THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 JUNE 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976226
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: June 29, 1968

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200190001-8
The President's Daily Brief
29 June 1968
31
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THE PRESIDENT1S
DAILY BRIEF
29 JUNE 1968
1. France
2. Thailand
The internal crisis has forced the
French to abandon development of an in-
tercontinental ballistic missile for the
present. With the 1969 military budget
now pegged at the 1968 level, the Defense
Ministry cannot cover the additional
costs for this weapon resulting from re-
cent economic concessions.
Communist insurgents in the north-
east are being hard pressed by Thai army
operations. Over-all Communist activity
has leveled off well below the highs es-
tablished in early 1967
the army
has forced armed bands out of their base
areas, disrupted supply sources, and
undermined insurgent morale. The bands,
however, remain intact.
In the northern provinces, guer-
rillas have recently become more ag-
gressive and for the first time have
struck army truck convoys. While the
northeast is still the key Communist
target, it is increasingly clear that
the north has also become a major one.
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3. Cuba
4, Gold Sales
The United States Intelligence Board
has approved a National Intelligence Esti-
mate on Cuba: Castro's Problems and Pros-
pects over the Next Year or Two. This es-
timate concludes that:
--Castro's problems have taken a turn
for the worse over the past year. A severe
drought has depressed sugar production and
agriculture generally. Living conditions
have become more stringent, and there has
been an increase in popular discontent.
--Nonetheless, there is little pros-
pect that economic adversity will signi-
ficantly weaken Castro's position over the
next couple of years. Even if economic
conditions deteriorated further, Castro
would still have the advantages of wide
appeal, political skill, and ultimately,
a formidable military-security apparatus.
--Although the level of future So-
viet aid to Cuba probably, will fluctuate,
it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will
permit the Cuban economy to approach a
critical Condition.
--It is doubtful that either Castro's
economic difficulties or his contentious
relationship with the Soviet Union will
cause him to turn to the US. He will, how-
ever, seek to expand his trade with other
non-Communist countries.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006200190001-8