THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 AUGUST 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976299
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: August 12, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
12 AUGUST 1968
1. South Vietnam
No significant enemy action took
place over the weekend, but signs of
early and possibly widespread attacks
continue to multiply. Although Saigon
is still high on the Communist target
list, it now looks as if any big push
against the city would come five to
ten days after the offensive is kicked
off elsewhere./
2. Thailand The Communists may be gearing up
for an attack on Nakhon Phanom airbase.
Thai insurgents operating near the base
met early this month to discuss an at-
tack and are caching automatic weapons.
A 27-man demolition team is also said
to have established itself north of
the base and a team of North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao operatives is allegedly
slated to arrive soon to help out.
Some of these reports may amount
only to groundless scuttlebutt stimu-
lated by the raid against Udorn on 26
July. Nevertheless, Nakhon Phanom,
just across the Mekong from Communist-
held territory in Laos and used exten-
sively for air attacks in the Lao in-
filtration corridor, would be an obvious
Communist target.
Thai security authorities in any
event are taking no chances. They are
reinforcing the garrison defending the
airbase and have placed it on alert.
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3. Czechoslovakia
Ulbricht follows Tito with a
somewhat different mission. The East
German Communist leader is probably
making the trip to Prague to foster
the impression back home that relations
with Czechoslovakia, sorely strained by
Pankow's opposition to Dubcek's reform-
minded regime, are improving. Ulbricht
would thus hope to allay some of the
unrest which lies just below the sur-
face in East Germany.
During Tito's triumphant visit,
the Czechoslovaks published the drafts
of some new statutes they plan to pre-
sent for approval at the Communist
Party congress next month which are
bound to upset Dubcek's opponents at
Bratislava. One calls for a federal
system of two Communist parties--one
for the Czechs and one for the Slovaks--
which would be only loosely adminis-
tered by a central party organization.
Another would, among other things, per-
mit greater participation by non-Commu-
nist groups within the National Front.
Soviet, Polish, and East German
forces continue their war of nerves
along Czechoslovakia's frontiers. The
completion of a rear services exercise
on 10 August was followed the next day
by the start of a joint communications
exercise. However, there have been no
significant changes in the deployment
of Soviet, Polish, and East German
ground forces.
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4. Jordan
5, Communist China
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
12 August 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
12 August 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Le Duc Tho in Moscow: Le Duc Tho arrived in Mos-
cow Saturday and will stay there "two or three days"
before going on to Paris. according to the Snviet new
agency
Tho may well be returning to Paris armed with
new North Vietnamese decisions on both the military
and the diplomatic front. His lengthy sojourn in
Moscow indicates that he may be spelling out in some
detail whatever new tactical departures Hanoi has de-
cided on and may be trying to line up Soviet support
for them. Similar Soviet - North Vietnamese exchanges
took place when Le Duc Tho passed through Moscow going
to and returning from the Paris talks in June.
* * *
Hanoi on Prisoner Releases: The Communists seem
to be involved in some new maneuvering on the prison-
er issue. The North Vietnamese press agency issued a
statement on 11 August demanding that the US and Sai-
gon "immediately set free all those whom they have il-
legally arrested" and return them to North Vietnam
through the Demilitarized Zone or in North Vietnamese
territorial waters. Hanoi used its usual elliptical
language to avoid acknowledging North Vietnamese forces
in South Vietnam, but the statement clearly refers to
North Vietnamese prisoners in allied custody, includ-
ing the 14 sailors the US is preparing to release.
US and North Vietnamese embassy officers in Laos
discussed the procedures for releasing these 14 pris-
oners on 10 August. The Communists claimed that the
US plan to return the prisoners via Vientiane presented
unspecified problems and that Hanoi preferred they be
freed near the Demilitarized Zone or in nearby North
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Vietnamese waters. The North Vietnamese said that the
military problems this would cause could be solved by
the US stopping its bombing and other attacks in the
area. They acknowledged implicitly that Communist mili-
tary activities would also have to be curtailed.
Although Hanoi accepted three North Vietnamese
sailors through Vientiane earlier this year, it may
wish to shun further use of this channel because of
the publicity which can be focused on Vientiane.
On the other hand, Ambassador Sullivan speculates
that the Communists may, among other possibilities,
wish to use the prisoners to arrange a temporary cease-
fire in the Demilitarized Zone as a means of meeting
one of the US suggestions for "reciprocity." Another
possibility is that Hanoi is preparing for a large-scale
exchange of prisoners in connection with the Paris
talks. The US pilots held in North Vietnam probably
are considered a trump card by the Communists, and one
which they undoubtedly will play eventually in an at-
tempt to extract US concessions.
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* * *
Pole on North Vietnamese Intentions: The Polish
commissioner to the International Control Commission in
Laos took a rather rosy view of North Vietnamese inten-
tions in a recent chat with Ambassador Sullivan. He
suggested that the first "phase" of the Paris talks was
now over and "serious negotiations should begin soon."
The Pole agreed with Sullivan's suggestion that North
Vietnamese stalling might be connected with the US po-
litical campaign. But he said that "nominations are
now over (sic), negotiations can begin." He doubted
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that a "third wave" of Communist attacks in South Viet-
nam was in the cards because they would be against
Hanoi's best interests. Sullivan correctly notes that
the Pole is unlikely to have any inside information to
back up such views.
More on Revolutionary Administrations: Communist
propaganda continues to give heavy play to the estab-
lishment of new administrative organizations in South
Vietnam to consolidate Communist control of the coun-
tryside. A Viet Cong broadcast on 10 August claimed
that "hundreds of persons" in Binh Long and Phuoc Long
provinces in northern III Corps have set up these
"revolutionary administrations." The broadcast said
that "incomplete statistics" show that "hundreds of
villages" in these two provinces had held elections
for village "people's councils" and "people's libera-
tion committees." The local people were said to be
happy to have an "administration that really represents
them."
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report today.
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