THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 24 OCTOBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976425
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 24, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
Top Sec el 24 October 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
24 OCTOBER 1968
1. South Vietnam
2. South Korea
3. Guatemala
While major enemy forces remain
relatively inactive, the unusual volume
of Communist communications in several
parts of the country suggests prepara-
tions for a new round of attacks. The
areas involved are III Corps - Saigon;
the northern provinces of Quang Nam,
Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh; and western
Pleiku Province.
At Annex today we examine another
dimension of the Latin American prob-
lem--the prospects for military coups
in five countries. One of these is
Guatemala, where some elements of the
military are unhappy with Mendez.
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4. Soviet Union
5. Western Europe
* * *
An improved weather satellite
is under development. II
The five Common Market members
favoring closer ties with Britain have
again retreated with tattered colors
from an encounter with the French. The
friendly Five had hoped to use the
framework of the Western European Union
as a means for expanding cooperation
with the British. When the meeting of
the Union's council ended in Rome on
Tuesday, however, a French veto was
stamped on that scheme. Despite some
earlier talk about getting tough with
the French, the Five, as usual, put up
no fight.
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ANNEX
Latin America: The Prospects For
More Military Coups
The recent coups in Peru and Panama resemble
those in Brazil in 1964 and Argentina in 1966. Some
common threads run through all of them. In each
case, military leaders moved in the belief that the
civilian government was threatening, or was about to
threaten, military influence and prestige. In all
but Panama, the economy was deteriorating rapidly.
Seeing themselves as the ultimate protectors of the
nation, military leaders felt they had to act to res-
cue the country, from inept civilians.
?The military establishments in some other Latin
American countries probably would react the same way
to similar conditions. At present there are five
that stand out as the most vulnerable.
--Bolivia: The Barrientos administration is
closely, linked with the military. General Ovando,
armed forces commander, expects to succeed Barrientos
and will not stand around idly waiting for the elec-
tions scheduled for 1970 if Barrientos appears to be
losing his grip before then. The government often
seems to be teetering on the brink of collapse and
a series of bad breaks for Barrientos could touch
off a coup in fairly quick order.
--Brazil: Costa e Silva is the military's man,
and, for that reason, anything he does is generally
viewed as reflecting to the credit or discredit of
the armed forces.(
--Ecuador: When Velasco was inaugurated last
month, he inherited a near-catastrophic fiscal situa-
tion and a high level of social and political insta-
bility throughout the country. Velasco brought with
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him a mercurial and abrasive temperament and no
proven talent for administrative leadership. To
top it off, he almost immediately made it clear
that his policies will be directed against the
vested interests of the powerful oligarchy. Velasco
will be hard pressed to keep the country on even
keel and a real or seriously threatened breakdown
in public order would invite a military coup.
--Guatemala: Since last March, President Men-
dez has been moving cautiously to cut down the power
of the military officers behind the right-wing vigi-
lante groups that had been carrying on a heavy-
handed counterguerrilla campaign. This month, civil-
ian vigilantes were made to turn back the weapons
they had been issued. Some rightists, military and
civilian, look on this as an unwarranted relaxation
of pressure against the Communists. A new wave of
Communist-led violence could prompt a military coup.
--Venezuela: Venezuelan military officers have
in recent years proclaimed themselves to be fervent 50X1
advocates of the democratic way, but
they may change their minds. 50X1
Specifically, they might well move to prevent a gov-
ernment elected with Communist support from coming
to power. Presidential hopeful Prieto, a leading
candidate in the elections scheduled for 1 December,
might fill that bill in the minds of many military
officers.
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
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16
? 24 October 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
24 October 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Possible Propaganda Shift: North Vietnam may be
taking some limited steps to prepare its Communist
friends for a rapid shift in propaganda emphasis in
case a bombing halt should occur soon.
the next few months would be critical and
Communist propaganda slogans might change auick-
ly to meet new situations.
it suggests at least some belief in Vietnam-
ese Communist circles that some progress in the Paris
talks is likely before long and that key sympathizers
had better be tipped off to expect a change of pace.
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
day.
There is nothing of significance to report to-
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Top Secret
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