THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 JULY 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976277
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: July 30, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
-777,--Sreget.30 July 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
30 JULY 1968.
1. Czechoslovakia -
Soviet Union
. Laos
3. Southern Yemen
There has been no change in the
situation overnight. The confrontation
at the border yesterday went on well
into the night and was scheduled to re-
sume at about 4:00-AM Washington time
this morning. Neither side is putting
out interim communiqu?or announce-
ments.
Ambassador Sullivan reports that
he spent the weekend attending a royal
Laotian wedding in Luang Prabang. The
atmosphere "brimmed with Pollyannish
hope" from most of the Lao and many of
the diplomats. The reason for this un-
wonted optimism was the dramatic return
?(after four years) of the North Vietnam-
ese ambassador bearing gifts from Ho Chi
Minh. With him came the Pathet Lao rep-
resentative, also bearing gifts.
The North Vietnamese was "very
cagey" about his intentions. A number
of people expect him to return quickly
to Hanoi, but he told Sullivan that he
will remain "for some time."
In any case, this conspicuous ges-
ture flattered the King considerably.
Ambassador Sullivan comments that if in
fact the North Vietnamese does stay,
this could be the beginning of a long-
anticipated "peace offensive" in Laos.
Disturbances in upcountry areas
are spreading, and there are signs
that the army may be splitting up along
tribal lines. This would seriously
;pair the army's effectiveness and could
open the door to widespread tribal
anarchy.
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4. South Vietnam
5. India
6. North Korea
Intelligence from all sources con-
tinues to suggest that another country-
wide enemy offensive is not imminent
but may be planned ;for the second or
third week in August. The Communists
are capable of mounting multiregimental
attacks at any time in several areas
acrossthe Demilitarized Zone, central
I Corps, central highlands, and north,
western III Corps--but the information
at hand indicates that enemy prepara-
?tions for attacks against Saigon and
-key objectives ,in .I Corps are not yet
in the final stages.
Prime Minister Gandhi has emerged
relatively unscathed from the critical
parliamentary debate over Indo-Soviet
relations. In meeting the domestic up-
roar over the Soviet decision to sell
arms to Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi blunted
what could have been a heavily damaging
issue to her.
Extensive consultations before
Parliament opened and full public back-
ing from her most dangerous rivals with-
in the Congress Party limited the ef-
fectiveness of the opposition attack.
But it was her refusal to entertain
.even .a mild opposition resolution con-
demning the Soviets that forced the op-
position's hand. The opposition re-
sorted to a motion implying censure,
which helped to unite support behind
her.
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
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16
30 July 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
30 July 1968
I. NOTES ON'THE-SITUATION
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:Le Duc Tho to Return to Paris: The North
Vietnamese ambassador in Vientiane told Ambassador
Sullivan over the weekend that he had talked with
Le Duc Tho in Hanoi and that he expected Tho to go
back to Paris in the "next week or two."
* * *
Hanoi and the Czech Situation: Hanoi media
have not discussed or reported on the Czech situa-
tion
Hanoi's sympathies probably are with the Czechs,
but the North Vietnamese also are concerned that
the situation in Eastern Europe may weaken their
own position in the war. A domestic broadcast on
28 July carries a nine-day-old Soviet press item
accusing the US of "dark schemes" in Eastern Europe
to undermine the capabilities of the Communist coun-
tries. The Hanoi account does not discuss Czecho-
slovakia but merely reports that the Soviet article
called on Communist countries to strengthen their
unity and to be ready to counter any "aggressive
action against socialist positions."
* * *
NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Hanoi on US Elections: North Vietnamese propa-
ganda during the past month contained no reference at
all to the US election campaign and no mention of
any of the candidates as such..
Hanoi's lack of propaganda coverage of the US
election campaign indicates both serious interest in
the subject and uncertainty about how to interpret
the events thus far. There are many instances of
Communists probing Westerners for interpretations of
the campaign.
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300100001-6