THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 20 APRIL 1967

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005973760
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date: 
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 20, 1967
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PDF icon DOC_0005973760.pdf103.05 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24: CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 The President's Daily Brief ( 20 April 1967 23 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 OX1 DAILY BRIEF 20 APRIL 1967 1. South Vietnam 2. South Vietnam 3. Greece Recent intelligence assessments conclude that the Viet Cong have lost momentum in the southern Mekong Delta provinces, but government forces have not been making much progress either. Despite some ambitious plans for Revolu- tionary Development, the situation in these eight southernmost provinces ap- pears to be stalemated. The government may be getting ready to arrest left-wing leader Andreas Papandreou, the ex-premier's son. 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 1 4. Sino-Soviet 5. Nigeria There may be some truth to the story that Moscow and Peking have made a deal which will make it easier for the Russians to get their military ship- ments across China to North Vietnam. Much of the heat seems to have gone out of the transit issue since last February, when Moscow was charging the Chinese with serious obstruction. It is not clear just what arrange- ment has been made A transit agreement would appear to have more psychological than mili- tary significance. Its importance has in fact been ballooned by the press. For instance, despite ganda charges, there is no that Soviet shipments have delayed. There also is no to support stories that an agreement has opened the way to greatly increased arms ship- ments. Soviet propa- evidence been seriously evidence yet In any case, it would suit the Russians and North Vietnamese if they could get it across that the Sino-Soviet problem is not so serious as to under- mine North Vietnam's defenses. The Eastern Region has come still closer to de facto secession by taking over the management and assets of all federal services in the East, such as power, transport and communications. This puts the ball in Gowon's court. When it has been there before, he has talked tough but done little. 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 50X1 6. Bolivia 7. Soviet Union 8. Soviet Union We now have good evidence that the guerrilla activity in southeast Bolivia is--as La Paz has claimed--Communist sup- ported and directed. Both the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese Communist parties of Bolivia are involved 50X1 50X1 50X1 All our usual indicators point to a major space launch--probably another test in the-Soviet manned space program-- within the next few days. It could be a third test of the new capsule, possibly with cosmonauts on board, or a further - test of a new upper-stage propulsion sys- tem for boosting a spacecraft into a much higher orbit. An unmanned flight around the moon (with return to earth) is also a possi- bility. The best opportunity for such a flight during April will come up next week. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A005100260001-2