THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 NOVEMBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976447
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: November 6, 1968

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006500210001-2
The President's Daily Brief
t 6 November 1968
23
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
6.NOVEMBER 1968
1. South Vietnam
There are additional sig-
nals from some South Vietnamese leaders
that they believe it is time to modify
the government's position against talk-
ing with the Liberation Front in Paris.
While such signals may indeed indicate
a softening of the government's posi-
tion, they may also be intended to
serve personal political ends. They
suggest, for instance, that Ky is lead-
ing the way out of the dilemma0
a council of government leaders includ-
ing Thieu has accepted a formula pro-
posed by Ky. This would involve- send-
ing a South Vietnamese delegation to
Paris for "preliminary" talks but not
for full-scale peace negotiations'. If
the Saigon delegation could hold direct
talks with the North Vietnamese and get
an agreement on the status of the Liber-
ation Front representatives, the dele-
gation.would stay on for substantive
talks. If not, it supposedly would
withdraw.
.Meanwhile, as of Sunday, Ky was
still preparing to go to Paris as chief
of the delegation.
2. Peru Velasco's troubles are deepening.
his trigger
temper and unimpressive public appear-
ances are convincing more and more
people that he is unfitted for the post
of chief of state.
Should he be forced out, the US
Embassy expects a continuation of the
military government, but under more
reasonable management.
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3. Czechoslovakia
4, Thailand
5, Soviet Union
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Liberals and conservatives seem
to be heading for a test of strength.
The first encounter may take place on
7 November when the Czechs will reluc-
tantly commemorate the Russian Revolu-
tion. Conservatives are planning :a
nationwide display of strength, and
they may clash in the streets with stu-
dents and young workers,
Many Czechs believe that the hard-
liners, with Soviet support, will at-
tempt to oust Dubcek when the central
committee plenum meets on 14 November.
Liberals, youths, intellectuals, and '
other supporters of reform are lining
up to block such a move, and they seem
to have the votes to do so,
The Soviet and East German press
is giving propaganda support to the
conservatives in increasingly strong
terms.
Ambassador Unger comments that,
while there is no evidence that Thanat
will cease to be helpful regarding the
present negotiations, underneath his -
official position he is bitter over
what he sees as the first step toward
a repetition of the Laos negotiations.
It looks as if the Soviets will
display several new tactical weapons
systems at their annual parade on 7 No-
vember. The wraps will probably come
off a new mobile surface-to-air missile
launcher, a new tank, and a new assault
gun. No new surface-to-surface missiles
are expected,
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6. Berlin
The leftist youth riot of 4 Novem-
ber was the most violent since Easter.
The police used tear gas for the first
time, but still suffered 120 injuries;
the students were armed with everything
from smoke bombs to Roman candles.
By provoking serious violence,
followed by the inevitable charges of
police brutality, radical elements
may have fired up Berlin's youth pro-
test movement again. The students had
been relatively inactive in the past
few, months.
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. ' ? .,-,
Top Secret
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J.J
Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
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16
6 November 1968
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?J?,.//? I
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
6 November 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Demilitarized Zone Developments: Additional Com-
munist elements have been noted pulling back from the
Demilitarized Zone. On 4 November, the headquarters
of the B75 Front, the senior North Vietnamese authori-
ty in the DMZ sector,.was located in North:Vietnam
about 16 miles north of its position two days earlier
in.the southern half of the zone Another radio, be-
lieved to be serving A regimental size North Vietnam-
ese unit, was also located in North Vietnam on the
4th, some 18 miles north of its location near Khe Sanh
in mid-September.
References to the bombing halt continue to be
noted in North Vietnamese communications. One mes-
sage claimed that the halt was "the greatest victory
ever." Other messages, however, warned Communist
units to guard against unwarranted optimism because
"final victory" must still be sought.
*
Hanoi Broadcasts: Radio Hanoi has broadcast re-
ports of Communist attacks on some cities in the South
since the bombing halt. These accounts have so far
not differed basically from several battlefield com-
muniqu?broadcast prior to 1 November. They, attempt
to portray a business-as-usual attitude toward the
fighting in the South.
In international English language broadcasts on
4 November, Radio Hanoi described Viet Cong mortar
attacks' on My Tho city, Loc Ninh, and Cai Lay as at-
tacks.against "enemy positions" rather than as against
the cities themselves. Similarly, Communist shellings of Bien Hoa and Ben Tre were carefully cast as
.attacks against the airfields in those cities rather
than as attacks against the provincial capitals them-
selves.
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Communist broadcast facilities have not yet re-
ported accounts of enemy actions against Quang Tri
city and Vinh Long city, both of which occurred on
2 November.
. The careful wording in these communiqu?may
be calculated to provide the Communists sufficient
room to deny direct military actions against popu-
lation centers as opposed to military targets.
There are no suggestions, however, that they intend
to refrain from attacks in populated areas.
* * *
-Reaction to Aerial Reconnaissance: Hanoi pro-
tested continued US reconnaissance and "intensifica-
tion" of the war in South Vietnam in a Foreign.Minis-
try statement yesterday. The statement charged that
this "proves" the US is persisting in "aggression"
and encroachment upon the sovereignty and security
of North Vietnam.. It called for an end to such ac-
tions, but like other statements since the bombing
stopped, it put the demand in the longer term con-
text of a settlement and did not present it as a
condition for continuing the Paris discussions.
* * *
:New Missile: North Vietnam maybe employing a
new or modified surface-to-air missile in an attempt
to deal with high-flying US reconnaissance aircraft.
An intercepted message passed on 25,0ctober from a
regimental headquarters in Hanoi to a SAM support
facility ordered the assembly of "18 number-two
type missiles and fuses," ?The same support facility
was again alerted on 27 October that a unit familiar -
with the new fusing techniques, and containing the
necessary,troops; equipment, and instruments,would
arrive to assemble the missiles. The message further
stated the missiles were to be in the hands of firing
units by 29 October,
-2-
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
day.
There is nothing of significance to report to-
-3--
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