THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 MAY 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005975730
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: May 4, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
--rorS-rfr-eL 4 May 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
A MAY 1968
1. Paris Talks
The news that the US and North
Vietnam have agreed to meet in Paris
has been greeted with relief in most
parts of the non-Communist world.
Three comments from Communist coun-
tries are available so far. Two of
them--Havana's domestic television
and East Berlin's German service--
take the line that Hanoi has forced
Washington to the negotiating table.
The third, a Radio Moscow broad-
cast in Serbo-Croatian to Yugoslavia,
plays a somewhat different version of
essentially the same theme. In a
tone largely devoid of shrillness, it
questions how much the US really wants
the talks to start. It alleges that
"those who insist on a military solu-
tion to the problem" are becoming more
influential in Washington, and it
quotes recent remarks by Vice President
Humphrey and Ambassador-designate Ball
as indicative of US reservations.
Nevertheless, the broadcast con-
cludes, the fact that contacts are to
start is by itself "very cheerful."
The next step is to force the US to
halt its raids in North Vietnam "and
then to achieve the cessation of the
entire war."
There has been no more authorita-
tive comment than this from Moscow.
Hanoi's reaction has so far followed
generally predictable lines. Peking
has not yet commented.
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2. South Vietnam
3. North Vietnam
4. North Korea
5. Soviet Union
Fighting has slackened somewhat
in the northern provinces. Communist
losses in this area may have been heavy
enough to delay their plans for attack-
ing such cities as Hue. On the other
hand, the fact that some of the combat
occurred near the major towns indicates
how much the Communists have expanded
their operational areas along the coast
since the first of the year.
Signs continue to appear that the
Communists are getting ready for fur-
ther offensive action. It is still not
clear, however, how they plan to orches-
trate military activity with political
talks.
The Soviets have deployed more mo-
bile missiles along the Sino-Soviet
border. Satellite photography has dis-
closed 13 transporters for their surface-
to-surface missile at just one border
installation. We previously had never
seen more than four such transporters
at any of the four sites.
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6. Panama
7. Czechoslovakia-
Soviet Union
Dubcek has suddenly gone to Mos-
cow with four of his chief lieutenants.
According to the Czechoslovak press
service, this "short comradely meet-
ing" was called by the Soviets.
Prague's domestic service said this
morning that the two sides would dis-
cuss Czechoslovak-Soviet economic re-
lations, but the Soviets doubtless are
looking for further reassurance that
the liberal trend in Prague is not get-
ting out of hand.
Dubcek is acutely aware of Moscow's
potential leverage, particularly in the
economic field. He therefore has con-
sistently tried to persuade the Soviets
of Czechoslovakia's basic loyalty. All
the while, signs of Czechoslovak dissat-
isfaction with the standard Communist
way of doing things keeps cropping up.
For example, no less an authority
than the Communist Party paper in
Prague yesterday criticized East Ger-
man efforts to hinder Western access to
Berlin. In the process, it also criti-
cized Soviet policy in Germany in strong--
if indirect--language. This kind of talk
obviously is not going down well in Mos-
cow.
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8. Soviet Union
9. Pakistan
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
4 May 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
4 May 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
* * *
North Vietnamese Efforts to Look Flexible on
Site for Contacts: More than a week before Hanoi
proposed Paris as its third choice, one of its Eu-
ropean diplomats told a propaganda forum in Austria
that North Vietnam would be willing to consider
sites other than Phnom Penh or Warsaw. In an appar-
ent effort to make Hanoi look as flexible as pos-
sible, a North Vietnamese diplomat from the Budapest
mission said publicly on 23 April that Hanoi pre-
ferred Warsaw as a site, but it was "not the only
acceptable location." /
* * *
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?
* * *
Disorders in China Cause Slowdown in Shipments
to North Vietnam:
civil dis-
orders in the city of Nanning had caused a slowdown
in rail shipments to North Vietnam. This was de-
spite efforts of the Chinese Army to keep the goods
moving on schedule, troops
were closely guarding the trains bound for North
Vietnam. this was necessary to
prevent pilferage by hungry Chinese.
Japanese Trade: Two Japanese ships are appar-
ently to load coal at the North Vietnamese port of
Cam Pha this month. These will be the first Japan-
ese vessels to visit North Vietnam since 1965.
* * *
Unusual Passenger Flights: Hanoi may have made
unusual flight arrangements to get one of its people
home from Phnom Penh in a hurry. Under normal cir-
cumstances, the ICC flights are used to carry North
Vietnamese personalities between Cambodia and North
Vietnam. On 30 April, however, the scheduled ICC
flight was canceled.
-2-
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* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report.
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Top Secret
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