THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 OCTOBER 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976389
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 3, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
3 October 1968
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.THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
3 OCTOBER:1968
Soviet Union -
Czechoslovakia
Peru
LATE ITEMS
A Czechoslovak delegation left
for Moscow this morning, according
to Radio Prague. Dubcek, Premier
Cernik, and Slovak leader Husak are
on the delegation, but Svoboda and
National Assembly, leader SmrkovskY
stayed in Prague.
The army began moving into stra-
tegic points in Lima early this morn-
ing. Our embassy reports a power play
is obviously in progress, but it has
no details yet.
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
3 OCTOBER 1968
. Mexico
. Soviet Union
3. Australia
4. Nigeria
Last night's battle was the worst
yet in Mexico City's current crisis.
There apparently was firing on both
sides as the army tried to break up a
student demonstration. An undetermined
number of people were killed or wounded
in the shooting and the mass panic
which followed.
The students now have a new batch
of martyrs and will probably try to
press their campaign. ?With the Olym-
pics scheduled to start a week from
Saturday, the government is likely to
grow even more sensitive to threats of
disorders and more inclined toward Dra-
conian measures.
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the Biafrans are beginning to coun-
terattack strongly. Casualties appar-
ently are heavy on both sides. Ojukwu's
forces may be able to keep their oppo=
nents at bay for a while, but we still
believe the federals will eventually be
able to occupy Biafra.
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5. Jordan-Egypt
6. Albania-
Yugoslavia
The Albanians, jolted by recent
events in Eastern Europe and uncertain
how far they can rely on Communist China
in a pinch, have made an unprecedented
effort to improve relations with the
Yugoslays. Details of Tirana's ap-
proach are unavailable, but some sort
of marriage of convenience seems in the
making.
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7. Soviet Union - Czechoslovak leaders apparently
Czechoslovakia still expect to go to Moscow soon to
discuss implementation of the Moscow
agreement, and possibly also to head
off a purge. Soviet officials are
still saying privately that Dubcek and
some other leaders will have to go,
and a group of ousted pro-Moscow con-
servatives seems to be trying to sell
itself to the Soviets as the nucleus
of a new regime.
8. Greece-Cyprus
9. Nationalist
China
There is still no evidence, how-
ever, that Moscow plans to push for
Dubcek's removal in the near future.
Nor have the Soviets been able to make
a dent in the unity of the present
Czechoslovak leadership.
A Czechoslovak official has told
the National Assembly that illness,
first Dubcek's and then Brezhnev's, is
the reason the Moscow talks have been
delayed. Brezhnev is alleged to have
had the flu.
More than one source has reported
that the forces occupying Czechoslo-
vakia will be reduced soon, but that
nine Soviet divisions are to remain as
a garrison.
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Sfgret 50X1
3 October 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
3 October 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Free World Shipping: Free World shipping to
North Vietnam, which dropped steadily from early
1965 until the end of 1967, has increased signifi-
cantly during 1968. During the first eight months
of 1968, an average of twelve Free World ships a
month called at North Vietnamese ports, compared
with six a month during 1967. Since the cessation
of US air strikes north of the 20th Parallel, Free
World arrivals have averaged 14 a month and have
accounted for 31 percent of total arrivals.
During the first eight months of 1968, the
volume of cargoes carried by Free World ships to
North Vietnam was more than twice that carried in
the comparable period of 1967. From January to Au-
gust 1968 these ships have carried 32 percent of
North Vietnam's total seaborne imports. They car-
ried about 23 percent of seaborne imports during
all of 1967.1
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Reaction to New Jersey: The initial reaction
of the North Vietnamese Government to shore bombard-
ments by the New Jersey was routine and brief. In a
four-paragraph statement broadcast by Radio Hanoi
yesterday, the Foreign Ministry termed the bombard-
ment an escalation of the war, sabotage of the 1954
Geneva accords and a "gross encroachment" on North
Vietnam's sovereignty.
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Demonstrations Planned: Various sources indicate
the World Council of Peace is busily organizing anti-
war activities in several countries for the week of
l521 October ("Vietnam Solidarity Week").
The peace organization's secretariat has asked
the "South Vietnam Peace Committee" in Hanoi to fur-
nish delegations for activities in Finland, Italy,
and other unspecified countries.
various national
committees are being requested to plan demonstra-
tions, meetings, and news conferences. These com-
mittees are also being asked to send delegations to
Paris to protest to the US mission at the Paris
talks. The council has suggested letters and cables
be sent to the US presidential candidates.
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
:More On Reaction to Vice President: North Viet-
namese spokesmen in Paris disparaged Vice President
Humphreyts speech on Vietnam as adding nothing new to
the US position on a bombing halt. As noted yester-
day, Le Duc Tho called it "the same demand for reci-
procity" which has been continually rejected by
Hanoi.. In the official Wednesday meeting, Xuan Thuy
charged the Vice President had been forced to speak
out on the bombing issue because of the "pressure
:of public opinion." Xuan Thuy implied the Vice Presi-
dent's position on the bombing was even harder than
President Johnson's because he had threatened to re,-
.sume,the bombing if Hanoi did not respect the Demili-
tarized Zone.
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Top Secret
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