THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 AUGUST 1968

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005976289
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 6, 1968
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PDF icon DOC_0005976289.pdf134.88 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 The President's Daily Brief ret 6 August 1968 23 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 50x1 THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 AUGUST 1968 1. South Vietnam 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 5oxi 2. Bolivia 3. Israel-Jordan 4, Pakistan 5. South Korea Barrientos seems to have big- mouthed himselfout of a tight spot over the weekend. By tough talking and threatening to resign, he has ,backed down the politicians and prob- ably the military malcontents as well. Tension has dropped, but could easily flare up again if the opposition suc- ceeds in raking up the ashes of the Guevara diary case. More student dem- onstrations are another likely source of serious trouble. The Israeli attack on Sunday against terrorist bases in Jordan has made Jarring's job even harder. The incident can only harden the already fixed bargaining positions on both sides. For Jordan, prospects now are for increased terrorist activity which will bring more violent retaliation from Israel, which in turn will sour public opinion in Jordan toward any peace moves. President Pak's shuffling of sev- eral senior military commanders on Sunday was probably rooted in his dis- satisfaction with the minister of de- fense. A public controversy involving leaks of military information to the press provided Pak with a convenient excuse to move. The new defense minis- ter was most recently chairman of the joint chiefs; a firm friend of the US. 50X6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 Top Secret \ FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY .) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam 2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S Political Attitudes Top Secret 50X1 16 6 August 1968 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 5oxi Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only 6 August 1968 I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION Hanoi on Bombing Anniversary: Nhan Dan commemo- rated the fourth anniversary of the first US air at- tacks on North Vietnam with an editorial saying that President Johnson had finally limited the bombings because of "great setbacks" in the war. The editorial ?50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 50x1 says the bombing was started in an attempt to "save" the US war effort from "complete failure," but argues that it has not done the job. It concludes by say- ing that the US is now "feverishly escalating" the war and "threatening" to end the bombing limitation. Liberation Front Sending Out More Representa- tives: Hanoi's international service announced in MITIsh on Sunday that the Liberation Front had named envoys to Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania, and had accredited its man in Moscow to Mongolia. With these appointments, the Front has a quasi-diplomatic representative accredited to every Communist country. II. .NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE 'WAR There is nothing of significance to report today. 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300160001-0