
that Hanoi is somewhat uncertain of the proper tac-
tics for the present fluid situation. The Communists
appear to believe that the best course is to wait out
developments on the allied side before taking any sig-
nificant new initiatives.
, On the one hand, the Communists are conducting
limited military actions in the South, such as shell-
ings of population centers, which could be calculated
to make it more difficult for Saigon to move to Paris.
On the other hand, however, they are not conducting
?any significant military activies in the Demilitarized
Zone. Nor have they really made the kind of propa-
ganda hay out of the Paris stalemate, reconnaissance,
or US actions in the DMZ which they might if their
primary aim was to stall the opening of talks..
North
North Vietnam may be preparing to make a greater
issue of US military action in the DMZ area, however.
A North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman issued
a statement on 21 November which "sternly condemned"
the US for "wantonly shelling" three villages in the
northern half of the DMZ from positions inside the
southern half of the zone. The statement said this
occurred on 16, 17, 20 and 21 November and was ac-
companied by US naval gunfire. In the toughest lan-
guage Hanoi has used to date on this subject, it said
the alleged shellings were "extremely brazen provoca-
tive acts,, ,which grossly encroached upon the sover-
eignty and security" of North Vietnam.
Intercepted messages suggest the North Vietnam-
ese are collecting data to back up such charges, per-
haps on a regular basis. On 20 November an unidenti-
fied North Vietnamese artillery regiment in the DMZ
area ordered a subordinate to report daily on allied
artillery fire from south of the Ben Hai River. The
subordinate was also told to report the number of
times and the number of rounds the allies had fired
from south of the river for the period 14 through 18
November. Elements of another Northern regiment re-
ported on 18 November that a South Vietnamese regi-
ment was in the eastern DMZ.
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Military Developments: Communications intercepts
from infiltration-related elements within North Viet-
nam continue to provide an inconclusive picture of the
activity in the manpower pipeline. The limited evi-
dence available, however, fails to show any large-scale
movement of troops toward South Vietnam since the sus-
pension of bombing north of the Demilitarized Zone on
1 November.
There is persuasive evidence that the
movement of casualties could be the first order of
business in the infiltration system at this time. A
message intercepted on 16 November has provided the
first positive indication that the term "students"--
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which has been repeatedly noted in Rear Services com-
munications in the past--is a cover term for sick and
wounded personnel. When these references are com-
bined with the reports which openly discuss casualty
movements, the total number of disabled men being
moved from the South is revealed to be substantial.
In recent days intercepted. messages referring
to the evacuation of large groups of disabled troops
have become even more 'striking. On 8.November a
commo-liaison station reported that it had received
315 sick and wounded personnel, dispatched 113, and
was retaining 202 others. . On the same date it:was
reported that 2,500 "students" were .awaiting trans-
port at three Rear Services stations within North
Nietnam, On 16November an unidentified station re-
ported that between 1 and 15 November it_had.receiyed
l,435-"students," 730 of whom were.wounded and 705
sick.
The degree of duplication involved in the inter-
cepts received from various points in the pipeline,
as the sick and wounded move north, is presently un-
known. It may. be high. The incomplete nature of many
of the intercepts precludes'aknowledge of the time .
Irame in which the numbers of disabled personnel are
being counted, -Moreover, increased collection assets
focused on the Rear Services system in recent months
may be providing a fuller view of an evacuation pro-
cedure which could have been operating for.many_yearS.
-Nevertheless, the evidence strongly suggests that a
major effort to move out the wounded is now under
way and that this project is a chief concern- of the
infiltration system at this time.
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report today.
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