THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 NOVEMBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976441
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: November 2, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
7'n4.eL2 November 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
, DAILY BRIEF' ?
2 NOVEMBER 1968
1, Vietnam
Hanoi has broadcast a.qualified
endorsement of a four-party meeting as
one of the next steps.in.the-Paris
talks. This grudging andcircumscribed
approval, which puts the -questionof a
political solution to the war ln,the
background, leaves plenty of room for
a complicated procedural wrangle in
Paris. The broadcast runs:through.the
full list of hardline Communist.posi,-
?tions on a'settlement and calls the
bombing:halt a "great victory," but
"only, the initial one."
On the other hand, the South Viet-
namese have balked at attending the
next session of the Paris talks under
the arrangements described by'President
Johnson. Thieu yesterday objected spe-
cifically to the arrangements for the
inclusion of the National Liberation
Front at the talks in terms that leave
him little room for further maneuver.
Domestic political considerations no
doubt weighed heavily in Thieu's calcu-
lations, and he may believe they require
him to take this kind of independent
position--at least for the moment.
The Communists initiated a mortar
attack on Quang Tri city, about three
hours after the bombing halt took ef-
fect. This is the only significant ac-
tion reported since the halt began;
some 30 rounds fell on the city.
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2. Egypt
3, Communist China
The successful Israeli raid deep
behind the Egyptian lines north of
Aswan laid bare Egyptian vulnerability
to Israel's highly professional mili-
tary operations. Nasir, however, is
not likely to get the message. .Instead,
he will probably decide this is no time
to show weakness by relaxing Egypt's
aggressive military posture.
The regime has just.announced the
.conclusion of the first plenum .of the
party Central Committee in .over two'
years.. The biggest thing -to,come.out
of the session was.a.public commitment
to convene at.an unspecified future
date.the long-overdue ninth party, con-
gress. ?
While this is a big step toward
closing out the Cultural Revolution,
the party--and the country--are not yet
out of the woods. The plenum was prob-
ably stormy,,with various factions
arguing over who would be given power
in the reconstructed party apparatus.
The patronage question is a sticky
one. Radical beneficiaries of the Cul-
tural Revolution on one hand, and vet-
eran party cadres on the other, are
likely to be engaged in bitter political
warfare for some time to come.
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4, Brazil
5. Soviet Union
6, Panama
If the Soyuz spacecraft has a role
in Soviet manned lunar missions--and
we are not certain about this--Berego-
voy's flight doesn't get them much
closer to the moon. No significant ad-
vances were demonstrated, despite the
long wait since Komarov crashed in
April 1967. If the Soviets go by the
book, additional manned flights 'will
be necessary before they are ready for
more advanced missions, such as con-
struction of a manned earth space sta-
tion ora manned circumlunar flight.
At Annex we speculate on some of
the pressures facing the men running
the Soviet circumlunar program.
Antijunta students and professors
are planning to join a "silent march"
of Slum. dwellers in Panama City on in-
dependence day--3 November--and they
may attempt-to-stage protest demonstra-
tions.against the National Guard. The
Communist.Party,,which nominally domi-
nates the largest student federation,
has :been urging the students to cool
it, but with little success. The Com-
munists fear further repression if-the
students get out of hand.
The government should be able to
control the situation, but serious
clashes cannot be ruled out.
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7. Egypt.-
Soviet Union
8. Britain-Rhodesia
Egypt and the So-
viets have concluded agreements for the
building of Soviet-designed merchant
ships at the new shipyard in Alexandria.
The Soviets will supply the materials
and supervise ship construction--in fact,
it looks as if the entire,shipyard will
,be under direct Soviet control.
.About two-thirds of yard capacity
:will be used ?for new merchant-ship-con-
struction, leaving the remaining third
available for naval repairs and refits.
This would supplement the facilities?
already, available to Soviet naval ves-
sels at the Egyptian Navy base in Alex-
andria.
London's latest terms for a settle-
ment in effect assure continued white
rule in Rhodesia. As it now stands
Wilson, and not Smith, has made most of
the concessions. Further bargaining
is still to come, but Wilson has al-
ready set aside his pledge not to grant
independence before majority African
rule--the heart of the British negoti-
ating position.
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ANNEX
The Soviet Lunar Program: To Gamble or
?Not to Gamble?
The announcement that NASA is considering flying
Apollo 8 around the moon in December has probably
created a dilemma for Soviet leaders.
We believe that they realized some time ago they
could not beat the US to a manned lunar landing and
hoped instead to upstage the US effort by making the
first manned flight around the moon. A successful
moon flight by Apollo 8 would deny the Soviets this
propaganda victory and could cause them to regard
their entire manned circumlunar program as a failure.
? They might, therefore, go for broke and attempt
a manned circumlunar mission ahead of Apollo 8. This
would be extremely risky, however, since it would
mean accelerating greatly the pace of their program,
which has been.plagued by serious technical problems
that resulted in the failure of two, and probably
three, of their four flights to date.
.The success of Zond 5 in September might encour-
age them to gamble on a manned flight. Last week's
urgent Soviet demarches asking for immediate permis-
sion to station recovery aircraft in India and Ceylon
suggests that they are at least keeping open the op-
tion,of gambling on .a manned circumlunar flight before
Apollo 8. Aircraft in India and Ceylon would be with-
in easy reach of the area of the Indian Ocean where
,Zond 5 was recovered. ?We need more information, how-
1 ever, before we can say with certainty that the Soviets
?plan to shoot the works.
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
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2 November 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
2 November 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Chinese Position: Chinese Foreign Minister Chen
Yi reportedly told Le Duc Tho that, although Peking
remains opposed to negotiated settlement in Vietnam,
it will "tolerate" any decision Hanoi takes in this
regard
Chen's reported assurance to the North Vietnam-
ese is in line with earlier Chinese state-
ments recognizing Peking's lack of decisive influence
in Hanoi,. (
Although there has been a pro-
gressive deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations,
such statements strongly indicate that Peking has
grudgingly reconciled itself to Hanoi's negotiation
tactics and will continue to support and encourage
Hanoi's War effort'while the talks continue
* * *
Indoctrination in the South: A long, exhorta-
tory statement which was published in the Hanoi army
journal on 26 October appears to contain the core of
the political indoctrination program which has been
under way for several weeks among Communists in the
South. The article was written under the pseudonym
"Chien Thang" (combatant), an unidentified but fre-
quent North Vietnamese commentator on the battlefield
situation in SOuth Vietnam,
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Chien Thang invariably takes a tough and confi-
dent line, but this statement is unusually strident
in its assertions that the Communists have won strong-
er military and political positions through their ef-
forts of the past year. He argues that in war every-
thing hinges on whether "the strategic position is good
or bad," and he repeatedly asserts that the events of
the past year have put the Communists in a favorable
position and forced the allies into .a weak and defen-
sive one. This is the standard Hanoi line on the
results of this year's "general offensive and general
uprising," and this article probably is another effort
to reassure Communists in the South about their pros-
pects and the magnitude of their alleged accomplish-.
ments. Chien Thang reminds his readers, however, that
difficult days still lie ahead, and he calls for a
continuation of intensive military action.
Despite its militant tone and its emphasis on al-
leged military, achievements, the article specifically
rules out a military victory for the Communists. In-
stead, Chien Thang puts the goal in terms of frustrat-
ing the achievement of US military and political ob-
jectives. His language is not tempered by anything
suggesting that the Communists are willing to compro-
mise their own objectives, but he does leave room for
tactical maneuvering and for greater emphasis on the
political aspects of the struggle. He says, form-
stance, that the balance of power in Vietnam is de-
termined not only by military power but also by poli-
tical forces, "which possess very great strength." He
calls these forces "an important offensive wedge, .a
vigorous blow directly affecting even the political
objectives of the war." In what could be a hint that
these forces are about to assume greater importance,
he cites alleged "disharmony" between US military and
political policies and claims that US strategy is "un-
able to cope with the situation on both the military
and political fronts."
* * *
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.:Burchett Back: Wilfred Burchett, the Communist
newsman occasionally used by Hanoi for contacts with
Western newsmen, .has returned to Phnom Penh from
.few:weeks in the North Vietnamese capital_ .He did
not file any significant copy from Hanoi, but the
timing of his visit suggests that he probably did
get a reading on Hanoi's new propaganda objectives
in the new .phase of the talks which will open up in
the Wake of the US bombing halt.
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report today.
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