THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 APRIL 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005974389
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: April 19, 1968

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006000220001-6
The President's Daily Brief
Top Secret 19 April 1968
23
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DAILY BRIEF
19 APRIL 1968
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1. Vietnam
2. Panama
Ky is not in favor of replacing
Prime Minister Loc with Tran Van Huong.
Ky
described Huong as "too old, stubborn,
and opinionated."
Ky's idea of a prime minister is a
man who would leave running the country
to Ky and Thieu. The vice president
remarked that unity within the govern-
ment would be threatened should a man
of independent thought be named prime
minister.
* * *
No large military actions have
been reported overnight. Substantial
North Vietnamese forces are concen-
trated near Hue - Phu Bai, but else-
where major enemy units are moving away
from combat areas to regroup and re-
supply. We continue to note signs of
heavy infiltration.
Robles has let it be known that
he is not interested in having observ-
ers from the OAS watching the elections
on 12 May. There are two reasons for
his stand. First, the idea of import-
ing observers was broached by Arias;
second, the government plans some
strong-arming to back up its presiden-
tial candidate, Samudio.
Meanwhile, both candidates con-
tinue barnstorming through the country-
side with Arias drawing big crowds.
This display of popularity will spur on
the government in its determination to
contrive a win for Samudio.
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3. Soviet Union
4. Israel
5. Nigeria
Eshkol is under pressure to annex
the occupied territories permanently
and openly, "peace or no peace." Ex-
tremists in Eshkol's own Israel Labor
Party took this line at a recent meet-
ing of the party secretariat. Eshkol
should be able to keep these hawks on
the roost for the time being, but the
sentiment they represent is gaining
ground in Israel.
The civil war moves into its
tenth month with no clear prospects
for a solution either on the battle-
field or at the conference table.
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6. Czechoslovakia
We have now had an opportunity to
examine the full text of the "action
program" approved by the Czech Central
Committee last week. This document is
a landmark for a Communist Party, lift-
ing the party's deadening hand from the
process of government.
The program emphasizes a careful
approach to change, but it is a char-
ter pledging the party to work with
the people rather than rule them auto-
cratically. It guarantees personal
rights, including freedom of assembly,
speech, and religion. It recommends
that the National Assembly stop being
a rubber stamp congress and "really
decide on laws and important politi-
cal questions."
The program shows many compro-
mises between the conservatives and
progressives and to that extent re-
flects Dubcek's own middle-of-the-
road course.
The Soviets are far from enthu-
siastic about the Czech program and
the change it implies. The Moscow
press, for instance, has published
only the least offensive portions of
the program, pointedly omitting the
more contentious features. Moscow,
nevertheless, is probably reconciled
to important changes in Czechoslovakia--
and Dubcek presumably knows the limits
of Moscow's toleration.
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c.:7?
Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
19 April 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
19 April 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
More Propaganda: As Hanoi propaganda continues
to bear down on the issue of the US accepting either
Warsaw or Phnom Penh, the Communists are also begin-
ning to play the theme that the site for initial
talks does not have to be used for the subsequent
substantive talks.
The message is apparently being pushed by the
North Vietnamese through the Poles and the French.
On 17 February, a Polish deputy foreign minister
called in the ambassadors of several Free World coun-
tries to urge concerted pressure on the US to accept
Warsaw as a site for preliminary talks.
* * *
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t.))(1
* * *
Soviets Reinforcing Hanoi's Position: Speak-
ing in Rawalpindi on 17 April, Soviet Premier Kosygin
tried to interject a note of urgency into the demand
that the US immediately enter into talks with HanOi.
Kosygin, on a state visit to Pakistan, is reported by
Tass to have stated that "a highly crucial moment"
has nowcome for the US to act. The-Soyiet Premier
also reiterated that the complete cessation of bomb-
ing and 411 acts of war against North Vietnam is
"the first necessary step" toward a political settle-
ment and the "minimum demand" to be met.
The tenor of Kosygin's comments is in line with
North Vietnam's own propaganda. Soviet media since
3 April have done their best to put pressure on the
US to move to the negotiating table as rapidly as
possible. At the same time, the Soviets continue to
state their fullest possible support for all of
Hanoi's moves.
Notes from Hanoi:
impres-
sions of the situation in Hanoi:
--The feeling in the diplomatic corps is that
Hanoi's rapid response to President Johnson's 31
March offer was because North Vietnamese leaders had
been about to spring their own peace initiative.
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had heard nothing--not
even rumors--that the Chinese had approached North
Vietnam on the issue of contacts with the US.
--Hanoi's complaints about continued US bomb-
ing at and below the 20th parallel were "routine"
and not taken particularly seriously by Hanoi under
present circumstances.
--Anti-US propaganda has continued at about
the same volume as before, but is now "back page"
news; prominence is now given to world press opinion
on the desirability of talks.
offer of 31 March
North Vietnamese,
tary victory.
Hanoi portrayed the US
as a "political victory" for the
rather than the result of a mili-
--Only one bombing alert has been heard in
Hanoi since 3 April. Children, especially those of
preschool age, are now more in evidence in Hanoi.
* * *
Soviet Seaborne Shipments to North Vietnam;
Plans for 1968: The Soviet Union has announced
plans to increase seaborne shipments to North Viet-
nam by 20 percent in 1968. The implied growth in
North Vietnamese imports from the Soviet Union above
the 1967 level is about 125,000 tons--less than the
increases of 137,000 in 1966 and 141,000 in 1967.
About 30 additional ship arrivals would be needed
to carry the increase in tonnage planned for 1968.
In the first quarter of 1968, imports from
the Soviet Union ran 30 percent higher than the
monthly average in 1967. All of this increase con-
sisted of petroleum and foodstuffs; these commodi-
ties probably account for most of the planned growth
for the year.
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* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Hanoi Quotes Critics: Senators Fulbright and
McCarthy get prominent mention in today's propaganda.
This morning Hanoi broadcast in English a Nhan Dan
article about the US lack of good will in TE--Fri-OTTig
a place to talk. ;The point was buttressed by quotes
from the two senators. Senator Fulbright is quoted
saying, "I see nothing at all wrong in going to "
.Phnom Penh." Senator McCarthy is reported criti-
cizing the President and calling for a new Secretary
Of State.
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