THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 21 OCTOBER 1967

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005974076
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 21, 1967

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The President's Daily Brief
21 October 1967
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DAILY BRIEF
21 OCTOBER 1967
1. Soviet Union
The Soviet public is beginning to
be exposed to some of the real issues
raised in Secretary McNamara's speech
on antiballistic missiles a month ago.
It is a contentious problem for Soviet
policy makers and the commentators are
dealing with it only by indirection
and implication. Thus far, all the
comment in the Soviet press seems to
be shaded ,toward the side of those who
would prefer negotiations to a new arms
race.
Some Soviet writers have seized
on stories Tin the foreign press which
stress that participants in an ABM arms
race would receive very little added
security in return for the enormous
cost of the system. As one commentator
put it, "the illusion of nuclear in-
vulnerability" created by full-scale
ABM deployment could reduce the re-
straint of the nuclear powers in
generating and coping with new world
crises.
An article in an important Soviet
weekly went on at length to describe
the US decision as the product of US
domestic politics--a move to head off
future campaign slogans about an "ABM
gap." The implication is that Moscow's
own ABM system may have had a role in
the US decision.
Soviet military publications,
which might be expected to reflect
views favoring full-scale ABM deploy-
ment, have remained silent.
Soviet commentators have yet to
make any mention of Secretary McNamara's
invitation for strategic arms talks.
Moscow seems still unwilling or unable
to commit itself on this.
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2. Middle East
3. Communist China
The Chinese are unaccountably
dragging their feet on negotiations for
Canadian wheat. Agreements on fall
deliveries have usually been concluded
by early summer. Peking may be just
holding out for lower prices, but un-
less the Chinese get down to business
soon it will be difficult to arrange
deliveries for the peak period of need
in the early spring.
About 2.6 million tons of Canadian
wheat were imported in the
ending last June?but none
Current deliveries, coming
1.5 million ton Australian
are to end in December,
crop year
since then,
only from a
contract,
The Chinese fall grain harvest,
the year's biggest, is expected to be
at least average this year and perhaps
a little larger. Even so, the Chinese
people will be tightening their belts
next year unless talks are soon begun
for Canadian wheat.
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4. United Kingdom
5. Iran
6. Algeria
The British pound is once again
in difficulty. It is takin7 a beating
on foreign exchange markets
Three factors seem mainly respon-
sible: the release of very disappoint-
ing trade figures for September, the
possibility of devaluation to meet
Common Market conditions for British
membership, and the continuing lethargy
of the British economy. The growing
rail and dock strikes are not helping.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Top Secret
15
21 October 1967
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,Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
21 October 1967
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
* * *
Hanoi's "Present Thinking" on Peace Talks: The
number two man in the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow
called on his US counterpart on Wednesday to pass
on what he said was Hanoi's present thinking on how
to begin work toward a political settlement of the
war. The Yugoslav stated that he had recently
learned from a high Soviet official that not long
ago Hanoi had reconfirmed to Moscow that it would ,
definitely engage in talks following an uncondi-
tional bombing halt. The US Embassy believes the
Yugoslav's talk with the high Soviet official
probably took place on 16 October.
? It strikes us that, if the Russians are trying
to tell us something this way, they are following
a curious route. The high Soviet official in
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question does not belong to the inner circle in
Moscow, nor is there any particularly good reason
why the Russians should need to use a Yugoslav go-
between.
The Russians' reticence on the question of
negotiations on Vietnam has been due to their urge
to stay exactly in step with Hanoi and we think
that, if and when Hanoi indicates to Moscow that
it is ready to talk, the Russians will relay the
signal clearly. Thus, if there is a serious pur-
pose behind the Soviet-Yugoslav conversation, it
should be followed by a more direct approach at a
higher level.
* * *
* * *
Polish and Rumanian Views: Embassy Rome
learns that Polish and Rumanian diplomats in the
Italian capital have been saying recently that a
suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam would
serve no purpose. They also say they are unable to
account for Hanoi's rigidity.
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* * *
Hanoi "Refutes" Statements of Souvanna Phouma:
North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry issued a state-
ment broadcast by Hanoi on 20 October "refuting"
alleged "lies" attributed to Laotian Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma. The statement claimed that while
preparing to meet President Johnson, Souvanna had
recently made repeated "slanders" against North
Vietnam which "reverse black and white." The North
-Vietnamese were annoyed at Souvanna's assertions
that Northern troops are fighting in Laos.
According to Hanoi, these statements cannot
defend US "crimes" such as conducting bombing raids
in-Laos and "scheming" to bring more US and "satel-
lite" troops into Laos, nor can they cover
Souvanna's "collusion" with the US. The statement
repeated Hanoi's standard line on Laos--that North
Vietnam respects the 1962 Geneva -Agreements and
demands that the US, the "Vientiane authorities,"
and other parties concerned do the same.
* * *
First Chinese Reference to Secretary Rusk's
Press Conference: A People's Daily Commentary
yesterday asserted that President Johnson and Sec-
retary Rusk had recently pressed for negotiations
on Vietnam in order to enable the US to gain what
it "could not gain on the battlefield." The
article quoted Secretary Rusk's comments at his
12 October press conference that any time Hanoi was
interested in talks he would immediately set out
for negotiations to settle the Vietnam question.
The People's Daily Commentary repeats Peking's
standard opposition toUS statements concerning
negotiations on the war. It is noteworthy in that
it contains the first specific reference the
Chinese have made to Secretary Rusk's press con-
ference; however, the article avoids any reference
to the Secretary's comments on China as a possible
danger to world peace.
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* * *
Soviet Comment on Hanoi's Engineers: A recent
article in the leading Soviet military newspaper
talks about bridge construction and traffic move-
ments in North Vietnam.
For one thing, the article claims that the
efficiency of North Vietnamese engineering troops
has improved greatly. For example, a 100 meter
pontOon bridge used to take three hours to set up;
now it takes only 26 minutes. Also, 78 vehicles
were recently moved across the Red River in three
hours as compared with only a couple of dozen a
night not so long ago.
* * *
Hanoi Power Plant: Recent photography shows
that repairs to the Hanoi Power Plant are proceed-
ing slowly and that the plant cannot be completely
restored before the end of the year.
Photography indicates that as of 18 October at
least one of the three boilers damaged by air
attacks was still unrepaired. In addition, one and
possibly two of the plant's six turbine generators
remain unrepaired.
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* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
North Vietnamese Line on Embassy Saigon:
Hanoi, in a broadcast beamed to South Vietnam, has
quoted a "recent New York Times article" to the
effect that Ambassador Bunker--"ringleader of US
authorities in Saigon"--has openly ordered his
"lackeys Thieu and Ky" to carry out obediently all
US instructions and not make any trouble for the
Americans. The broadcast went on to assert that
the article showed that the US embassy was putting
strong pressures on the South Vietnamese govern-
ment to accept all US political and military
policies and claimed that "this brazen and arro-
gant pressure" was resulting in a strongly
developed anti-US movement in all the southern
cities.
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